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Abstract
Elections are at the heart of democratic societies and for this reason they should
provide the voters the assurance that their votes have been cast as intended
and that the final result is accurate, whilst at the same time, delivering voter
anonymity and secrecy of the votes. On the other hand, the voters should trust
the voting systems and be able to verify the correctness of the final tally and the
integrity of the elections. In this regard, in recent years, thanks to the improve-
ment of cryptographic techniques, different electronic voting schemes have been
implemented. However, such schemes are rather complex, and in order to pre-
serve their properties, rely on the integrity and trustworthiness of single points of
trust and failure. With the aim of achieving anonymity and public verifiability,
Mix Net protocols have been developed for use in conjunction with a trusted and
publicly accessible Web site, on to which all the produced data are posted for ver-
ification. However, implementing such distributed algorithms is not trivial and
many Mix Net constructions have been broken after they were introduced. This
thesis identifies the problems existing in Mix Net implementations and proposes
sound solutions to address them.
The work presented in this thesis increases the rigour with which Mix Net pro-
tocols are verified against their security requirements. Moreover, it bridges the
gap existing in the literature regarding the absence of formal modelling, analysis
and automated verification of Mix Net implementations, by using the process
algebra, Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP), and the model checker,
Failures-Divergence Refinement (FDR). In particular, the version of the source
code taken on 7 January 2014, which formed the basis of the analysis in this the-
sis, did not meet all of the security requirements for the election to take place in
November 2014, and solutions are proposed. In the event, the code was updated
and the version for the election did not have the flaws identified here. More-
over, a novel method is put forward for constructing and making conventional
Mix Net implementations robust, by distributing the trust among its components
and giving them the power to decide about the others’ honesty; an approach that
can be adopted for all constructions that follow the same design principle. Ad-
ditionally, different and more efficient methods for devising such protocols are
v
demonstrated. Finally, the automated analysis conducted in this thesis has been
performed under the existence of a powerful intruder, who can perform a number
of active attacks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
From their origins in ancient Greece up until the present, elections have been
the most important aspect in ensuring democracy and many different methods
of voting have been used throughout the years. Owing to the importance of con-
verting the wishes of people into political decisions, it becomes apparent that the
results of the elections must be correct, that is, the used voting systems should
provide voters with secrecy of their vote while assuring the integrity of the pro-
cess. Furthermore, they should provide the voter with the assurance that her
vote has been cast as intended and included in the tally without being modified.
Additionally, no one must be able to link the voter with her vote, thus providing
anonymity.
During the early stages of democracy, around the fifth century BC in Athens,
any citizen could participate in the voting procedure and vote only against the
person thought to be a threat to the state. Each voter wrote the name of the
person he wished to be expelled from the state on a potsherd and at the end of the
elections day all the potsherds were collected and tallied in public. The person
whose name was written the most times on the potsherds was subsequently exiled
from the state. Although this method remained active for some centuries, the
privacy of the voter was not guaranteed, in that someone could identify a voter’s
writing style and link the potsherd with her. Additionally, this method allowed
voters to be coerced by others. That is, someone could ask a voter to vote against
a particular person by putting a specific mark on the potsherd, which would then
act as evidence that they had done what was requested. However, as time passed,
people became more suspicious of the potential attacks and in South Australian
parliamentary elections in Victoria, in 1856, the first secret paper-ballot based
elections were introduced. Furthermore, this was the first time a voting booth
was used to ensure voter secrecy and a sealed ballot box was provided for de-
positing the ballot papers. Using these new techniques, the voters obtained a
better level of privacy, so the integrity of the elections now relied on whether or
1
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not the contents of the ballot boxes had been interfered with as well as on the
honesty of the officials responsible for counting the votes.
“Those who cast the votes decide nothing.
Those who count the votes decide everything.”
—Joseph Stalin
In order to solve these problems and those arising in later years, different tech-
nologies have been combined together and vast amounts of money have been
spent by governments all over the world. As a result, many different voting
systems have been proposed over the last few decades, aimed at providing all
the security requirements and trustworthiness that a voting scheme should sat-
isfy. However, this is not always possible and some of the most advanced voting
schemes have been found open to fraud and failure. The most notorious example
of such a failure occurred in the United States presidential elections, in Florida,
in 2000. There, due to difficulty of voters making the appropriate mark in the
ballot, the Democratic candidate received 16,022 votes fewer than he should have,
which erroneously resulted in the national elections being won by the Republican
candidate. However, Florida was not the only state where such problems have
occurred, for similar abuses where voters were unable to use the ballot correctly
and hence, the election was tarnished, occurred in other parts of the country. A
study conducted by researchers at M.I.T and CalTech in 2001 [flo14a], as well as
articles in newspapers [flo14b, USA14], estimated that four to six million votes
were left uncounted in the 2000 election. A similar problem was encountered in
the 2004 presidential elections in Florida, when around 60,000 postal votes went
missing [BBC14, USA14].
These problems have shown that there are immense obstacles to be overcome
before a secure and user-friendly system is developed. Nowadays, the common
trend in constructing such voting systems that can be used in real and large-
scale elections is to use cryptography to offer security properties, such as voter
anonymity, vote integrity and privacy and so forth. A properly designed scheme
should also offer much better security properties than current conventional sys-
tems, in the presence of untrustworthy election authorities. In this context, a
key principle and a “must-have” property is voter-verifiability, that is, the ability
for voters to check whether their vote has been recorded and counted as cast.
Regarding which, there are systems that offer a different and stronger notion
of verifiability, namely public (universal) verifiability, where anyone can verify
the correctness of the outcome of the elections [CRS05, AR06, ECCP07, Hea07,
CCC+08, Adi08, CCM08, SDW08, Gjø11, BBE+13]. For example, the upcoming
elections in the State of Victoria, Australia, in November 2014, will be the world’s
first large-scale political elections where a verifiable electronic voting system will
be used [BCH+12a, BCH+12b].
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1.1 Mix Nets
Recent proposals for secure electronic voting aim to provide end-to-end verifi-
ability using cryptographic techniques, and they use anonymising Mix Nets to
provide secrecy of the ballots, by anonymising which voter has cast any particu-
lar vote, whilst also providing the assurance that the votes have been decrypted
correctly. A Mix Net is a cryptographic protocol, which unlinks the correspon-
dence between its input vector of encrypted values and the permuted vector of
decrypted values given as output, thus providing anonymity to the communicat-
ing entities. Many Mix Net proposals exist in the literature and some of the
most characteristic constructions can be found at [Cha81, PIK93, SK95, Nef01,
JJR02, GJJS04, Wik04, Wik05b, WG06, Wik14]. In its general construction, a
Mix Net consists of a sequence of a small number, n, of servers, M1 . . .Mn, also
called mix servers, that collectively execute a protocol. Figure 1.1, illustrates
such a Mix Net, where c0,j represents the ciphertext resulting after encrypting
the message, mj , sent by the jth sender, under the Mix Net’s joint public key,
PK, i.e. c0,j = EPK(mj).
M1 M2 · · · Mn
J
o
in
t
D
ec
ry
p
ti
o
n
c0,1
c0,2
c0,k
c0,l−1
c0,l
c1,1
c1,2
c1,k
c1,l−1
c1,l
c2,1
c2,2
c2,k
c2,l−1
c2,l
cn−1,1
cn−1,2
cn−1,k
cn−1,l−1
cn−1,l
cn,1
cn,2
cn,k
cn,l−1
cn,l
mpi(1)
mpi(2)
mpi(k)
mpi(l−1)
mpi(l)
Figure 1.1: A general Mix Net construction: the original messages are en-
crypted under the joint public key of the Mix Net and then fed into the
Mix Net. Each mix server in turn re-encrypts and shuﬄes its input cipher-
texts and forwards them to the next mix server. Finally, the mix servers
jointly decrypt the list (cn,1, cn,2, . . . , cn,l−1, cn,l) and consequently output the list
(mpi(1),mpi(2), . . . ,mpi(l−1),mpi(l)) of plaintext messages in lexicographical order.
Owing to their importance in providing anonymity to the communicating par-
ties, Mix Nets play a critical role in building systems where security requirements,
such as privacy, should hold. In electronic voting schemes such [SK95, MH96,
Nef01, Cha04, Adi08, CCM08, BFL+12, BCH+12b], Mix Nets are used to en-
sure that no one can track and reveal a voter’s vote, thereby guaranteeing its
privacy and the anonymity of the voter. However, this is not always enough,
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for a well constructed Mix Net should attain a number of security and safety
requirements, such as robustness, correctness and public verifiability. Regarding
which, a Mix Net is called robust if it terminates and produces a proof of the
correctness of the operation in the presence of (a limited number of) faulty or
malicious mix servers. Correctness guarantees that the output is, indeed, a valid
permutation of the input encrypted values. Additionally, it is crucial for misbe-
haviour to be detectable by anyone who is interested in checking the correctness
of the execution, a property called public verifiability. It then becomes apparent
that a Mix Net does not produce any output that is of no interest.
1.2 Formal Methods
In addition to concerns regarding security protocols, there has been increasing
concern that all employed voting systems need to be formally analysed and veri-
fied against their desired properties. This is achieved using formal methods and
their rigorous definition is given at [For14], as:
“Formal methods are mathematical approaches to software and system
development which support the rigorous specification, design and veri-
fication of computer systems. The use of notations and languages with
a defined mathematical meaning enable specifications, that is state-
ments of what the proposed system should do, to be expressed with
precision and no ambiguity.”
As a first step of the verification process, a formal model of the system is required,
including a precise description of tasks to be carried out by each component in the
voting protocol. Secondly, with respect to this formal model, the properties that
the system are to be verified against should be defined. However, it is difficult
and non-trivial to ensure that the formal definitions of these properties capture
their desired meaning. Finally, it must be proved that the formal model of the
system satisfies the desired properties and for this reason model checkers that
allow automatic verification are employed.
Recently, a variety of electronic voting schemes have been modelled and formally
analysed in the literature [KR05, DKR09, KRS10, SRKK10, CcCK12, CS11,
MH13, MHS14], without considering modelling and formalising the security of
the Mix Net protocols. Process algebras, like the Communicating Sequential
Processes (CSP) [Hoa78] and pi-calculus [AF01], have been used to model and
analyse important voting properties like voter-privacy, coercion resistance, receipt
freeness and verifiability in the presence of an ideal Mix Net. In this regard, the
use of CSP and its associated model checker, Failures-Divergence Refinement
(FDR) [TGR13], have proved successful in finding previously unknown flaws in
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security protocols [Low96, RRS+01]. The concurrent nature of security proto-
cols results in a large amount of complex interactions even though they are often
simple in form. For instance, the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key (NSPK) proto-
col [NS78] can be reduced to just three lines, but the formal analysis in [Low96]
which did not take place until some years later owing to its complexity automat-
ically identified a flaw. Such systems, that are easily expressed but difficult to
evaluate, frequently find value in the use of formal methods. Mix Nets informal
analyses have invariably focused on safety properties and consequently, important
liveness properties, such as robustness (deadlock freedom), have been completely
neglected, which is a regrettable omission.
To address this gap in the literature, this thesis provides modelling, formal anal-
ysis and automated verification of the safety and liveness properties of different
Mix Net implementations. This work is novel in that it is the first time such mod-
elling and analysis has been conducted. The Mix Nets modelled in this thesis not
only have theoretic interest, but also practical usage; in this case for elections.
For example, the Ximix Mix Net that is described and modelled in Chapter 8,
will be used in the aforementioned upcoming real large-scale elections in Victoria
State, Australia, in November 2014. It is crucial to analyse Mix Nets’ security
properties before using them, as many constructions in the extant research have
been broken after they were introduced.
Moreover, due to the extensive research in the literature [Low95, Ros95, Low96,
Mea96, Ros98], the NSPK protocol has become a classic one for these proposed
methods of analysis. Thus, the approach of modelling and analysis provided for
this protocol, will be the foundation for doing so with the models of Mix Nets
in this work. Additionally, the formalisation of safety and robustness properties
will be based on the work presented in [Low96], where Lowe used abstract CSP
processes to show the correctness of the NSPK protocol. That is, he verified in
FDR that upon successful completion (termination), the participants are reas-
sured that they are talking to each other and that the secret messages that they
have created remain confidential to them.
1.3 Contributions
It has been seen that Mix Nets are used to provide anonymity by passing en-
crypted messages through a collection of mix servers (peers), each of which re-
encrypts and permutes messages. They are used in secure electronic voting pro-
tocols, because they provide a combination of anonymity and verifiability. The
use of several peers also ensures robustness, since a Mix Net can run even in the
presence of a minority of dishonest or incorrectly behaving ones. However, in
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practice, the protocols for peers to decide when to exclude one of their number
are complex distributed algorithms, and it is non-trivial to gain confidence that
the Mix Net will be robust and live in the presence of faulty or malicious peers
that do not follow the protocol faithfully. This is the main problem that this
thesis solves by modelling, analysing such complex distributed algorithms used
by Mix Nets and proposing sound solutions.
In this regard, in this thesis, the distributed algorithms are modelled and for-
mally analysed using the CSP process algebra and the FDR model checker, thus
showing the concurrent interactions between different components used by differ-
ent Mix Net implementations. This is enhanced by the modelling and analysis
of different Mix Net protocols in the presence of a realistic intruder, based on
Roscoe and Goldsmith’s perfect Spy [RG97, Ros98], who can overhear, intercept,
fake or modify messages on the communication channels. It is shown that in this
hostile environment, the current implementations of the analysed protocols do
not satisfy the robustness and safety requirements and methods for making them
robust are put forward. Furthermore, it is demonstrated and verified in FDR
that the proposed solutions are sound and provide the desired requirements. In
addition, the experimental results show that, with the proposed approach in mod-
elling as well as the methods and modifications, the resulting protocols guarantee
completion and produce a correct output in the presence of a powerful intruder
who can corrupt a minority of mix servers.
Moreover, another contribution of the work presented in this thesis is that it
bridges the gap between informal and formal models of Mix Nets. While Mix Net
protocols are very difficult to test in practice, the use of formal methods in this
thesis is successful in producing precise models that remove ambiguities existing
in their implementation. Since Mix Net protocols are extremely complex and
fragile, and small and seemingly benign changes may result in security flaws, in
this work, the desired properties are checked automatically in FDR and should
a protocol fail to meet its specifications, traces, which indicate the flaws, are
generated for further analysis.
However, there are numerous different Mix Net proposals existing in the liter-
ature and each of their designs follows a different method in constructing such
schemes. Hence, it is not always clear which of the desired security requirements
are met, or how best to resolve some of the implementation questions, such as
what to do if a mix server fails. For example, a Mix Net based on the Randomised
Partial Checking (RPC) [JJR02] auditing technique, does not normally indicate
where the random challenges come from and yet this is a subtle issue in practice
and an inappropriate approach can undermine the security of the Mix Net. In
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this regard, it is believed here that standardisation of Mix Nets would address
issues such as this, thereby providing some clear direction for developers and thus
confidence for users.
Additionally, once such questions have been addressed, the advantages and ben-
efits of Mix Nets being standardised will be apparent. Having a standard for
Mix Nets would provide a reference point for future implementations and the
properties that they provide. For example, Verificatum [Wik14], the most ad-
vanced Mix Net implementation to date, has been used in small-scale elections
in Norway [Gjø11] and Israel [RTRBN14, BFL+12]. Hence, in the case where
Verificatum would become a standard, techniques like RPC verification would
also become standardised and not leave it up to the constructor to decide. The
benefits of Mix Nets having a standard are also apparent from the subject matter
of this thesis, in particular in Chapter 8, where the approach taken to the de-
velopment of Ximix, the Mix Net under analysis, is to combine the results from
a number of different research papers, and to provide additional implementation
detail, resulting in a system which requires further formal analysis. Its correct-
ness relies entirely on the programmers and the way they interpret and implement
the proposed techniques. In the presence of a Mix Net standard, it is hoped that
these opacities could be avoided.
The contributions presented above were published in the following journal and
conference proceedings, upon which the thesis is partly based.
• [SWH13] Efstathios Stathakidis, David Moreton Williams, and James
Heather. Verifying a Mix Net in CSP. In Steve Schneider and Helen Tre-
harne, editors, Automated Verification of Critical Systems, 13th Interna-
tional Workshop, AVoCS 2013, Guildford, UK, September 11-13, 2013,
volume 66 of Electronic Communications of the European Association of
Software Science and Technology. ECEASST, 2013.
• [SSH14] Efstathios Stathakidis, Steve Schneider, and James Heather.
Robustness Modelling and Verification of a Mix Net Protocol. In Liqun
Chen and Chris Mitchell, editors, Research in Security Standardisation,
First International Conference, SSR 2014, Royal Holloway, London, UK,
December 16-17, 2014, volume 8893 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 131–150. Springer, 2014.
• [SWH14] Efstathios Stathakidis, David M. Williams, and James Heather.
Constructing and Verifying a Robust Mix Net in CSP. Software and System
Modeling, 2014. DOI: 10.1007/s10270-015-0474-0. Accepted for publication
on 02/05/2015.
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1.4 Structure of the thesis
The thesis consists of four parts and how the chapters are developed within these
is explained below.
Part I, contains constructions taken from the literature for helping the reader
to understand the concepts covered throughout the thesis. In this regard, the
cryptographic primitives used to construct Mix Net protocols are captured and
the abstract properties (deduction rules), as proposed in [Sch96], are described.
By abstracting the underlying cryptographic primitives and reasoning that a
message exchange alone is not open to attack, there can be confidence that the
security objectives will be achieved under the perfect encryption assumptions.
Later in Part I, the process algebra, CSP, and its associated model checker,
FDR, are introduced, as the chosen method for modelling Mix Net protocols. To
this end, it is demonstrated how the CSP/FDR combination can be effectively
used for finding flaws in security protocols, by modelling and analysing the NSPK
authentication protocol, which shall be the general modelling approach followed
throughout the thesis.
Having described the cryptographic building blocks in Part I, a thorough anal-
ysis of Mix Net protocols is provided in the second part of the thesis. A study
of previous work in Mix Nets, which spans over 30 years, is presented and they
are categorised based on how they operate and process messages. Additionally,
the general security requirements that they should satisfy are pointed out, but
the key interest is in the safety and liveness requirements, which are considered
through an extensive literature review showing how Mix Net proposals have pro-
gressed in relation to these requirements throughout the years. Furthermore, how
these Mix Nets are related to the core of the work presented in the Part III of
the thesis is also analysed. It has been discussed earlier that Mix Nets play an
important role in constructing real-life applications where anonymity and verifi-
ability are of major concern. Regarding which, in Part II, this is illustrated via
some specific examples: three of the most well-known electronic voting schemes
and their applicability in other domains are analysed. In sum, Part II, contains
a complete study of Mix Nets and has the aim of preparing the reader for the
next part of the thesis, where different Mix Net protocols are modelled, formally
analysed and verified against safety and liveness requirements.
Part III of the thesis contains the results from modelling and verifying different
Mix Net protocols in the extant literature. To begin with, the lack of such mod-
elling and verification in previous works on Mix Nets is highlighted and the hostile
environment in which the protocols have to run in is introduced. More specifically,
the threat model employed in this work is based on the strong Dolev-Yao intruder
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model [DY81]. However, under some modifications, the intruder is not as power-
ful as the original proposal, because a full Dolev-Yao intruder, who is in control
of the whole network, would obviously violate the robustness requirement, i.e.
instead it follows the Roscoe and Goldsmith’s perfect Spy [RG97, Ros98]. This
framework will form the basis for modelling and analysing the Mix Net protocols
in this part. The structure of the solid work regarding this part of the thesis is
as follows.
In Chapter 8, a CSP formal model is constructed and an automated verifica-
tion of the Ximix Mix Net is presented, which will be used in the real large-scale
elections in Victoria State, Australia, in November 2014. It is shown that in its
current implementation the protocol does not satisfy the robustness requirement.
To address this, a method for making it robust is proposed, and it is verified in
FDR that the proposed solution is sound, thereby providing the necessary robust-
ness. Following this, in Chapter 9, to the best of this researcher’s knowledge, the
first formal analysis and verification of a conventional Mix Net is presented. The
protocol verified is inspired by the state-of-the-art Verificatum Mix Net [Wik14]
and removes the reliance on a single component during the mixing process, by
allowing direct communication between the mix servers. On top of this, the
protocol presented in Chapter 10 substantially extends the work presented in
Chapter 9: it removes the need for a single point of trust and failure from the
decryption phase as well as providing a different and more efficient approach to
constructing a Mix Net. Furthermore, the experimental results presented in each
of the aforementioned chapters, show that all the proposed protocols guarantee
completion and produce a correct output in the presence of an active intruder
who can corrupt a minority of mix servers.
Finally, in Part IV, the contributions and findings of the thesis are reviewed,
the limitations considered and suggestions for future research directions are put
forward.
Note on the experimental results. The experimental results regarding the ver-
ification for the automated analysis of the Mix Net protocols in Chapters 8, 9
and 10, were performed using the refinement checker FDR3 beta 7 on a desktop
with an Intel(R) i7 Quad-Core CPU @ 3.6GHz with 8GiB of memory running
64-bit Ubuntu 12.04.

Part I
Background
11

Chapter 2
Cryptographic Primitives
In this chapter, the cryptographic building blocks used in constructing Mix Nets
and electronic voting systems are introduced, as presented in detail in Part II.
The aim is to give enough detail for the reader to understand the main concepts
used in the later chapters of the thesis.
Section 2.1 begins with an introduction to the discipline of cryptography. In
Sections 2.2 and 2.3, the most well-known and used secret-key and public-key
cryptosystems are presented alongside the deduction rules capturing their prop-
erties. These rules are important for understanding the core ideas behind mod-
elling a cryptographic protocol using the process algebra CSP [Hoa78], which is
used throughout this thesis, as shown in Section 3.5 and Part III. The notions
of one-way hash functions and digital signatures are explained in Sections 2.4
and 2.5, respectively.
Also in this chapter, the importance of secret sharing techniques, in which a
secret message is distributed among a number of participants, so no one has a
complete knowledge of the secret, is discussed. In Section 2.7, how public-key
cryptosystems exploit these techniques to encrypt or decrypt messages success-
fully is explored. Additionally, in Section 2.8, protocols by which a participant
proves knowledge of a secret without revealing any crucial information about the
secret itself are introduced. Zero-knowledge protocols play an important role in
constructing robust Mix Nets and trustworthy electronic voting schemes. The
basic cryptographic assumptions are given in Section 2.9. Finally, in Section 2.10
there is a chapter summary.
2.1 Cryptography
For thousands of years, secret communications between people were of major con-
cern. People always wanted to communicate with others without revealing the
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contents of the communication to a third party, thus keeping the communicating
messages confidential. This raised the need for creating techniques to ensure that
sensitive communications are kept private.
Until the 20th century, cryptography was the art of secret communication, mean-
ing the art of turning a secret message into an unreadable format that could later
be turned back into the original message. The method of converting a message
into an indecipherable version of the message is called encryption; the reverse
operation is called decryption. Usually, the message to be encrypted is called
the plaintext and the output of the encryption is called the ciphertext. How-
ever, in the late of the 20th century, due to the extensive use of computers and
the Internet, the notion of cryptography dramatically changed and it now deals
with more than secret communication. Today, cryptography is everywhere and
is part of our lives. For example, cryptography is relied on every time a secured
Web site is accessed or when money is transferred using Web banking. Fur-
thermore, cryptography is involved in many other commercial applications, such
as obtaining digital signatures, providing message authentication and designing
trustworthy electronic elections schemes. In [KL08], Katz and Lindell give an
informal definition of modern cryptography.
Definition 2.1. Cryptography is the scientific study of techniques for securing
digital information, transactions and distributed computations.
Following this informal definition, Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone [MvOV01]
give a more rigorous definition of cryptography.
Definition 2.2. Cryptography is the study of mathematical techniques related
to aspects of information security, such as confidentiality, data integrity, entity
authentication, and data origin authentication.
It should be noted here that keeping the cryptographic algorithm secret is an
additional hurdle, so the security of the cryptographic techniques should not rely
on the secrecy of the encryption scheme, but on the secrecy and the length of
the used key. In Sections 2.2 and 2.3 it will be seen that cryptographic schemes
exist, where the involved key is the same for both encryption and decryption
operations, and there are others where the keys are different but, in some way,
associated with each other. For a good introduction to modern cryptography,
the reader should look at [Sch95, MvOV01, KL08] and for the evolution of the
cryptography throughout the years at [Sin99] and [Sin00].
Specifically, cryptography is based on the assumption that only the person who
possesses the secret key can decrypt a ciphertext that has been encrypted un-
der the corresponding public key. Moreover, it is assumed that the intruder is
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computationally bounded, that is, the probability of breaking the used cryp-
tosystem is neglibile. Hence, in this thesis, the focus is on modelling Mix Net
cryptographic protocols where only the secret key holder is able to decrypt an
encrypted message. Additionally, in modelling a cryptographic protocol using the
process algebra CSP, as shall be seen in Section 3.5 and Part III, the underlying
cryptographic operations are abstracted away and treated as symbolic operations.
The abstract properties are described as deduction rules of the entailment re-
lation `, as presented in [Sch96]. The relation is described as that between a
finite set of messages (in its general term, facts), which is closed under tuple
forming, and those that can be generated, i.e. `: P(MESSAGE)× (MESSAGE).
This relation is closed under the axioms from Table 2.1 for an information sys-
tem. The following axioms demonstrate how a message m can be deduced from
a set of messages M, i.e. M ` m.
A1. If m ∈M then M ` m
A2. If M` m and M⊆M′ then M′ ` m
A3. If M ` mi for each mi ∈M′ and M′ ` m then M ` m
Table 2.1: Axioms for an information system.
When, instead of MESSAGE, a fact is used, it means that this is a CSP datatype.
Additionally, messages (or facts) can be also constructed; Table 2.2 shows all the
possible ways that a message can be constructed given knowledge of the secret
and public keys, sk and pk, respectively, as well as the encryption, signing and
hashing methods. For example, the meaning of the rule C2 is that Ssk(m) can
be inferred from knowledge of the message and the secret key.
C1. M ` m ∧M ` sk ⇒ M ` Esk(m)
C2. M ` m ∧M ` sk ⇒ M ` Ssk(m)
C3. M ` m ∧M ` pk ⇒ M ` Epk(m)
C4. M ` m ⇒ H(m)
Table 2.2: Deduction rules for constructing a cryptographic message under perfect
encryption assumptions.
For the purposes of this thesis, it is pertinent to present the remaining deduc-
tion rules for the cryptographic primitives covered in the corresponding following
sections.
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2.2 Private-key Cryptography
Private-key cryptography (also known as symmetric-key cryptography) is a mem-
ber of the cryptographic algorithms that use the same key (secret key or shared
key), sk, for both encryption and decryption operations, as illustrated in Fig-
ure 2.1.
plaintext Encryption ciphertext
secret key
Decryptionciphertext plaintext
Figure 2.1: Private-key cryptography.
In the case where two agents or more wish to establish a secure communication
between them, they need to share the key. This requires there being an agreement
on the shared key and it is resolved using public-key cryptography, as seen in
Section 2.3. With the private-key cryptosystems, when encrypting a plaintext
message m under the secret key sk :
Dsk(Esk(m)) = m
That is, anyone who possesses the secret key can encrypt the plaintext message,
m, and decrypt the produced ciphertext. The deduction rules and the derived
deduction rules for a symmetric-key cryptosystem are illustrated in Table 2.3.
SYMM1. {Esk(Esk(m))} ` m
SYMM2. {Dsk(Esk(m))} ` m
SYMM-ENC. {m, sk} ` Esk(m) A1., C1.
SYMM-DEC. {Esk(m), sk} ` m A1., C1., SYMM2./SYMM1.
Table 2.3: Deduction rules and derived deduction rules for a symmetric-key cryp-
tosystem.
Depending on how the plaintext message is handled during the encryption, private-
key cryptosystems are divided into two categories:
• block-ciphers, which operate on a fixed-size block of plaintext bits; and
2.2. Private-key Cryptography 17
• stream-ciphers, which operate bit by bit on the plaintext message.
In this subsection, two block-cipher and one stream-cipher based cryptosystems
are briefly discussed.
2.2.1 DES and Triple-DES
The Data Encryption Standard (or DES ) [DES77], is the most well-known secret-
key cryptosystem, based on the block-cipher technique. It is based on an IBM
idea and was developed in 1976 by IBM for the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST), which wanted to assist the development of a secure
cryptographic algorithm. DES encodes plaintext messages m in blocks of 64-bits
and the key is always 56-bits long. To break DES, no significant analytic attacks
are known and someone should perform brute-force attack, that is, trying all
the 256 possible keys, one-by-one, until the correct one is found. Triple-DES (or
3DES ) [CJM+], is a modification of the DES cryptosystem in which the plaintext
message m is encrypted three times using three different keys for each encryption
process and employs 168-bits long keys (3 × 56), but managing three keys is more
difficult. However, the effective security 3DES provides is 112 bits.
2.2.2 AES
The Advanced Encryption Standard (or AES ) [oST01], is another block-cipher
based secret-key cryptosystem. It was established by NIST in 2001 and it is based
on the Rijndael [DR02] encryption scheme. AES encodes fixed block sizes of 128
bits with 128, 192 or 256-bits long keys. The latest experiments [BKR11] have
shown that trying a brute-force attack on AES-256 would take 2254 operations to
recover the key.
2.2.3 RC4
RC4 is the most widely-used software stream-cipher and was designed by Rivest
[Riv92a] in 1987. One of its advantages is that it can operate for any key-size and
it is extremely simple and fast. It is used in most SSL [FKK96] implementations
as well as in Kerberos [SNS88], TLS [DR06] and WEP [IEE97]. RC4 generates a
random stream of bits and encrypts the plaintext bits by performing a bit-wise
exclusive-or (XOR) operation.
2.2.4 One-time pads
One-time pad encryption provides perfect secrecy if used correctly. It relies on
both the sender and receiver having access to the same source of random bits.
Each bit of the plaintext message is encrypted by a bit-wise exclusive-or with a
bit of the randomly generated secret key (pad). The key must be of the same or
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greater length than that of the plaintext. After encryption, the key is discarded
and never used again. One of its limitations is that encrypting massive files
requires generation of a truly random massive key. Additionally, another problem
is the key distribution; the communicating parties should find a secure way of
distributing the random key bits. Storage media or even face-to-face meetings
can be used to carry the extremely long keys. However, despite its problems,
one-time pad cryptography was used during the Second World War.
2.3 Public-key Cryptography
Public-key cryptography (also referred as asymmetric-key cryptography) was first
introduced by Diffie and Hellman in 1976 [DH76]. It is termed public-key in order
to differentiate it from the traditional and widely used symmetric-key cryptogra-
phy. Unlike symmetric-key cryptography, where the same key (secret key) is used
for both encryption and decryption, public-key cryptography requires two differ-
ent keys for these operations: the public key, pk, which is publicly known, and
the private key (or secret key), sk, which is kept secret, as is shown in Figure 2.2,
respectively.
plaintext Encryption ciphertext
public key
secret key
Decryptionciphertext plaintext
Figure 2.2: Public-key cryptography.
With the public-key cryptosystems, when encrypting a plaintext message m under
the public key pk :
Dsk(Epk(m)) = m
This means that only the agent who possesses the secret key is able to decrypt
the encrypted message. In a similar fashion to Table 2.3 in Section 2.2, the
deduction rules and the acquired deduction rules for a public-key cryptosystem
are presented in Table 2.4.
The knowledge of the public key does not compromise the safety and security
of the algorithm as well as not compromising the secret key, for it is computa-
tionally infeasible to obtain sk from pk. Public keys can be safely listed in a
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ASYMM1. {Dsk(Epk(m))} ` m
ASYMM-ENC. {m, pk} ` Epk(m) A1., C3.
ASYMM-DEC. {Epk(m), sk} ` m A1., C3., ASYMM1.
Table 2.4: Deduction rules and derived deduction rules for a public-key cryp-
tosystem.
publicly available directory with the owner’s name alongside. A generalization of
the scheme was proposed and implemented by Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir and
Leonard Adelman in 1977 [RSA78] and became the first completed as well as the
most influential cryptosystem in modern cryptography [Sin99].
In the following subsections, some of the public-key cryptosystems which are
relevant to the current work on Mix Nets (see Part II) and that on cryptographic
electronic voting schemes (see Chapter 6) are introduced.
2.3.1 RSA
RSA is the most well-known and widely used public-key cryptosystem [RSA78].
Its name comes from the initial letters of the surnames of its creators Ron Rivest,
Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman. Its security relies on the hardness of the fac-
torisation problem, whereby it is easy to compute the product of two large prime
numbers but it is infeasible to perform the reverse operation, namely to decom-
pose it into its dividers. That is, if one could find an efficient method of factorising
large numbers, then one could break RSA. Moreover, it is a deterministic encryp-
tion scheme in which the same plaintext will be always encrypted to the same
ciphertext. Nowadays, RSA is used in many commercial applications, such as
SSL [FKK96] and PGP [Zim95]. The RSA cryptosystem works as follows:
Key Generation. To generate the public and secret keys, two large prime
numbers p and q are taken and then the modulus N = pq and φ = (p− 1)(q− 1)
are computed. Next, any random value e < N is chosen, such that e and φ
have no factor in common, as shown by gcd(e, φ) = 1. Applying the extended
Euclidean algorithm, the next step is to find the unique value d < N , such
that ed = 1 mod φ. The RSA public key (or encryption key) is the pair 〈N, e〉
and the corresponding secret key (or decryption key) is the pair 〈N, d〉. As stated
earlier, if it were possible to extract the factors p and q from N, then d could be
found and the algorithm broken.
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Encryption. To encrypt a plaintext message m, first, the message needs to
be split up into a finite sequence of messages mi of size smaller than N. The
ciphertext sequence is then computed as:
ci = m
e
i mod N
Decryption. To decrypt the produced ciphertext, only someone who possesses
the secret key can compute:
cdi = ((m
e
i ) mod N)
d
= (mei )
d mod N
= medi mod N
= mkφ+1i mod N
= mi mod N
2.3.2 El Gamal
El Gamal [Gam84], is a probabilistic public-key cryptosystem in which the same
plaintext will always be encrypted into a different ciphertext. Its security relies
on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms over finite fields and it is the
most extensively used alternative to RSA [CPP06]. Similar to the factorisation
problem, it is believed that there is no efficient polynomial algorithm to solve it.
Tsiounis and Yung [TY98], proved that it is semantically secure if the decision
Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in the group Gq. El Gamal can be defined in
any cyclic group but here only subgroups Gq of order q in Zp are considered.
Additionally, it can be generalised to work in any finite cyclic group, such as a
group of points on an elliptic curve over a finite field [MvOV01].
Key Generation. Let p and q be two prime numbers, such that p = 2q + 1
and let g be a generator in Gq. The secret key is the randomly chosen value x
∈ Zp and the corresponding public key is calculated as:
y = gx mod p
The public key is the tuple 〈y, g, p〉; the secret key is x = logg y.
Encryption. To encrypt a plaintext message m ∈ Gq, a random value r ∈ Zq
is chosen, ensuring that r and p−1 are coprime. Then the following is calculated:
α = gr mod p
and
β = yrm mod p
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The ciphertext is c = Epk(m) = 〈α, β〉. When encrypting using the El Gamal
cryptosystem, the resulting ciphertext is twice as long as the plaintext message.
This is a disadvantage which becomes more severe when message size is an im-
portant factor.
Decryption. When invoked on a cipheretxt c and a secret key x, the decryption
algorithm calculates:
m =
β
αx
mod p
=
yrm
grx
mod p
=
grxm
grx
mod p
= m mod p
Furthermore, El Gamal enjoys two interesting characteristics: re-encryption and
homomorphism. Most of the recent Mix Net constructions such [SK95, JJR02,
GJJS04, Wik05b, SK94, CFSY96, BFP+01], and electronic voting schemes such
as [Cha04, CRS05, Adi08, BCH+12a], exploit these two important properties.
The correctness of the re-encryption and decryption operations can be proved
using the Chaum-Pedersen Interactive Zero-Knowledge protocol [CP92], as shown
in Section 2.8.1.
Re-encryption. Re-encryption is based on the fact that given an El Gamal
ciphertext c = 〈α, β〉 = 〈gr, yrm〉, encrypted using a random value r ∈ Zq,
someone can efficiently encrypt it again using a fresh random value r′ ∈ Zq. The
resulting new ciphertext is c′ = 〈αgr′ , βyr′〉 = 〈grgr′ , yrmyr′〉 = 〈gr+r′ , yr+r′m〉.
That is, two different cipherexts encode the same plaintext message. The re-
encryption operation does not require knowledge of the secret key, x. To decrypt
the new ciphertext c′ into the plaintext message m, only one round of decryption
is required. The secret key x is applied to the c′ and the following is calculated:
m =
βyr
′
(αgr′)x
mod p
=
yrmyr
′
(grgr′)x
mod p
=
yr+r
′
m
(gr+r′)x
mod p
=
grx+r
′xm
(gr+r′)x
mod p
=
(gr+r
′
)xm
(gr+r′)x
mod p
= m mod p
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This technique is used in El Gamal-based Mix Nets, during the anonymisation
phase, in order to cut the link (correspondence) between its inputs and outputs.
Homomorphism. Apart from the re-encryption property, El Gamal appre-
ciates the multiplicative homomorphic property. In homomorphic encryption
schemes, operations are allowed to be made on ciphertexts without revealing any
information about the secret. Without loss of generality, an encryption algo-
rithm Epk(·) is homomorphic, if for two given different encryptions Epk(m1) and
Epk(m2) of plaintext messages m1 and m2, someone can obtain Epk(m1m2) for
some operation . El Gamal is multiplicatively homomorphic in that, for two
given El Gamal encryptions (ciphertexts) Epk(m1) = 〈gr1 , yr1m1〉 and Epk(m2) =
〈gr2 , yr2m2〉 with plaintext messages m1, m2 it can be shown that:
Epk(m1) · Epk(m2) =
= 〈gr1 , yr1m1〉 · 〈gr2 , yr2m2〉
= 〈gr1 · gr2 , yr1m1 · yr2m2〉
= 〈gr1+r2 , yr1+r2m1 ·m2〉
= Epk(m1 ·m2)
Exponential El Gamal. A variant of the El Gamal cryptosystem is the expo-
nential El Gamal. For this, there is an extra parameter, k, which is a generator
of the group Gq. Similarly to the standard El Gamal scheme, to encrypt a mes-
sage m ∈ Zq, a random value r ∈ Zq is chosen and then Epk(m) = 〈gr, kmyr〉
calculated. The decryption and re-encryption processes are exactly the same as
for the standard scheme. The only difference is that the exponential El Gamal
enjoys additive homomorphism, such that for two given El Gamal exponential
encryptions Epk(m1) = 〈gr1 , km1yr1〉 and Epk(m2) = 〈gr2 , km2yr2〉 with plaintext
messages m1 and m2, one can show that Epk(m1) · Epk(m2) = Epk(m1 +m2).
2.3.3 Paillier
Paillier [Pai99], is another probabilistic public-key cryptosystem and its security
relies on the difficulty of factoring large numbers. Owing to its important tech-
nical properties, which makes it suitable to construct protocols secure against an
adaptive adversary, the Pailler cryptosystem has been used for Mix Net construc-
tions [NSK04, WG06] and in electronic-voting schemes [XSHT08, Rya08, DJN10].
Damg˚ard and Jurik [DJ01] proposed a generalisation of the Paillier scheme, in
which the expansion factor is reduced and allows for adjustment of the block
length of the scheme even after the public key has been fixed, without losing the
homomorphic property. The basic scheme works as follows:
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Key Generation. Let p and q be two prime numbers and modulus N = pq.
Let g be an integer of order of a multiple of N modulo N2. The public key is the
pair 〈N, g〉 and the secret key λ = lcm((p− 1), (q − 1)).
Encryption. To encrypt a plaintext message m ∈ ZN , a random value, r, is
chosen from ZN2 and the ciphertext c = Epk(m) = gmrN mod N2 computed.
Decryption. In order to decrypt the ciphertext and obtain the plaintext mes-
sage, the decryptor computes m = L(cλ mod N2)/L(gλ mod N2) mod N . To
see why this works, it suffices to note that the L function takes its inputs from
the set SN = {k < N2|k = 1 mod N} and computes L(k) = (k − 1)/N .
Re-encryption. Given a Paillier ciphertext c, it can be encrypted again using
a new randomness r′ ∈ Z∗N without knowledge of the secret key λ. The new
ciphertext c′ is a re-encryption of c, such that:
c′ = c× r′N
= gmrNr′N mod N2
= gm{rr′}N mod N2
Homomorphism. Similar to El Gamal, Paillier is additively homomorphic
over the plaintext space ZN in that for two given Paillier encryptions Epk(m1) =
gm1rN1 mod N
2 and Epk(m2) = g
m2rN2 mod N
2 with plaintext messages m1 and
m2, it can be shown that:
Epk(m1) · Epk(m2) =
= 〈gm1rN1 , gm2rN2 〉
= 〈gm1+m2rN1 rN2 〉
= Epk(m1 +m2)
2.4 Hash Functions
A hash function H(·), is a function that takes as input a message m of arbitrary
size and converts it into a small and fixed-length value, which is called the hash
(or digest) of the message. An ideal cryptographic hash function should satisfy
the following properties and its deduction rule is presented in Table 2.5.
• it is computationally infeasible to find two different messages m1 and m2,
such that H(m1)=H(m2) (collision-resistance property);
• it is computationally infeasible to find a message m1, such that H(m1)=m2,
for any given message m2 (one-way function);
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• it is easy and inexpensive to compute the hash H(m) for any given message
m; and
• it is infeasible to modify a message m to m′ without changing the hash
value.
The following deduction rule means that anyone in possession of the message m
can produce the hash H(m).
HASH. {m} ` H(m) A1., C4.
Table 2.5: Deduction rules for hash functions.
The notion of the one-way function was first introduced by Diffie and Hell-
man [DH76]. More precisely, a function, f, is one-way, if it is easy to evaluate
f(x), for any x in the domain of f, but it is computationally infeasible to solve
the equation y = f(x), for any suitable argument x.
Depending on the selected algorithm, the length of the output value varies from
128 to 512 bits. Thus, someone can produce a secure digest of a large document
by keeping the size of the digest down to a small size. The Secure Hash Function
(or SHA) family SHA-0 [SHA00], SHA-1, SHA-3, SHA-256, SHA-512 [NIS02] and
the MD2 [Kal92], MD4 [Riv90], MD5 [Riv92b] are among the most well-known
hash function algorithms. Hash functions play an important role in constructing
cryptographic protocols and they are highly interconnected with digital signa-
tures.
2.5 Digital Signatures
Diffie and Hellman [DH76], discovered a method with the same properties as a
written signature. Using this method, anyone can authenticate themselves and
prove their identity, but it is impossible for anyone other than the owner of the
key-pairs to generate it. Two years later, in 1978, Rivest, Shamir and Adle-
man [RSA78] implemented Diffie and Hellman’s idea, producing the first digital
signature scheme, in which the secret key (decryption key) is used to sign a plain-
text message, m, and the public key is used to verify (or extract) the signatory.
This is opposite to the public-key encryption methods, where the public key is
used to encrypt the message and the secret key to decrypt the obtained cipher-
text, as shown in Table 2.6.
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SIGN1. {Epk(Ssk(m))} ` m
SIGN-CRT. {m, sk} ` Ssk(m) A1., C2.
SIGN-VRF. {Ssk(m), pk} ` m A1., C2., SIGN1.
Table 2.6: Deduction rules and derived deduction rules for digital signatures.
A digital signature is usually used in combination with a hash function. Suppose
that an agent, A, with public key, pkA, and secret key, skA, wants to ‘sign’ a
message m in order to prove that it has been generated and originated by her.
She hashes the message, using a commonly agreed hash function H(·), and signs
H(m) by encrypting it using her own secret key, thus producing EskA(H(m)).
Anyone knowing A’s public key can verify m’s authenticity and origin in two
separate ways:
• by calculating the hash function of the message m; and
• by using A’s public key to recover the signed hash value.
If these calculations do not give the same result, then the message is not genuine.
Any change to the message will result in a different hash value and moreover, no
one can forge the hash value as it has been signed using A’s secret key.
2.6 Secret Sharing Techniques
Secret sharing is a method for distributing a secret between a number of agents in
that each participant possesses a share (or piece) of the secret, but no one knows
all of it. Only when a sufficient (threshold) number of participants collude can
they reconstruct the secret; individual shares give no information of the secret
itself. A (t, n)-threshold scheme is the most typical method of secret sharing, as
explained below.
2.6.1 Shamir’s Secret Sharing
The first secret sharing technique was invented by Shamir [Sha79] in 1979. He
showed how a (secret) message m can be divided into n shares, such that knowl-
edge of t or more shares can easily recover the message, but any of t− 1 or fewer
leak no information regarding the message. The scheme works as follows:
Without loss of generality, it is assumed that the message m is a number. To di-
vide it into n shares m1,m2, . . . ,mn, a random polynomial P (x) of degree t− 1,
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such that a0 = m, is picked and m1 = P (1),m2 = P (2), . . . ,mn = P (n) is
computed:
P (x) = a0 + a1x+ a2x
2 + · · ·+ at−1xt−1
As is explained in [Sha79], given any subset of t of these mi values the coeffi-
cients of P (x) can be found by interpolation, and then m = P (O) evaluated, but
knowledge of t− 1 of these values will not suffice to calculate m. Shamir’s (t, n)
scheme enjoys some useful properties [Sha79]:
• the size of each share does not exceed the size of the original data;
• when t is kept fixed, mi shares can be dynamically added or deleted;
• it is easy to change the mi shares without changing the original message
m; and
• a hierarchical scheme can be obtained in which the number of shares needed
to determine m depends on their importance.
However, despite its importance, Shamir’s scheme has its weaknesses:
• a trusted authority is needed to produce and distribute the shares; and
• an agent cannot verify whether each of the participants has been given a
correct share of the secret.
2.6.2 Verifiable Secret Sharing
Verifiable secret sharing (VSS) is of broader interest and solves one of Shamir’s
secret sharing drawbacks in that all participants can verify that the secret has
been distributed correctly. Even under the existence of a malicious dealer who
distributes the shares secret, a verifiable secret scheme ensures that a sufficient
number of participants can re-construct it. The idea was introduced by Chor
et al. [CGMA85] in 1985. Most of the well known VSS schemes [Ben86, Fel87,
DF89, Ped91a] are based on the Shamir’s secret sharing [Sha79]. For example,
Feldman [Fel87], presented a VSS protocol, which allows a trusted dealer to share
a secret among a number of participants under the assumption that the dealer
is not corrupted by an intruder. Based on this protocol, Pedersen [Ped91b] in-
troduced a distributed solution to this problem by running Feldman’s protocol
in parallel executions as many times as the number of the participants. A de-
scription of Pedersen’s protocol [Ped91b] is given in Subsection 2.7.2. In this
subsection, the scheme which was introduced by Desmedt and Frankel [DF89]
in 1989 is described. It relies on the discrete logarithmic problem and uses the
El Gamal [Gam84] public-key cryptosystem to prove its properties.
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Similar to Shamir’s secret sharing scheme, the trusted dealer generates the secret
key x ∈ Zp and distributes it among the participants. Let P (z) be a random
polynomial of degree t− 1, such that:
P (z) = a0 + a1z + a2z
2 + · · ·+ at−1zt−1
where, a0 = x. The dealer also computes Fi = g
Pi , for i = 1, 2, . . . t − 1 and
makes these values public. At this point, the trusted authority has distributed
the secret key among the participants. The next step is for each participant to
verify where the given share is well constructed by following the step below:
1. assuming that the j th participant has been given the share xj , he verifies
that:
gxj =
t−1∏
l=0
F j
l
j
If the share is well constructed, the above equation will hold because:
gxj = gP (j) = ga0+a1j+···+at−1j
t−1
=
t−1∏
l=0
gflj
l
=
t−1∏
l=0
F j
l
j
The secret message m can be encrypted using standard El Gamal and sent to
the participants as c = 〈gr, yrm〉. To reconstruct the secret key and decrypt the
ciphertext c, any subset of k participants should collude together to compute:
m =
yrm
t∏
i=1
grxiLi
where
t∏
i=1
grxiLi = g
r(
t∑
i=1
xiLi)
= yr
and
Li =
t∏
j=1,j 6=i
j
j − 1
2.7 Threshold Public-key Cryptosystems
In threshold public-key cryptosystems, a secret key is distributed among the
participants in such a way that each of them holds a share of the secret key.
Expressed in a different way, the secret key is not available to a single party and
only when a threshold number of participants collude together, will the encrypted
ciphertext be successfully decrypted. Compared to a secret sharing scheme, where
a central trusted authority is required to generate, split and distribute the key, a
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more secure way is to have the participants generate their shares together. Hence,
no single party is aware of the complete key. In the next subsection, efficient
threshold techniques based on the RSA, El Gamal and Paillier cryptosystems are
presented.
2.7.1 Threshold RSA
Due to the algebraic structure of the RSA cryptosystem [RSA78], obtaining
threshold properties is more challenging as it requires a product of two prime num-
bers to be computed without any of the participants knowing them. Shoup [Sho00],
presented a scheme where a trusted dealer is responsible for generating and dis-
tributing the RSA modulus as well as the secret key. Using a different approach,
Boneh and Franklin [BF97], removed the need for a trusted dealer and described
an efficient technique where k parties, k ≥ 3 can jointly generate a RSA modulus
N. At the end of the protocol, N is publicly known and, the participants are
convinced that N is indeed a product of two primes, but none of them knows
its factorisation. Additionally, each participant holds a share of the private key
exponent, d, that allows threshold decryption. Some steps of the protocol require
a third party to interact with the participants, but in the end, they learn nothing
about the intermediate steps. At a high level, the protocol for generating the
modulus N for k participants P1, P2,. . . ,Pk functions as follows:
1. P1, P2,. . . ,Pk choose large n-bit integers s1, s2, . . . , sk and they keep them
confidential;
2. using a private distributed computation, P1, P2,. . . ,Pk and the helper C,
determine that (s1 + s2 + · · ·+ sk) is not divisible by small primes. If this
step fails, the execution returns to step 1;
3. P1, P2,. . . ,Pk choose large n-bit integers r1, r2, . . . , rk, they keep them secret
and the trial division phase starts (step 2);
4. using a private distributed computation, P1, P2,. . . ,Pk and C compute:
N = (s1 + s2 + · · ·+ sk)(r1 + r2 + · · ·+ rk)
This step reveals no information about the secret values s1, s2, . . . , sk and
r1, r2, . . . , rk. The value N is publicly known;
5. P1, P2,. . . ,Pk engage in a private distributed computation to test that N
is indeed the product of two primes. If the test fails, then the proto-
col is restarted from step 1. The primality test is a mix of the Solovay-
Strassen [SS77] and the Rabin-Miller [Rab80] primality tests;
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6. P1, P2,. . . ,Pk engage in a private distributed computation to generate the
public key e and the secret key d exponents. The reader should refer
to [BF97] for more details. The intuition behind RSA threshold decryption
is similar to El Gamal threshold decryption. The idea is to share the secret
exponent, d, and then use Lagrange interpolation to reconstruct t out of k
of these.
2.7.2 Threshold El Gamal
A modification of the El Gamal cryptosystem was used by Desmedt and Frankel
[DF89] to show that a threshold number of secret key share holders can deci-
pher a ciphertext encrypted under the unique public key. A few years later,
Pedersen [Ped91b] improved their threshold cryposystem in two ways: first, he
removed the need for a trusted party for distributing the key shares and secondly,
he showed that each participant can verify that their shares have been distributed
correctly.
The generation of the public and secret keys functions as follows: suppose there
are n participants (members) S1,S2, . . . ,Sn and all agree upon the El Gamal
parameters, the public key is the tuple 〈y, g, q〉 and the corresponding secret key
is x = logg y. The generation of the individual keys and their distribution, as
described in [Ped91b], is presented here as:
1. each participant Si randomly chooses xi, computes yi = gxi and publishes
yi;
2. the joint public key is then computed as y =
n∏
i=1
yi. At the end of this
step, all participants know the public key, but they cannot find the secret
key unless all collude together to compute x =
n∑
i=1
xi mod q. The next
steps show how a share, xi, is distributed to all other participants, using a
verifiable secret sharing scheme, such that a threshold number t can recover
xi:
2.1. Si chooses a random polynomial Pi(z) ∈ Zq(z) of degree t− 1. Let
Pi(z) = a(i,0) + a(i,1)z + a(i,2)z
2 + · · ·+ a(i,t−1)zt−1
where a(i,0) = xi;
2.2. Si computes K(i,j) = gPi(j) for j = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1 and broadcasts
(K(i,j))j=1,2,...,k−1. Note that K(i,0) = yi is known beforehand;
2.3. when each participant has sent these k − 1 values, Si signs and sends
secretly s(ij) = Pi(j) to the other participants Sj , for j = 1, 2, . . . , n;
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2.4. Si verifies that the share s(ji) received from Sj is consistent with the
previously published values by verifying that:
gs(ji) =
k−1∏
l=0
Ki
l
(j,l)
If this check fails, Si broadcasts that an error has been found, publishes
the signed s(ji) and then stops;
2.5. finally, Si computes the share of the secret key, x, as the sum of all
shares received in step 2.3. as:
si =
n∑
j=0
s(ji) mod q
and signs the public key y. When all participants have signed y, a key
authentication centre verifies the signatures, and if they are correct,
it makes a certificate showing that y is the public key of the group of
participants [Ped91b].
In order to decrypt a ciphertext of a plaintext message m, without revealing
the secret key, a set of t participants can work together to compute:
m =
myr
t∏
i=1
grsiLi
where
Li =
t∏
j=1,j 6=i
j
j − 1
2.7.3 Threshold Paillier
Paillier and RSA cryptosystems use a quite similar number theory but their
decryption process is not quite the same. For simplicity, it is assumed that there
is a technique in which a number of participants can jointly generate Paillier’s
key pairs, as described in [Sho00] and [BF97]. In this subsection the focus is
on the decryption part of the threshold Paillier, as it was first introduced by
Fourque et al. in [FPS00]. The description of the original paper is followed and
any unnecessary symbols are dropped where appropriate.
Key generation. ∆ = n! is defined, where n is the total number of the partic-
ipants S1,S2, . . . ,Sn. The key generation phase consists of the following steps:
1. let N be the product of two strong prime numbers p and q, such that
p = 2p′ + 1, q = 2q′ + 1 and gcd(N,φ(N)) = 1;
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2. set k = p′q′ and let β be a random number in Z∗N ;
3. g is an integer of order of multiple of N mod N2;
4. (a, b) are randomly chosen from Z∗N × Z∗N and set g = (1 + a)N × bN
mod N2;
5. the secret key is λ = βk and is distributed among n participants using
Shamir’s secret sharing technique [Sha79], as described in Section 2.6.1:
5.1. P (x) is a random polynomial of degree t− 1, such that a0 = βk and
P (x) = a0 + a1x+ a2x
2 + · · ·+ at−1xt−1
5.2. the share si of the ith participant Si is P (i);
5.3. the public key is the tuple 〈N, g, L(gλ)〉 = 〈N, g, (aλ mod N)〉;
5.4. the verification key for the P (i) share is vi = v
∆si mod N2, where v
is a square that generates the cyclic group of squares in Z∗N2 .
Encryption. To encrypt a message m, r is randomly chosen from Z∗N and the
ciphertext c = gmrN mod N2 is computed.
Before proceeding to a rigorous analysis, an informal description of the threshold
decryption operation is given. A threshold decryption scheme is a multi-party
public-key cryptosystem that allows any sufficiently large subset of participants
to cooperate and decrypt a ciphertext, but disallows the decryption otherwise. In
such schemes, the secret key is typically split into shares using a threshold secret
sharing scheme (see Section 2.6). When a sufficiently large subset of participants
wants to decrypt the ciphertext, each of them computes a partially decrypted
value using its secret key share. Anyone who collects sufficiently many partially
decrypted values can decrypt the ciphertext.
Threshold decryption. The threshold decryption functions as follows:
1. using its own share, si, of the secret key, the Si participant computes the
partial decryption of the ciphertext, c, as ci = c
2∆si mod N2;
2. Si proves, in zero-knowledge, correct decryption, which assures that c4∆
mod N2 and v∆ mod N2 have been raised to the same power si in order
to obtain c2i and vi;
3. if any of the proofs fail, the corresponding participant is dispelled;
32 CHAPTER 2. CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES
4. t of the shares should collude together to retrieve the plaintext message m
as:
m = L(
t∏
i=1
c2µii mod N
2)× 1
4∆2aλ
mod N
where
µi = ∆Li = ∆
t∏
j=1,j 6=i
j
j − 1
Correctness of threshold decryption. The threshold decryption works pro-
vided the following equations hold:
∆λ = ∆P (0) =
t∑
i=1
∆LiP (i) =
t∑
i=1
µisi mod kN
so
c4∆
2λ =
t∏
i=1
c4∆µisi =
t∏
i
c2µii mod N
2
The ciphertext c can be decrypted to the plaintext m because:
c4∆
2λ = g4∆
2λm = (1 +N)4a∆
2λm = 1 + 4a∆2λmN
therefore
L(
t∏
i=1
c2µii mod N
2)× 1
4∆2aλ
= 4a∆2λm× 1
4a∆2λ
= m mod N.
2.8 Zero-Knowledge Proofs
An important component in constructing verifiable Mix Nets and trustworthy
electronic voting schemes is the notion of Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP), which
is an interactive (see Subsection 2.8.1) or non-interactive protocol (see Subsec-
tion 2.8.2) between a prover, P, and a verifier, V. In such protocols, the prover
interacts with the verifier and should convince the latter of having knowledge of
a secret without revealing any information about it. If the prover is honest, the
verifier should accept the proof. Otherwise, the verifier should reject the proof
with overwhelming probability. In any case, the verifier learns nothing more than
the truth of the statement that the prover knows. Zero-Knowledge Proofs were
discovered by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [GMR85] in 1985 and have been ex-
tensively used in cryptographic applications like multiparty computation, where
the communicating parties should prove that they follow a protocol without de-
viating from it. A very nice example of how to explain ZK protocols to someone
who knows nothing about them can be found at [QQQ+89].
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Zero-Knowledge Proofs must satisfy three requirements and they are presented
here as described in “Handbook of Applied Cryptography” [MvOV01]:
• Soundness. There exists an expected polynomial-time algorithm P with
the following property: if a dishonest prover can with non-negligible prob-
ability successfully execute the protocol with the honest verifier, then P
can be used to extract the prover’s knowledge, which allows for successful
subsequent protocol executions.
• Completeness. Given an honest prover and an honest verifier, the proto-
col succeeds with overwhelming probability. The definition of overwhelm-
ing depends on the application, but generally implies that the probability
of failure is not of practical significance.
• Proof of Zero-Knowledge. There exists an expected polynomial-time
algorithm, which can produce, upon input of the assertion to be proven but
without interacting with the real prover, transcripts indistinguishable from
those resulting from interaction with the real prover.
2.8.1 Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs (IZKP)
This variation of the ZKP requires the prover, P, to interact with the verifier,
V, in order to prove knowledge of a secret without disclosure of any information
about it. To minimise the probability of successful cheating, the protocol can be
executed many times, in favour of the verifier, until he/she is convinced of the
proof. Usually, it is a three-move protocol and its general structure is illustrated
below:
1. P → V: witness. The prover chooses a secret value from a pre-defined
set of values as its commitment and from this computes the associated
public witness. Thereafter, he sends the witness to the verifier; this is the
commitment to the protocol.
2. P ← V: challenge. The verifier challenges the prover by sending a challenge,
which could be the outcome of a fair coin toss.
3. P → V: response. Taking into account the secret, the witness and the
challenge, the prover calculates and sends a response to the verifier, who
checks its correctness.
In this subsection, the Fiat-Shamir identification protocol [FS86] is introduced as
well as the Chaum-Pedersen protocol [CP92], which is used to prove equality of
discrete logarithms. The work by Guillou and Quisquater [GQ88] is an extension
of the Fiat-Shamir protocol and is used to prove knowledge of modulus N without
revealing its factorisation. Shnorr’s identification algorithm [Sch91], is used to
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prove knowledge of a secret key without revealing it. Due to their efficiency, speed
and simplicity, these schemes are suitable for applications where the prover has
limited memory and computational power. Additionally, in the next subsection
how the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS86] can be used to transform an IZKP into a
non-IZKP is illustrated. Applying the Fiat-Shamir heuristic, the aforementioned
protocols can be transformed into a non-IZKP.
Fiat-Shamir Identification Protocol
The Fiat-Shamir protocol [FS86], is a combination of IZKP and identity-based
schemes [Sha84] and is used to enable a user to prove his identity to other users
without sharing any information about the used public keys. The scheme is
based on the RSA cryptosystem, where the public key, N, is the product of two
large prime numbers p and q. As is described in [FS86], the scheme assumes the
existence of a trusted centre, which issues smart cards to physically identified
users. The issuing centre proceeds as follows:
1. computes vi = H(I, j) for small values of i, where I is a string containing
all the information about the card holder and j = 1, . . . , k;
2. Let N = pq, where p and q are two large primes. Compute the correspond-
ing k smallest square roots sj of v
−1
j mod N , for j = 1, . . . , k. It should
be noted here that the credit card centre knows the factorisation of N and
therefore it can calculate these square roots efficiently. The sj , . . . , sk are
called quadratic residues modulo N . For a formal description the reader is
referred to [KL08].
3. it issues a card which contains I and all the first k sj values.
When a smart card is used in a verification device, such as a card reader, it
must prove that it knows all the kth si values, i.e. s1, . . . , sk, without, of course,
revealing them. The above notation is followed, so the smart card is the prover,
P, and the card reader the verifier, V. The IZKP executes the following steps:
1. P → V: I. The prover (smart card) sends I to the verifier (card reader).
2. V: generates vj = H(I, j) for i = j, . . . , k.
3. P → V: witness. P chooses ri and sends xi = r2i mod N to V.
4. P ← V: challenge. V chooses a vector of binary values ei1, . . . , eik and sends
these challenges to P.
5. P → V: response. P calculates yi = ri
∏
eij=1
si mod N and sends this as
response to V.
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6. V: check. V checks whether xi = y2i
∏
eij=1
vi mod N holds.
The execution is iterative and the steps 3 to 6 can be repeated a number of times
until V is satisfied with the outcome of the protocol. Its security relies on the
difficulty of calculating modular square roots of a modulus N, given the fact that
its factorisation is unknown.
Chaum-Pedersen Protocol
The Chaum-Pedersen protocol [CP92] is frequently used to prove equality of
discrete logarithms. The same notation is used here as in Subsection 2.3.2, where
the public key is the tuple 〈y, g, p〉 and the secret key is x = logg y. In this
situation, the prover, P, should prove to the verifier, V, that for a pair (m,n),
the logg y = logm n = x holds. The proof works as follows:
1. P → V: witness. P chooses r from Zq, computes the pair (a, b) = (gr,mr)
and sends it to V.
2. P ← V: challenge. V chooses a random challenge c from Zq and sends it
back to P.
3. P → V: response. P computes s = r+xc mod q and sends it as a response
to V.
4. V: check. V accepts the proof only if both gs = ayc and ms = bnc hold.
The Chaum-Pedersen protocol can be used to prove correctness of the re-encryption
and decryption operations of the El Gamal crytposystem, as presented in Sub-
section 2.3.2. Recall an El Gamal ciphertext c = 〈α, β〉 = 〈gr, yrm〉 and its
re-encryption c′ = 〈αgr′ , βyr′〉 = 〈gr+r′ , yr+r′m〉, under a new random value r′
∈ Zq. To prove that c′ is indeed a re-encryption of c, without revealing the secret
random value r′, the prover should prove to the verifier knowledge of r′, such
that logy(βy
r′/β) = logg(αg
r′/α).
2.8.2 Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs (NIZKP)
In contrast to an Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof (IZKP) protocol, where both
the prover and the verifier must be present in order to execute the protocol, a
Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof (NIZKP) protocol, allows the prover to
convince the verifier about knowledge of a secret by committing to the protocol
only a single message, given the fact that both have access to a random string, i.e.
generated by a collision-free “deterministic” hash function. This flavour of ZKP
protocols was introduced by Blum, Feldman and Micali [BFM88] in 1988 and the
security of the NIZKP relies on the properties of a one-way hash function, where
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no one, including the verifier, can forecast its random outcome. In its general
form, an NIZKP protocol works as follows:
1. P generates a witness.
2. P generates a challenge by hashing the witness and some other information.
3. P computes the response and sends the transcript of the witness, the chal-
lenge and the response to V.
Having briefly described how an NIZKP protocol works, it is now explained under
what modifications the Fiat-Shamir protocol, as it has been presented in the
previous section, can be turned into one NIZKP.
Fiat-Shamir Heuristic
The Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS86], is used to convert an IZKP into a one-message
NIZKP protocol by hashing the prover’s first message to select the verifier’s
challenge. When describing the interactive Fiat-Shamir protocol, it was seen
that the role of the verifier is passive, because the vector of random binary values
he sends as challenges has no information and this prevents the prover from
cheating. To turn this scheme into an NIZKP protocol, V’s role is replaced by a
collision-resistant hash function H(·) and then, as it is described on page 34, the
following protocol is obtained:
1. P: witness. P chooses ri at random and computes xi = r2i mod N , for
i = 1, . . . t, where t is the number of the protocol runs.
2. P: challenge. P computes the hash H(m,x1, . . . , xt) and uses the first kt
bits as the eij challenge values, where 1 ≤ i ≤ t, 1 ≤ j ≤ k and kt is
the number of bits P sends to V in order to decrease the number of the
communicated bits in step 3 of the protocol on page 34.
3. P → V: response. P computes yi = ri
∏
eij=1
si mod N , for i = 1, . . . , t and
sends I, m, eij and yi (called transcript) to V.
To verify the validity of the transcript, the verifier, V, works as follows:
1. V computes vj = H(I, j), for j = 1, . . . , k.
2. V computes zi = y2i
∏
eij=1
vi mod N , for i = 1, . . . , t.
3. V: checks. V accepts the proof only if the first kt bits of H(m, z1, . . . , zk)
equal eij .
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It should be noted here that the Fiat-Shamir heuristic relies on the existence of
one-way functions and in the case where they do not exist, then secure digital
signatures do not exist either. As a consequence, the Fiat-Shamir heuristic is not
secure because it fails to produce secure signatures. The security of an NIZKP
and therefore the Fiat-Shamir heuristic can be proved secure in the Random
Oracle Model [BR93], in which the participants have access to a (ideally) truly
random function. Indeed, the work of Pointcheval and Stern [PS96] also proved
the security of the Fiat-Shamir heuristic, when the used hash function is mod-
elled by a Random Oracle.
Controversially, Goldwasser and Kalai [GK03] and independently, Bitanksy et
al. [BDG+13], found that the digital signatures produced by the Fiat-Shamir
heuristic are not secure. In [GK03], the authors state that there exist some
three-move protocols for which the Fiat-Shamir heuristic is never secure, regard-
less of the used hash function. The intuitive idea, as presented in [GK03], is to
take any secure three-move protocol and extend its verdict function so that the
verifier also accepts views which convince him that the prover knows the verifier’s
next message. The reader is referred to [GK03, BDG+13, Bar01] for a thorough
analysis of the proposed techniques. However, the results on insecure Fiat-Shamir
protocol do not affect the work presented in this thesis as it is not an allowed
behaviour of dishonest mix servers. In that case, a dishonest party would be
caught and removed from the protocol during the checking phase. Then, instead
of producing invalid zero-knowledge proofs, the corrupt parties try to break the
protocol by performing a number of attacks, such as generating valid messages
that deviate from the protocol or refusing to participate in the execution.
2.9 Cryptographic Assumptions
In this thesis, cryptographic protocols are considered under the assumption that
the underlying cryptographic techniques are assumed to be secure. Moreover, in
all that follows, the following cryptographic assumptions are made.
Assumption 2.1. The cryptography is perfect, that is, any ciphertext can only
be created using the appropriate public key and the message. In this context, there
is never Epk1(m1) = Epk2(m2), unless m1 = m2 and pk1 = pk2.
Assumption 2.2. The cryptography is secure, that is, no one can recover a
plaintext from the ciphertext unless he/she possesses the corresponding decryption
(secret) key.
Assumption 2.3. Random numbers (also called nonces) are perfectly generated
by all participants. These numbers shall be chosen from a sufficiently large set,
they are unpredictable and they cannot be reliably reproduced by an attacker.
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Assumption 2.4. The zero-knowledge proofs produced by all mix servers are
valid: no dishonest mix server wishes to be removed from the protocol and for
this reason they provide the checkers with valid commitments to the secret per-
mutations and decryption values when challenged to do so.
2.10 Summary
This chapter has provided the essential background to the cryptographic primi-
tives employed in constructing Mix Nets and trustworthy electronic voting schemes
in Part II. Additionally, using the entailment relation from [Sch96], some of the
necessary deduction rules that are to be used in modelling a cryptographic pro-
tocol in the next chapter and Mix Nets in Part III have been captured. This is
performed using the process algebra CSP, as is introduced in the next chapter.
Chapter 3
CSP and Tools
In this chapter, the Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) process alge-
bra and its verification tools being used throughout this thesis for modelling,
analysing and verifying the cryptographic protocols in Section 3.5 and Part III
are presented. In these chapters, the systems consist of a collection of mix servers
interacting with each other by means of communication channels controlled by
an intruder. Under these circumstances, CSP is the appropriate choice for de-
scribing each individual component. Hence, the intention is to give the necessary
details of the language and for much fuller descriptions the reader is advised to
consult [Ros98, Sch99, RRS+01, Ros10].
Section 3.1 starts with explaining how CSP handles atomic events and processes
and in Section 3.2 the CSP syntax necessary for constructing models of Mix Net
protocols is covered. Traces and the other CSP semantic models are presented
in Section 3.3 along with the associated model checker Failures Divergences Re-
finement (FDR) and the ProBE animator in Section 3.4. These tools have been
important for identifying flaws in security protocols [Low96, RRS+01]. Such a
protocol is modelled and analysed in Section 3.5. Finally, the chapter is concluded
in Section 3.6.
3.1 Events and Processes
Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) is a process algebra designed for
describing processes interacting with each other. It was introduced by Tony
Hoare [Hoa78] in 1978 and developed in the early 1980s [Hoa85]. Since then it
has been extensively used for applying the theory of concurrency in practice.
The core of the CSP algebra is a process, which is described by the way it commu-
nicates with its environment and processes proceed from one state to another by
engaging in events. An event describes a particular action that can be performed
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or refused by a process. The set of all possible events is denoted by Σ and the
internal events are written as τ . In CSP, all the communication events are in-
stantaneous and they happen only when both the processes and the environment
agree on their occurrence (handshaken communication). In this thesis, Hoare’s
modelling approach is followed, which allows each process to have its own alpha-
bet. During the construction of a process in CSP, the alphabet of a process P ,
denoted αP , is the set of all visible communication events that this process may
perform. In the case where no explicit alphabet is specified for a process, then
it will be the set of all events this process can perform. In modelling a real sys-
tem in CSP, the choice of the alphabets is the most important modelling decision.
An event e may be a compound event structured as a c.m, which represents
communication of a message m over a channel c. Channels are given names and
specific types in CSP: the type of the channel is the set of values T that may
passed along it [Sch99]. If a channel has type c, then the set of events asso-
ciated with it is {c.m | m ∈ T}. For example, consider the channel comm of
type P ×P ×M, where P denotes the set of all mix servers and M denotes the
set of all possible messages a mix server can receive and send. In this scenario,
comm.{1}.{2, 3, 4, 5}.S1(M1, c) may be one such event, in which, mix server 1
broadcasts a signed mixed message.
Given a process P and an event a from Σ, the process a→ P is initially willing
to communicate ‘a’ and then behaves like P . This operation is known as prefixing
and it is the most common in CSP. For instance, the process P = a→ b→ STOP
will perform the events a and b before it terminates. STOP is the simplest CSP
process that does nothing - it simply stops the execution. SKIP is another CSP
process that terminates immediately, but in contrast to STOP , it indicates suc-
cessful termination. The process c?x→ P (x) describes a process that is initially
prepared to accept a variable x along the channel c and then behaves as P (x).
If the channel c is of type T, then the first event of this process will be c.t for
t ∈ T . In contrast, the process c!m→ P (m) outputs the value m on channel c and
then behaves like P (m). The set {| c |} denotes the set of all events of the form c.t.
What has been described so far suffices to introduce recursive processes. There
are two different ways of describing a recursion in CSP, both having the same
effect: tail and mutual recursion. In tail recursion, the idea is that the identifier
representing a process is being defined on the left hand side of an equation and
appears on the right. The equation below illustrates this behaviour:
CALL =turnPhoneOn→ chooseContact→ speak→
hangUp→ turnPhoneOff→ CALL
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Here, the events turnPhoneOn, chooseContact, speak, hangUp and turnPhoneOff
are performed continuously. In mutual recursion, instead of defining recursion by
a single equation, multiple equations can be defined, such as:
CALL 1 = turnPhoneOn→ chooseContact→ speak→ CALL 2
CALL 2 = hangUp→ turnPhoneOff→ CALL 1
A more useful and practical example of recursion is the definition of a BUFFER
process, which transfers the input sequence on the channel input to its outputs
on another channel output. The process which describes a 1-place buffer is con-
structed as:
BUFFER = input?m→ output!m→ BUFFER
3.2 Syntax
In the previous section how to construct simple processes based on basic CSP
notation was described. Here, in Table 3.1, more complicated processes and
operators that are used throughout this work are presented. Given two processes
P and Q, their alphabets αP ⊆ Σ and αQ ⊆ Σ, and a set of events X , the
following notation is used.
3.2.1 Choice Operators
The 2 operator denotes the deterministic (or external) choice. The process P 2 Q
may act either as P or Q, the choice of which is in the hands of the environ-
ment (or better, resolved by the environment). For example, for the process
(a→ P ) 2 (b→ Q), if the first chosen event is a, then the process will behave as
P after performing the event a. Similarly, if the event b is chosen, the process will
behave as Q after performing b. In its replicated form, 2
x∈X
P (x), the environment
resolves a choice between a number of finite processes P (x), for x ∈ X .
The u operator symbolises the non-deterministic (or internal) choice. The pro-
cess P u Q may act either as P or Q, but in this case the choice is internally
resolved by the system. Given the same process (a → P ) 2 (b → Q) as before,
the choice of the a → P or b → Q route is non-deterministically chosen. In its
replicated form, u
x∈X
P (x), the choice between a number of finite processes P (x),
for x ∈ X , is resolved by the system.
The <I b>I operator represents the conditional choice, which is similar to the tra-
ditional if . . . then. . . else branching. If b is any boolean variable, the process
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c?x→ P (x) Acceptance of variable x along the channel c
c!x→ P (x) Output of variable x on channel c
P 2 Q Deterministic (external) choice
2
x∈X
P (x) Replicated deterministic choice
P u Q Non deterministic (internal) choice
u
x∈X
P (x) Replicated non deterministic choice
P <I b>I Q Conditional choice
P ‖
X
Q Generalised parallel composition
P αP ‖αQ Q Alphabetised parallel composition
‖x∈X [αP ]P (x) Replicated alphabetised parallel composition
P [[a/b]] Relational renaming
P \ X Hiding
Table 3.1: CSP processes and operators.
P <I b>I Q is translated to if b then P else Q and the process b&P is an abbre-
viation for if b then P else STOP . This conditional choice is widely used for
creating tail-recursive processes.
3.2.2 Parallel Composition
In concurrent systems, complicated processes may consist of a collection of sub-
processes that run in parallel and are synchronised on common events that they
wish to agree on. In CSP, the process P ‖
X
Q synchronises the processes P and
Q on events lying on only the set of events X and not outside it. In the special
case where X = ∅, the generalised parallel operator could be used to denote the
interleaving of processes P and Q, P ‖
∅
Q = P |||Q, which means that there is
no interaction between P and Q and they run independently from each other.
Another special case is alphabetised parallel composition in which the processes
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are synchronised on events lying in the intersection of their whole alphabets. For
instance, the process P αP ‖αQ Q, executes P and Q in parallel by synchronising
them in the intersection of αP and αQ, αP ∩ αQ. Finally, ‖x∈X [αP ]P (x)
is written for the replicated alphabetised parallel composition synchronising a
number of processes on events lying in the intersection of the alphabet, αP (x),
of each process, P (x), for x ∈ X .
3.2.3 Abstraction Methods
For the analysis of the cryptographic protocols in this thesis, two abstraction
methods are employed: hiding and relational renaming. By using the former,
certain events are removed from the view of the environment, making them in-
ternal actions and subsequently invisible to an external observer. For example,
in the process P \ X , all the internal events from X are hidden from the envi-
ronment and occur as internal events. In relational renaming, the process P [[a/b]]
behaves as P with the exception that all the events b occurring in the process
are replaced by the events a. As a characteristic example, consider the process
Z = (a → P ) 2 (c → Q). The relational renaming Z[[b/a]] would result in the
process (a → P ) 2 (c → Q)[[b/a]] = (b → P ) 2 (c → Q). Apart from the
one-to-one substitution, multiple substitutions (renamings), such as one-to-many
P [[b,c/a,a]], where a maps to b and c and many-to-one P [[
b,b/a,c]], where a and c
both map to b, are allowed.
3.3 Semantic Models and Model Checking
There is a wide range of semantic models in CSP that help to describe process
behaviours. In this thesis the Traces, T , and the Failures-Divergences, FD,
models are used. For full details regarding them the reader is referred to [Ros98,
Sch99, RRS+01, Ros10].
3.3.1 Traces Model
The Traces model, T , refers to a finite sequence of all the visible events that a
process may perform. The trace of the STOP process is denoted as the empty
sequence 〈〉 and is written as traces(STOP) = {〈〉}. The concatenation of two
traces tr1 and tr2 is denoted as tr1 tˆr2. More generally, a trace may be written
as a sequence of events 〈e1, e2, . . . , en〉. For the CALL process above, the set of
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all traces is:
traces(CALL) = {〈〉,
〈turnPhoneOn〉,
〈turnPhoneOn, chooseContact〉,
〈turnPhoneOn, chooseContact, speak〉,
〈turnPhoneOn, chooseContact, speak, hangUp〉, . . . }
The processes (a → STOP) 2 (b → STOP) and (a → STOP) u (b → STOP)
have the same traces {〈〉, 〈a〉, 〈b〉}, although they exhibit different behaviours.
Some of the rules for the traces models, as presented in [Ros10], are shown in
Table 3.2.
traces(SKIP) = {〈〉, 〈X〉}
traces(a→ P ) = {〈〉} ∪ {〈a〉ˆ s | s ∈ traces(P )}
traces(P 2 Q) = traces(P ) ∪ traces(Q)
traces(P u Q) = traces(P ) ∪ traces(Q)
traces(P <I b>I Q) = traces(P ) if b true else traces(Q)
traces(P ‖ Q) = traces(P ) ∩ traces(Q)
traces(P \ X ) = {s \ X | s ∈ traces(P )}
Table 3.2: Rules for the Traces model.
3.3.2 Failures and Failures-Divergences Models
So far it has been shown that the traces model can be used to describe what
events a process may perform, but what events a process must perform has not
yet been covered. In general, given only the traces of the processes P 2 Q and
P u Q, it is not possible to distinguish between them.
CSP provides the Failures model, F , which gives information about what events
a process refuses to perform and refusals(P ) represents the set of events. In ad-
dition to this, failures is a trace/refusal pair (tr, R), where tr ∈ traces(P ) and
R is a refusal set of the process P after the trace tr. In the case where no inter-
nal events τ ’s may be performed after the execution of the trace tr, the failures
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model is called stable Failures. For the processes (a → STOP) 2 (b → STOP)
and (a→ STOP) u (b→ STOP), their failures sets are:
{(〈〉, ∅),
(〈a〉, {a, b}), (〈a〉, {a}), (〈a〉, {b}), (〈a〉, ∅),
(〈b〉, {a, b}), (〈b〉, {a}), (〈b〉, {b}), (〈b〉, ∅)}
and
{(〈〉, {a}), 〈〉, {b}), 〈〉, ∅),
(〈a〉, {a, b}), (〈a〉, {a}), (〈a〉, {b}), (〈a〉, ∅),
(〈b〉, {a, b}), (〈b〉, {a}), (〈b〉, {b}), (〈b〉, ∅)}
respectively. The differences between these two sets is derived from the initial
choices, that is, the first process is willing to perform any of the events a and b,
while the second may refuse to carry out both of them. Hence, in contrast to the
Traces model, which is unable to discern between the internal and external choice
the Failures model helps to distinguish between these processes and observe how
they differ.
When divergence is a possible behaviour of a system, the Failures (resp. the
stable Failures) model does not suffice because it ignores any divergent action.
For this reason, apart from the Traces and Failures model, CSP offers the Failures-
Divergences model, FD, which provides information about when a process reaches
a state from where it can diverge and it is mostly used for checking liveness prop-
erties, such as deadlock and livelock freedom. Divergence is the state where a
process enters into an infinite execution of internal (invisible to the environment)
events τs and refuses to perform any other visible events. A divergent trace, is
defined as a sequence of all atomic events that a process may perform before
reaching a state from where it can diverge. Furthermore, divergence is the worst
behaviour that a component of a system may go into, because other components
may wait forever to synchronise with it, leading to consumption of the system’s
resources.
3.3.3 Refinement
In this thesis, the work is grounded in the Traces and Failures-Divergences mod-
els of CSP. Refinement is used in CSP to check whether a process meets the
specifications described by another process. These processes are called IMPL
(implementation process) and SPEC (specification process), respectively, and
are written as:
SPEC v IMPL
46 CHAPTER 3. CSP AND TOOLS
to express that IMPL refines SPEC (or that SPEC is refined by IMPL).
Regarding the traces refinement, P traces-refines Q and Q vT P , if every trace of
P is also a trace of Q, i.e. traces(P ) ⊆ traces(Q). If the processes P and Q refine
each other, then they are taken as equivalent in the Trace model and P ≡T Q.
STOP is the process which refines every process and is written as P v STOP ,
for any process P. Since STOP is the strictest specification, if the refinement
STOP v P holds, then P = STOP . In a similar fashion to the traces refinement,
the notation Q vFD P asserts that P failures-divergences refines Q and states
that Q diverges only when P does. In terms of subsets for failures-divergences
semantics, the process P failures-divergences refines the process Q if and only
if failures(P ) ⊆ failures(Q) and divergences(P ) ⊆ divergences(Q). This check
is significantly slower than the traces-refinement one, being commonly used for
checking the safety properties of a system and is used in this research to ascertain
the robustness of Mix Net protocols in Part III.
3.4 FDR and ProBE
For two decades, the Failures-Divergences Refinement model checker [TGR13,
GRABR14], (FDR), has been the principal tool for verifying the properties of
models expressed in CSP. FDR analyses programs written in machine readable
CSP, called CSPM , which combines the operators of CSP with a functional pro-
gramming language. It checks whether the CSP model of the system being anal-
ysed refines some specification of the system’s desired behaviour, which is also
written in CSP, i.e. of the form SPEC v IMPL. FDR checks the assertions au-
tomatically and, as illustrated in Figure 3.1, if the assertion holds then it prints
a green circle next to the check; otherwise it prints a red one. By clicking on the
failed assertion, a debugger, with up to 100 counter examples, pops-up and the
user can then navigate through. These counterexamples are sequences of events
that demonstrate the violation of SPEC by the implementation process IMPL;
this is shown in Figure 3.2.
Despite its importance in model checking protocols written in CSP, FDR suffers
from the problems that all model checkers suffer from, such as state-space explo-
sion and difficulty in handling processes with large data types. In this regard, it
should be pointed out that the values passed on channels should belong to finite
sets. Although this does not impact on the modelling of the protocols under anal-
ysis, it does on their verification, because FDR cannot handle sets with an infinite
number of facts, i.e. it cannot handle an infinite number of states. When the
produced state-space becomes large, it is often advantageous to reduce it before
carrying out the state-space exploration and to achieve this FDR provides a num-
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Figure 3.1: FDR3 layout when checking assertions: the first and fourth do not
hold and a red circle is shown next to them; the other three have successfully
passed the check.
Figure 3.2: A trace counterexample for a failed assertion in FDR3.
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ber of compression mechanisms, including sbisim, normal, τ − loop elimination,
chase, diamond and sbdia. When using them, the produced state-space has fewer
transitions, while the CSP semantics remain the same and less time is required
for the exploration. A classic example showing the importance of compression
in reducing the state-space in systems with many parallel synchronisations, is
the dining philosophers problem, as described in [Ros98, Ros10], where a small
number, N = 20, of philosophers was used to model the system and propose
a solution to avoid a deadlock. In [RGG+95], the authors, using compression
methods, produced a model of 10N philosophers, where the required time for
model checking was proportional to that required for N , and the state-space dra-
matically smaller. For a detailed description of the compression mechanisms and
their effect on model verification, the reader is referred to [Ros10, RGG+95].
However, FDR is not the only existing model checker for CSP. The ProB [LB03]
and the Process Analysis Toolkit (PAT) [MS08] model checkers, are alternative
tools for analysis and verification of CSP processes using both refinement checks
and linear temporal logic (LTL) model checking. A user-friendly interface for
editing, simulating and debugging processes comes with both of them. ProB
toolset, was initially designed in 2003, for model checking method-B processes
and other specification languages are now supported, such as Z [ASM80]. PAT
was initially developed in 2009, for system verification under fairness assump-
tions specified in CSP. Since then, it has been expanded and can be now used as
a self-contained framework for model checking, analysis and verification of sys-
tems written in programming languages, such as C, C++ and Java. Due to their
maturity, the number of available semantics, the plethora of references as well
as the departmental experience in which this researcher is member of, CSP and
FDR, are engaged with throughout this thesis. Furthermore, the use of CSP and
its associated refinement checker FDR, has proved successful in finding previously
unknown flaws in security protocols [Low96, RRS+01].
Furthermore, having briefly described the ProB and PAT model checkers, it is
pertinent, for symmetry, to explain what might have been achieved when using
them. FDR has been designed mainly for refinement checking in terms of trace,
failures, divergences and refusals. ProB was designed as an animator and model
checker for method-B and recently it supports CSPM . Additionally, ProB com-
bines type checking, animation and model checking together. PAT is a powerful
framework for system modelling, simulation and verification and implements a
number of model checking techniques catering for different properties such as LTL
properties and refinement checking [SLS+12]. All of them allow for the analysis
of many common properties such as deadlock, livelock, determinism, and refine-
ment checking which includes trace, failure and failures-divergences refinement.
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Additionally, all provide basic model checking techniques such as breadth first
search and depth first search. Since they all use the linear temporal logic (LTL)
for model checking, the same results are expected when checking the desired
assertions. However, to cope with the problem of state space explosion during
verification, FDR, ProB and PAT have developed their own reduction techniques
and it is important to investigate the performance of the refinement checking for
each of them. To start with, the reader is referred to [SLS+12], where different
set of experiments were conducted in order to check the performance of each of
the tools. According to [SLS+12], FDR can be the best candidate when built-in
compression techniques are applicable in refinement checking. Second, PAT is a
better candidate to verify properties of models which involve shared variables.
Third, to verify LTL properties, the use of ProB for CSPM models or FDR for
some model where LTL formula can be verified by refusal checking. Finally, the
visited states in FDR and PAT are almost the same, and performance of these
two tools is similar using the same verification algorithm.
Process Behaviour Explorer (ProBE) [Ltd03] is a CSP animator that enables
a user to explore how a process behaves by following events that lead from one
state of a process to another. It allows the user to play the role of the “envi-
ronment” and explore every possible behaviour of the process in order to check
whether or not the assertion holds. ProBE was developed, as well as FDR,
by Formal Systems (Europe) Ltd (http://www.fsel.com). The latest version
of FDR, FDR3, was released by the University of Oxford and can be found at
https://www.cs.ox.ac.uk/projects/fdr/. It has a revised debugger and user
interface and it now uses multi-core parallelism to speed up its operations. Ad-
ditionally, the ProBE animator has now been embedded into FDR3 and can be
loaded directly from the command line. A screen shot of a process exploration
in ProBE/FDR3 is given in Figure 3.3.
3.5 The Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol
A security protocol is a general template for a sequence of communications be-
tween two or more entities using cryptographic techniques to achieve security-
related goals, such as secret sharing, entity authentication, key agreement, data
integrity and secure multi-party computation. The standard technique for de-
scribing a security protocol in the literature is as follows. Each step (also called
a message) in the protocol is numbered and the origin, the intended destination
and the actual sent message are specified. The contents of the messages being
communicated may consist of entities’ names, keys, secret random numbers and
timestamps. Cryptographic operations, such as encryption, digital signatures and
hash functions may be also applied to these messages, under the specified keys.
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Figure 3.3: Exploring the behaviour of a process in ProBE/FDR3.
How such a protocol message is structured, is illustrated in Figure 3.4, where A, is
the origin (sender), B the intended destination (receiver), and SskA(EpkB(NA,A))
the message being sent from A to B.
Message 1. A → B : SskA(EpkB(NA,A))
Figure 3.4: A one-message protocol, where agent A wishes to send a signed and
encrypted secret message, NA, to agent B.
In this section, the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key (NSPK) protocol [NS78] is
described and then modelled and analysed using a combination of the CSP pro-
cess algebra and the associated FDR model checker. Due to the extensive research
in the literature [Low95, Ros95, Low96, Mea96, Ros98], this protocol has become
a classic one for proposed methods of analysis. Thus, the approach of mod-
elling and analysis provided in this section, will be the foundation in modelling
and analysing Mix Nets in Part III. The NSPK protocol aims to provide mutual
authentication between the participants, after a sequence of message exchanges
between them. It also assures message secrecy in that a misbehaving participant
cannot deduce any information about the underlying plaintext message when in-
tercepting the corresponding ciphertext. The role of the protocol is to establish,
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when requested by an agent, a session key for use with another agent, a detailed
description of which is presented in the Subsection 3.5.2. However, before pro-
ceeding to this, it is pertinent to introduce the components used in the protocol
as well as the type of channels and messages employed.
3.5.1 Preliminaries
To achieve its goals, the protocol uses public-key cryptography in which each of
the participants, called agents, possesses its own key-pairs. For consistency with
the literature, the agents are named A, B and S and their key-pairs (pkA, skA),
(pkB, skB) and (pkS , skS), respectively. Moreover, the protocol uses nonces (ab-
breviation of “number used only once” [NS78]), which represents the actual secret
messages the agents A and B wish to exchange; for this reason, they are named
NA and NB. The finite set of all agents is denoted by G and the set of all possible
nonces by N . Agents communicate over comm channels of type G × G × M,
where M is the set of all possible messages being sent between them. Agent S
plays the role of a trusted server, whereby one of the agents requests the setting
up of a session key with the another agent. It will become apparent in Subsec-
tion 3.5.4, that such communications are susceptible to an active attacker, who
can intercept or fake channels.
3.5.2 Protocol Description
Having introduced the necessary information, the next step is to provide detailed
description of the protocol, which in its general form, is expressed as series of
messages that flow between the agents. There are different variations of the
protocol with three, five and seven-messages exchange, but here, the lattermost
version is the only one described. The protocol is initiated by an agent, for
convenience A, and Figure 3.5 illustrates a faithful run.
Message 1. A → S : A,B
Message 2. S → A : SskS (pkB,B)
Message 3. A → B : EpkB(NA,A)
Message 4. B → S : B,A
Message 5. S → B : SskS (pkA,A)
Message 6. B → A : EpkA(NA, NB)
Message 7. A → B : EpkB(NB)
Figure 3.5: The full Needham-Schroeder Public-Key (NSPK) protocol with seven
messages.
52 CHAPTER 3. CSP AND TOOLS
In this full version of the protocol, it can be noted that in Messages 1 and 2,
the communication between A and B is transparent, that is, the attacker can
see what messages are being sent. Additionally, it is assumed that the agents
do not necessarily know each other’s public keys and then they need to establish
a communication with the trusted server, S, in order to obtain them. Hence,
Messages 1, 2, 4 and 5 can be omitted and consequently, the protocol is shrunk
down to three steps, as shown in Figure 3.6. This shortened version has been
used for analysis in [Low95, Ros98].
Message 3. A → B : EpkB(NA,A)
Message 6. B → A : EpkA(NA, NB)
Message 7. A → B : EpkB(NB)
Figure 3.6: The NSPK protocol with three messages.
The transactions made in each of step of the complete protocol are now explained.
In this case, as mentioned earlier, A plays the role of the initiator, B is the
responder and S the trusted server.
Message 1. In the first step, A requests B’s public key from S.
Message 2. S communicates this to A and the identity of B, signed using its
own secret key. Now, A should verify the signature and that the sent identity
is indeed B’s name.
Message 3. Having issued the pkB from S, A sends to B its own identity along
with some NA, encrypted under B’s public key. Now, B should decrypt the
received message to get A’s name.
Message 4. B requests A’s public key from S.
Message 5. S communicates to B the public key and the identity of A, signed
using its own secret key. Now, B should verify the signature and that the sent
identity is indeed A’s name.
Message 6. The sixth message is constructed by B encrypting: (i) NA, which
is the correct response to A’s nonce challenge; and (ii) NB, a fresh nonce
that A is challenged to verify. This message is encrypted using the receiver’s
public key. Only A can decrypt this message; it does so, and if the received
NA is verified, then it assumes that it is from B, in response to the message
sent in step 3.
Message 7. Finally, A encrypts NB using the receiver’s public key and sends
it to B, which decrypts the message. Similarly to step 6, it verifies the received
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NB and in the case where it is the same as the one sent in step 6, it then
assumes that this is a genuine message from A.
When the protocol completes, both A and B are reassured that they are talking
to each other and that the secret messages (nonces) that they have created re-
main confidential to them.
Having described the protocol, it is now modelled in CSP and verified in FDR.
In order to achieve this, all the agents should be modelled as individual CSP
processes. That is, the well-behaved agents (also called honest agents) A, B and
S are modelled by the processes ALICE, BOB and SRVR, respectively. The
modelling of a misbehaving agent is modelled by the process EVE, as shown in
Subsection 3.5.4. The modelling and analysis of the protocol in the following
subsections is based on [Ros98].
3.5.3 Modelling Well-behaved Agents
In general, an agent can act either as the initiator of the protocol or as responder.
The following AGENT process describes the behaviour of the agent A with nonce
NA. In this process, if the agent possesses a nonce, he then chooses to act either as
initiator or responder. Otherwise, if no new nonce exists, the protocol terminates.
AGENT(A, 〈NA〉) =
if 〈NA〉 = 〈〉 then STOP else
INIT(A, NA) 2 RESP(A, NA)
Initiator. The aim of the initiator is to establish secure communication with a
target agent. For this reason, the initiator chooses an agent to communicate with
from the set of all agents, G, except itself and the trusted server, S. This is mod-
elled in the INIT process below, by the internal choice over the set G. Following
faithfully the protocol, the initiator, A, requests the digital certificate of B from
S, and encrypts the given nonce, NA, to issue a nonce challenge to the responder,
B. Having received the public key of B, A challenges him with NA, encrypted
under B’s public key. It should be mentioned here that the initiator is willing
to accept any nonce NB ∈ N , modelled as the resolution of the external choice.
Finally, the initiator answers the challenge nonce issued by B and the protocol
terminates by having A open a session (modelled by the SESSION process) with
the responder: the responder’s nonce is now used as the secret key for symmetric
encryption.
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INIT(A, NA) =
u
B∈G8{A,S}

comm.A.S.〈A,B〉 →
comm.S.A.SskS (pkB,B)→
comm.A.B.EpkB(NA,A)→
2
NB∈N
 comm.B.A.EpkA(NA, NB)→comm.A.B.EpkB(NB)→
SESSION(A,B, NB)


Responder. When acting as a responder, the agent is willing to receive any
structurally correct message. For example, if he is waiting to receive a nonce,
then the communicated message should be one, whereas if he is waiting to receive
a signed message from the server, this message should be indeed signed by it,
otherwise it will be rejected. The behaviour of the responder is modelled by
the RESP process below. It is constructed in a similar manner to that of the
initiator and upon completion, the responder opens a session with him. Similarly,
the initiator’s nonce is now used as the secret key for symmetric encryption.
RESP(B, NB) =
2
A∈G8{B,S},
NA∈N

comm.A.B.EpkB(NA,A)→
comm.B.S.〈B,A〉 →
comm.S.B.SskS (pkA,A)→
comm.B.A.EpkA(NA, NB)→
comm.A.B.EpkB(NB)→
SESSION(B,A, NB)

Authenticated Session. Upon completion of the NSPK protocol, both the
initiator and the responder are in an authenticated session and they can ex-
change secret messages. For the purposes of this section, the secret messages
are abstracted away and follow the format found in [Ros98]. Then, the value
AtoB, symbolises a message sent from A to B; in the same fashion, the value
BtoA, symbolises one sent from B to A. These messages are encrypted using
symmetric-key encryption, where the used secret key is the second nonce, here
represented as Ns. Additionally, the close event signifies the closing of the session
and the execution returns to the AGENT process.
SESSION(A,B, Ns) = comm.A.B.EpkNs (AtoB)→ SESSION(A,B, Ns)2 comm.B.A.EpkNs (BtoA)→ SESSION(A,B, Ns)
2 close→ AGENT(A, 〈Ns〉)

Trusted Server. The final step in modelling the honest agents, is to model
the trusted server, S, which is responsible for issuing and sending public-key
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certificates when asked to do so. Agents communicate directly with S, without
requiring it to be online other than when demanding the public keys.
SRVR =
2
A∈G8{B,S},
B∈G8{A,S}
 comm.A.S.〈A,B〉 →comm.S.A.SskS (pkB,B)→
SRVR

To perform a rigorous analysis of the protocol and investigate how it performs in
a hostile environment, an intruder model must be included and this is described
in the next subsection.
3.5.4 Adapting the Intruder Model
The intruder, E , who can overhear all messages being communicated between the
well-behaved agents, can intercept, block and send fake messages. Additionally,
he can choose to act as a legitimate agent using his own credentials, public key
and a fresh (new) nonce each time he communicates with other honest agents as
well as send secret messages to them. Based on all the messages he learns and
intercepts, and with the deductions he can perform on these messages, he builds
his own knowledge. However, the power of the intruder is limited by the standard
cryptographic assumptions, as presented in Section 2.9, i.e. he cannot decrypt
an encrypted message unless he possesses the corresponding secret key. How
the intruder is constructed, based on the actions he can perform, is illustrated
in Figure 3.7. For the purposes of the thesis, a comprehensive description of
the intruder is presented in Section 7.5 drawing on [Ros98], but only a concise
account is given here.
The learn channel enables the intruder to receive messages as incoming comm
events from other agents or he can intercept communications between the other
agents and the infer channel allows him to deduce new knowledge from what he
currently knows. Finally, the say channel allows for the intruder to communicate
or fake messages that may or may not be rejected by the honest agents.
As the intruder can always learn new messages and say them, the knowledge
he builds is huge. This is because this kind of modelling allows him to operate
on each single fact he possesses during the execution of the protocol. However,
this is not an efficient way of modelling him because the produced state-space es-
calates rapidly and the model checkers cannot handle it. In this context, Roscoe
and Goldsmith’s [RG97] lazy-spy provides an efficient way of keeping track of
his knowledge by avoiding unmanageable state-space explosion [Ros98]. The way
it is modelled, allows the intruder to know only the facts that he did not ini-
tially know, or that can be deduced from this initial knowledge. To this end,
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say
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Figure 3.7: A misbehaving agent in the NSPK protocol.
in [Ros98], the intruder is modelled as a parallel composition of those facts that
can be learned (learnable facts).
Having explained how the honest agents behave as well as having briefly de-
scribed the actions the intruder can perform, the next step is to compose them
together in order to build the overall system, which is explained in the following
subsection.
3.5.5 Composition of the System
To compose the system, appropriate changes in the construction of the honest
agents and the intruder should be made in order to allow them to communicate
with each other. That is, the comm, take and fake channels need to be connected
to each other. This is achieved using renamings, as shown below. It should be
also noted, that the channels take and fake are of type G × G ×M, modelling
the events of messages being intercepted and faked. The effect that the renaming
has on a well-behaved agent is illustrated in Figure 3.8.
From an honest agent’s perspective, each incoming comm is renamed in such a
way that the agent cannot distinguish between a fake and an honest comm. In
a similar fashion, each outgoing comm is renamed to take, thus making them
indistinguishable and due to the state-space explosion problem discussed earlier,
the number of agents should be kept to a minimum. To this end, the processes
ALICE and BOB model the honest agents A and B, which want to establish
an authenticated communication via the trusted server S, modelled here by the
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Figure 3.8: A well-behaved agent in the NSPK protocol.
process STEVE, in the presence of an intruder, E , who is modelled by the process
EVE. As has been the case so far, A plays the role of the initiator of the protocol
and B is the responder. The following processes model the renamed honest agents.
ALICE = INIT (A, NA)[[ comm,take.A.p,fake.p.A/comm,comm.A.p,comm.p.A p∈G8{A} ]]
BOB = RESP(B, NB)[[ comm,take.B.p,fake.p.B/comm,comm.B.p,comm.p.B p∈G8{B} ]]
STEVE = SRVR[[ comm,take.S.p,fake.p.S/comm,comm.S.p,comm.p.S p∈G8{S} ]]
The process ALL HON is defined as the parallel composition of the well-behaved
processes (agents), synchronised on the common events (events they share), in
such a way that allows the intruder to communicate with them over the comm
channel.
ALL HON = (ALICE ‖
{|comm.A.B,
comm.B.A |}
BOB ) ‖
{|comm.S.p,
comm.p.S |p∈G8{S} |}
STEVE
The intruder is modelled by the process EVE, under the necessary renamings. In
the process below, Spy, is the intruder, as modelled in [Ros98].
EVE = Spy [[ comm.p.E,comm.E,take.p.p′,fake.p.p′/learn,say,learn,say p,p′∈G,p 6=p′ ]]
Once all the participants have been modelled, the NSPK protocol can be now de-
fined as the parallel composition of the ALL HON and EVE processes, synchro-
nised on the common events, which is described by the following SYSTEMNSPK
process.
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SYSTEMNSPK = ALL HON ‖
{| comm,take,fake |}
EVE
The attack found by Lowe in [Low95, Low96] is examined in the next subsec-
tion and the system is formally analysed against its authentication and secrecy
requirements.
3.5.6 Attack and Formal Analysis of Authentication and Secrecy
After the NSPK protocol was published in 1978, it remained secure despite the
fact that different logics were employed in order to discover an attack and it was
only in 1995 that Lowe [Low95] found one that allows an intruder to impersonate
an honest agent in the protocol. One year later, in 1996, he formalised this
attack using CSP/FDR and proposed a solution to the problem [Low96]. Having
done that, he was the first who applied a CSP/FDR combination to analyse
cryptographic protocols.
Attacking the Protocol. The attack is mounted with two concurrent runs of
the protocol, which are labelled as α and β. In the run α, the honest agent, A,
tries to establish an authenticated session with intruder E , whereas in the run
β, E successfully impersonates A to set up a session with honest B. That is,
B believes that it is communicating with A and at the end of the protocol, as
responder, incorrectly believes that the latter has initialised the session. How
Lowe’s attack works in the full version of the protocol is shown in Figure 3.9,
where E(A) represents the intruder impersonating A.
Message α.1. A → S : A, E
Message α.2. S → A : SskS (pkE , E)
Message α.3. A → E : EpkE (NA,A)
Message β.1. E(A) → S : A,B
Message β.2. S → E(A) : SskS (pkB,B)
Message β.3. E(A) → B : EpkB(NA,A)
Message β.4. B → S : B,A
Message β.5. S → B : SskS (pkA,A)
Message β.6. B → E(A) : EpkA(NA, NB)
Message α.6. E → A : EpkA(NA, NB)
Message α.7. A → E : EpkE (NB)
Message β.7. E(A) → B : EpkB(NB)
Figure 3.9: Lowe’s attack on the full NSPK protocol.
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In more detail, in Messages α.1, α.2 and α.3, honest A requests from the trusted
server E ’s public certificate. Once S has sent it to A, then, in Message α.3, A
communicates its fresh nonce, NA, and its identity to E , encrypted under E ’s
public key. Consequently, E takes advantage of this situation and starts the pro-
tocol run, β, with B, by pretending to be A: he sends A’s identity and the same
nonce, NA, to B, encrypted under B’s public key. This is illustrated in Message
β.3. Later, in Messages β.4 and β.5, honest B communicates with the trusted
server S to get A’s public key.
Following receipt of pkA, in Message β.6, B responds to the intruder’s challenge
by sending NA and NB, encrypted under A’s public key, because he believes that
he is running the protocol with A. However, at this stage, the intruder cannot
decrypt the message because he does not possess A’s corresponding secret key.
Instead, he passes the whole message to A, as he is in the middle of the protocol
with A in Message α.6. At the end of the run α, the protocol requires A to
respond to the nonce challenge sent by E . Hence, in Message α.7, it decrypts
EpkA(NA, NB), retrieves NB and sends it to E , encrypted under his public key.
This is exactly what E was waiting to receive from A. Now, in Message β.7, he is
able to decrypt EpkE (NB) and respond to B’s challenge by sending NB, encrypted
under B’s public key.
Both runs of the protocol have now been successfully completed and B thinks
that he is in an authenticated session with A, but crucially, he has established a
session with the intruder. Hence, when B wishes to send a secret message to A,
encrypted using the shared nonce, NB, the intruder intercepts, decrypts it, be-
cause he possesses NB, and subsequently reads the secret message. Consequently,
the secrecy of the protocol is violated.
Fixing the Attack. A solution to the attack described above was also provided
by Lowe in [Low95], which involves the inclusion of the responder’s identity in
Message 6 of the original seven-message protocol, as is shown in Figure 3.10.
With this fix, the intruder is not able to perform the actions described above.
That is, by adding the responder’s identity in the message EpkA(NA, NB,B), the
intruder cannot replay it in Message.α.6, because A is expecting to receive one
that contains the intruder’s identity. However, after decrypting the message, it
notices that B was the original sender of the message and not E . Therefore, the
above attack is avoided.
Formal Analysis of Authentication and Secrecy. It has been shown that
honest agents A and B exchange secret messages and these are abstracted away
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Message 1. A → S : A,B
Message 2. S → A : SskS (pkB,B)
Message 3. A → B : EpkB(NA,A)
Message 4. B → S : B,A
Message 5. S → B : SskS (pkA,A)
Message 6. B → A : EpkA(NA, NB,B)
Message 7. A → B : EpkB(NB)
Figure 3.10: Lowe’s solution to the discovered attack on the NSPK protocol.
as AtoB and BtoA. However, the above attack described how the intruder can
impersonate an honest agent in order to set up an authenticated session with an-
other agent. In this case, the intruder learns the secret message and the secrecy
of the protocol is violated. In order for the protocol to ensure secrecy for any
messages, he should never learn any information about them. Putting it differ-
ently, the secrecy of the protocol is maintained only when no secret information
is leaked during the execution.
In particular, in the NSPK protocol, an extra channel called intruderKnows is
added to specify the information leakage, which is not part of the original pro-
tocol and it is only used for the purposes of the current analysis. That is, its
occurrence means that the intruder is in a state where he knows some secret
message and so is able to break the secrecy of the protocol.
Usually, safety specifications are modelled using the Traces semantic model, T ,
because it can be observed whether a certain behaviour is part of the produced
trace. That is, in order to establish whether the event intruderKnows ever occurs
in a protocol run, the following assertion is checked.
STOP vT SYSTEMNSPK \ Σ8{| intruderKnows |}
where Σ = {| comm, take, fake, intruderKnows |}.
In more detail, what is checked is whether the process STOP , which never per-
forms any event, is trace refined by the SYSTEMNSPK , when all events but
intruderKnows are hidden. When model checking in FDR, the above assertion
does not hold, which means that a trace is provided where an intruderKnows
event is performed. The following counter example confirms Lowe’s attack.
〈 comm.A.S.〈A, E〉,
comm.S.A.SskS (pkE , E),
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take.A.E .EpkE (NA,A),
fake.A.S.〈A,B〉,
take.S.A.SskS (pkB,B),
fake.A.B.EpkB(NA,A),
comm.B.S.〈B,A〉,
comm.S.B.SskS (pkA,A),
take.B.A.EpkA(NA, NB),
fake.E .A.EpkA(NA, NB),
take.A.E .EpkE (NB),
fake.A.B.EpkB(NB),
intruderKnows〉
3.6 Summary
This chapter has introduced the process algebra CSP with its notation, semantics
and the associated model checker FDR as well as the animator ProBE used in
Section 3.5. In addition, the combination of CSP/FDR used in Part III, has
also been utilised for modelling and analysing Mix Net cryptographic protocols.
Furthermore, the basic rules for the Traces model and the importance of the FDR
model checker in verifying protocols written in CSP have been highlighted. In
particular, in Section 3.5, the CSP language was combined with FDR and the
cryptographic deduction rules (abstractions) from Chapter 2, for the modelling
and analysis of the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key protocol, which forms the
foundation of this researcher’s approach to the modelling and analysis of Mix Nets
in Part III.

Conclusion to Part I
In this part of the thesis, the theoretical material that is necessary for the protocol
modelling and analysis presented in the rest of this thesis have been introduced.
Moreover, a detailed description of the cryptographic primitives and their asso-
ciated theory has been given. These primitives are essential when constructing
complex cryptographic protocols that consist of processes interacting with each
other. Additionally, the concept of modelling a cryptographic protocol for help-
ing the reader to understand the basic concepts covered throughout the thesis
and especially in Part III has been provided. To achieve this, the CSP process
algebra was introduced alongside its associated tools and their combination will
be extensively used for modelling different Mix Net protocols later on in this
thesis.
It has been seen that the use of CSP and its associated refinement checker FDR
have proved successful in finding previously unknown flaws in security protocols.
The concurrent nature of security protocols results in a large amount of complex
interactions even though they are often simple in form. For instance, it has been
illustrated that the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key protocol can be reduced to
just three lines, but Lowe’s formal analysis some years later automatically iden-
tified a flaw. Such systems that are easily expressed but difficult to evaluate
frequently find value in the use of formal methods. The attack that Lowe found
was not a consequence of the encryption being broken, but arose because the
associated message exchange leaked information after clever manipulation by an
active adversary. By abstracting away from the underlying cryptographic primi-
tives and reasoning that the message exchange alone is not open to attack, there
can be confidence that the security objectives will be achieved if the encryption
is suitably robust.
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Chapter 4
Introduction
A Mix Net is a cryptographic protocol that conceals the correspondence between
the initial vector of encrypted input values and the permuted vector of decrypted
values given as output (all duplicate inputs should be removed before the exe-
cution starts). No protocol participant should be able to learn anything about
the mapping from encrypted inputs to decrypted outputs, although all partici-
pants must be assured that the mapping is bijective. It was first introduced by
Chaum [Cha81] in 1981 for anonymous mail. Usually, a Mix Net consists of a
number of mix servers that collectively execute a protocol and the most recent
Mix Nets rely on a public-key encryption scheme, such as El Gamal [Gam84] or
Paillier [Pai99], that allows re-encryption of ciphertexts, as is depicted in Fig-
ure 4.1. To prove the correctness of the operation to the other mix servers or a
verifier, each produces and publishes to a publicly accessible site a zero-knowledge
proof of shuﬄe, which is used for public verifiability, so anyone can check it.
Mix Nets have been proposed for use in real-life applications, including anony-
mous Web browsing [SGR97], electronic cash payments [JM98], anonymising
of RFID tags [GJJS04] and untraceable mail systems [Cha81, GT96, DDM03,
Mix14]. Their main application is electronic voting [SK95, Nef01, Cha04, CRS05,
AR06, ECCP07, Hea07, CCC+08, Adi08, CCM08, SDW08, Gjø11, BFL+12,
BCH+12a, BCH+12b, BBE+13], where they are used to ensure that a voter’s vote
cannot be tracked and revealed throughout the process, thus providing voter pri-
vacy and anonymity. Although their anonymity has been exhaustively analysed
and proved, early Mix Nets were not fault-tolerant, as a dishonest mix server
could corrupt the execution in order to stop the whole process or result in an
invalid or inconsistent output. In this thesis, and specifically in Part III, the
interest is in verifying a critical liveness property of the Mix Net, namely robust-
ness: an honest majority of mix servers are guaranteed to output the decrypted
vector of plaintexts in spite of the malicious behaviour of a dishonest minority.
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Figure 4.1: Re-encryption Mix Net with joint decryption at the end of the mixing
phase: the original messages are encrypted under the joint public key of the
Mix Net, PK, i.e. c0,j = EPK(mj) and then fed into the first mix server. Each
mix server in turn re-encrypts and shuﬄes its input ciphertexts and forwards
them to the next mix server. The joint decryption phase involves a quorum
of mix servers decrypting and consequently outputting the plaintext messages in
lexicographical order. The dashed arrows show how the ciphertexts are permuted
within the mix servers.
Furthermore, an assumption often made in the Mix Net literature [PIK93, SK95,
Nef01, JJR02, GJJS04, Wik04, Wik05b, WG06] is the existence of a publicly
verifiable and trusted site, called a Web Bulletin Board (WBB). The mix servers
communicate with each other via the WBB and the Mix Net achieves universal
verifiability, for anyone has read access to it and can verify the stored informa-
tion. However, the bulletin board has proved notoriously tricky to construct in
practice. In this research, this assumption is replaced with two others that are
far easier to realise: first, that all communication is performed over authenticated
channels; and second, the honest majority assumption, under which strictly more
than half of the mix servers act according to the protocol. Moreover, on this basis,
the need for a WBB is removed and instead Mix Nets that allow direct commu-
nication between the mix servers are proposed and verified.
This chapter starts by categorising Mix Nets depending on how the mix servers
process their input messages in Section 4.1. The security and liveness require-
ments that a proper designed Mix Net should satisfy are examined in Section 4.2,
in parallel with used verification techniques. How the use of aWBB affects these
requirements and the modelling approach employed for this research are pre-
sented in Section 4.3, along with some proposed techniques for designing a secure
WBB. Finally, the structure of the remainder of this part is given in Section 4.4
and the summary of this chapter is provided in Section 4.5.
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4.1 Categorising Mix Nets
Based on the way the mix servers operate on the input ciphertexts, Mix Nets are
classified as decryption and re-encryption Mix Nets. In this section, a high-level
overview of these categories is provided. There exists another type of Mix Nets,
called hybrid [OA00, JJ01], in which the asymmetric-key cryptography is replaced
with a symmetric one. However, due to the difficulty in distributing the symmet-
ric keys among the mix servers, this type of Mix Nets is of little interest in this
thesis. The reader is referred to the following chapters of this part of the thesis,
where a rigorous study of the mentioned categories is given.
Decryption Mix Nets
In its general form, a decryption Mix Net does not have a final decryption phase,
but instead, each mix server, in turn, partially decrypts the received ciphertexts
using its own secret key, subsequently permuting and forwarding them to the
next mix server in the chain. The last mix server simply decrypts its inputs and
then outputs the shuﬄed plaintext messages in lexicographical order. How such
a Mix Net operates is portrayed in Figure 4.2. The basic idea is based on the
first Mix Net construction formulated by Chaum [Cha81] and since then, most
of the designs have been inspired by his work.
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Figure 4.2: Decryption Mix Net with three mix servers: the plaintext messages
are successively encrypted under the mix servers’ public keys and fed into the
Mix Net in reverse order. The different colours indicate which layer of the input
encryption onion each mix server decrypts. The last mix server outputs the
plaintexts in lexicographical order.
The working procedure is as follows. Inputs to the Mix Net are successively en-
crypted under the individual public keys of the participating mix servers, which
then build an onion of encryptions and post it on a WBB. As the onion travels
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through the Mix Net, each mix server, in turn, decrypts and re-orders the re-
sulting list of ciphetexts, with the last outputting them in lexicographical order.
Obviously, there are some important issues that need to be addressed. For exam-
ple, this type of Mix Nets is neither publicly verifiable nor robust in that only a
sender can check whether his/her message reached the destination and in the case
where a mix server refuses to participate, the whole execution halts. Clearly, the
last mix server can abort the operation or output messages of its preference, but
this can be avoided by having its secret key shared among the other mix servers.
A thorough analysis of this type of Mix Nets is given in Section 5.2, where it
can be seen that most of these drawbacks can be resolved using re-encryption
Mix Nets.
Re-encryption Mix Nets
As opposed to the work done by a mix server in a decryption Mix Net, the role
of which is to partially decrypt and permute its inputs, that of a mix server in
a re-encryption based Mix Net differs as it now re-encrypts and permutes its
input ciphertexts. The El Gamal and Paillier cryptosystems offer the nice re-
encryption property (see Subsections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3). Furthermore, it is possible
to generate a joint public key and the corresponding joint secret key in such a
way that the latter is shared among the mix servers, so no single party can re-
construct it. Each mix server operates on the input ciphertexts sequentially and
forwards them to the next mix server via a WBB, whilst the last publishes on
the WBB the final list of re-encrypted and shuﬄed ciphertexts. Additionally,
there exists a cryptographic technique (threshold cryptography), which allows a
set of mix servers to collude together in order to decrypt jointly the final out-
put. The first re-encryption based Mix Net was introduced by Park et al. [PIK93].
In contrast to a decryption Mix Net, where the input messages are successively
encrypted using the public keys of the individual mix servers, here, the inputs
are encrypted under the joint public key of the mix servers and then submitted
to the Mix Net. Each mix server, in turn, re-encrypts its inputs, re-orders them
using its own secret permutation and fresh randomness and then posts them onto
the WBB. Once all the mix servers have finished their mixing, the decryption
phase occurs, where the final list of ciphertexts is decrypted in some, usually
a distributed manner, to achieve robustness and then posted on the WBB for
public verification. Golle et al. [GJJS04] astutely outlines the operation of such
a Mix Net.
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4.2 Security Requirements
A Mix Net is an important component in constructing trustworthy electronic
voting schemes and for this reason an effective one must satisfy a number of
liveness and security requirements, among which the most important are privacy
and robustness. Many informal definitions of private and robust Mix Nets can
be found in the literature, but the first formal ones were given by Abe and
Imai [AI03]. According to their definition of robustness, the Mix Net is considered
as a re-encryption and decryption oracle. In the same fashion, privacy was defined
similarly to a chosen-ciphertext attack-secure (CCA) cryptosystem. Apart from
privacy and robustness, a well constructed Mix Net must be correct and publicly
(or universally) verifiable. Although public verifiability appears in the following
list of requirements, it is noted by this researcher that it is a desired property
and not a must-have one. In sum, in order for a Mix Net to be considered secure,
it must provide the following:
1. robustness: a Mix Net is robust if it terminates and produces a proof of
the correctness of the operation. Upon termination, no one is able to deter-
mine which output ciphertext corresponds to a given input message with a
probability better than guessing;
2. correctness: a Mix Net operates correctly if the output messages are indeed
a permutation of the inputs; and
3. zero-knowledge proofs (public verifiability): a Mix Net offers public verifia-
bility if any party is able to check the correctness of the execution, i.e. any
cheating attempt will be noticed.
In most cases, requirements 1 and 2 can be achieved under the assumption that at
least one of the mix servers is honest. Mix Nets based on the technique proposed
in [JJR02] and described in Section 5.7, offer a relaxed notion of privacy, where
it can be ensured as a global property of the Mix Net and not relying on the
honesty of a single mix server. Apart from this, in contrast to public verifiabil-
ity, some Mix Nets [Cha81, PIK93, Wik05b] provide only individual verifiability,
in that only the sender can check whether or not his/her message was processed
correctly by the Mix Net. It is believed here that, under some circumstances, this
suffices to convince some voters to trust the election scheme. However, in this the-
sis, the emphasis is given on modelling and analysing the robustness requirement.
Verifiability, and consequently correctness, are defined in terms of checking the
correctness of the operation, i.e. by auditing the proofs of re-encryption, shuﬄing
and decryption produced by the mix servers during the process. Two common
auditing methods exist: zero-knowledge proofs (see Sections 2.8 and 5.4) and ran-
domised partial checking (see Section 5.7 and [JJR02]). Both methods are based
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on a challenge-response protocol that checks each mix server in the Mix Net.
Compared to randomised partial checking (RPC), ZKPs are the more costly and
inefficient, but they produce a proof of correctness rather than strong evidence.
On the other hand, in RPC-based Mix Nets, no new data are generated but a
random subset of those produced during the mixing phase are revealed. Both of
these verification techniques are used for modelling Mix Nets in Part III.
What has been discussed so far, assumes the existence of an ideal functional-
ity of an authenticated and secure WBB. In the next section, it is explained
why this is a strong assumption in all the proposed Mix Nets. Moreover, the
results presented in Part III show that it can be replaced with direct commu-
nication between the mix servers, without failing to comply with the security
requirements.
4.3 Web Bulletin Board
All Mix Net constructions in the literature and verifiable electronic voting schemes,
such as Preˆt a` Voter [RP05], Scantegrity II [CCC+08], Civitas [CCM08] and
vVote [BCH+12a, BCH+12b], have been proposed under the assumption that
there exists a trusted, public and accessible to all Web Bulletin Board (WBB),
where all the produced data are posted. Moreover, it is a robust broadcast chan-
nel that anyone can read information from and only the participants (voters and
mix servers) can write on it. Heather and Lundin [HL08] identified the required
properties of an append-only WBB in the sense that no one should be able to
erase, alter or modify the posted data and that all the new data should be placed
at the end of the sequence of messages. Any attempt to go against these specifi-
cations needs to be detectable. Wikstro¨m first formalised the notion of a WBB
in [Wik04].
The assumption of the existence of a WBB that supervises the mixing process
is considered to be an additional weakness in the Mix Nets literature. Each mix
server reads what is posted on the WBB, operates on what was read and posts
back to theWBB. Most of the constructions are based on the strong assumption
that the WBB is authenticated, tamper-proof and resistant to denial-of-service
attacks. However, the possibility of constructing a practical WBB with the char-
acteristics typically assumed in the literature is questionable. In any case, as a
single point of trust and a single point of failure, if a WBB is made this runs
counter to the aim of reducing the amount of trust imparted in any individual
component. That is, under these circumstances, even if all the mix servers faith-
fully follow the protocol, but the WBB becomes unavailable, the entire process
stops and the Mix Net does not complete or produce an output.
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In verifiable voting systems, the WBB is the place where all the encrypted bal-
lots are posted along with a proof of correct construction in such a way that an
external observer cannot tell whom the voter has voted for. The ballot casting
and tallying processes are performed on the WBB. After the elections close, the
election authorities anonymise and aggregate the encrypted data using a Mix Net,
then they produce a tally of the votes posted on the WBB. This is accompanied
by proofs of correctness, so anyone can see and verify, thus achieving verifia-
bility of the system. For example, in all variants of the Preˆt a` Voter election
scheme [CRS05, RP05, RS06, XSHT08, RBH+09, XCH+10, DHvdG+13], a voter
can verify whether her vote has been recorded by simply checking whether the
obtained receipt is displayed correctly on the WBB and if not, she can raise a
complaint. Finally, the decrypted votes will be announced on the WBB in a
fashion that any interested party can verify the decryption process. In the case
where the WBB is not accessible, the verifiability and robustness properties are
lost.
Undoubtedly, aWBB vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks would violate the de-
sired requirements that Mix Nets and voting schemes should fulfil. Constructing
a secure and robust WBB then becomes one of the most challenging engineering
aspects when designing such cryptographic systems. A peered WBB protocol for
achieving robustness by distributing the trust among the peers would be a solu-
tion to this problem. Culnane and Schneider [CS14] proposed a scheme in which
when 2/3 of the peers act honestly, then correctness is ensured. Moreover, for
first time they formally verified it in Event-B [Abr10] under a Dolev-Yao [DY81]
intruder, who controls the network and a minority of the peers. Their approach
is analogous to that adopted for the current research and presented in Chap-
ters 8, 9 and 10, in that there is no reliance on a single point of trust and instead
power is given to the mix servers (resp. peers) to operate on the data and reach
an agreement on a correct output, under the existence of a modified Dolev-Yao
based intruder model. However, there are distinct differences between the in-
truder model used in [CS14] and in Section 7.5. In particular, in [CS14], an
untrusted medium is introduced and corrupt peers can prevent or delay messages
being received (asynchronous communication), whereas in Section 7.5 the com-
munication medium between the mix severs is not controlled by the intruder and
synchronous communication is employed in that any sent message will eventually
arrive its destination. Additionally, in [CS14] the adversary handles all commu-
nications and thus has access to all messages passed between the agents, whereas
in Section 7.5 the intruder can only see messages that arrive to (or send by) him.
In both cases, the adversary is able to generate new messages to introduce into
protocol executions. In particular, he can sign any message with any key that he
74 CHAPTER 4. INTRODUCTION
possesses, he can extract a message from a signature and he can add and remove
messages from a set of messages he has received during the execution. In its
general form, the problem presented in this thesis is analogous to the Lamport
et al.’s Byzantine Generals Problem [LSP82], where correctness is ensured when
more than 2/3 of the participants can be corrupt or absent themselves from the
protocol. However, as presented in Chapter 10, instead of adapting an existing
solution to a distributed consensus, which would enable the mix servers to agree
on a specific mix in each round, it is proposed that a new protocol that is spe-
cific to Mix Nets, operating in a stronger threat environment and requiring fewer
messages to be sent between the mix servers than Lamport et al.’s solution to
the Byzantine Generals Problem, is employed.
In what follows, in Chapters 9 and 10, some notion of aWBB is retained only for
publication of the final mixed data from each mix server. This is simply because
the final result of the mix needs somehow to be published, for obviously, if there
is no way at all of making something available permanently for public consump-
tion then there is no way of effectively completing the mix. However, this is a
much weaker assumption than that of its existence during mixing. The final pub-
lication problem can be solved by putting the mix data up, suitably signed, on
various news organisations’ Web sites, for example, or releasing it on BitTorrent,
but these mechanisms are not appropriate for live communication between mix
servers during the mixing process. Essentially, theWBB that is used in this work
to publish the final mix data corresponds simply to an assumption that after the
mix servers have done their work, the honest servers have a reliable way of getting
the message ‘out there’.
4.4 Structure
The rest of this part of the thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 5, exhaustive
research on the literature pertaining to Mix Nets is provided, where robustness
is of primary concern. Additionally, the Mix Nets that inspired the current re-
search in Part III are presented alongside their drawbacks and the found attacks.
Furthermore, a justification of how these selected Mix Nets are related to this
work is also given. Due to their important role in constructing trustworthy elec-
tronic voting schemes, in Chapter 6, some of the most well-known are presented
and their role is highlighted. Moreover, how Mix Nets are used in other domains
is described and finally, this part of the thesis is concluded with a summary of
findings thus far.
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4.5 Summary
In this chapter, an introduction to Mix Nets has been provided. They have been
categorised based on how mix servers operate on the input data and an overview
of the security requirements such a cryptographic protocol must satisfy has been
given. Additionally, the most common verification methods used in Part III to
model the proposals for this research have been presented. Furthermore, it has
been demonstrated how a typical Mix Net and verifiable voting system behave
under the assumption of a secure and trusted Web Bulletin Board. Finally, the
problem of having a single point of trust and whether or not other researchers’
approaches and existing solutions are similar to those employed here has been
examined.

Chapter 5
Chronological Review
In the preceding chapter, Mix Nets were defined and categorised based on how
they operate and process input messages. Additionally, the security requirements
they must satisfy were presented as well as the benefits and problems that occur
when using a WBB examined. The use of a WBB is a common assumption in
the Mix Nets literature, which spans more than 30 years and dozens of different
constructions have been proposed since their first introduction in 1981. Although
a complete picture cannot be provided given the vast amount of extant work in
this area, in this chapter, a critical review of the most important contributions
to Mix Nets development of relevance to the current research is presented. A
summary of and comparison between the different proposals described in detail
in this chapter is illustrated in Table 5.1.
This chapter is organised as follows. A study of previous works in Mix Nets
where robustness is of major concern is presented in Section 5.1 and then thor-
ough analysis of the protocols employed in this work is presented from Section 5.2
to 5.9, in chronological order. Subsequently, a justification of how and why the
presented Mix Nets relate to the current research is given in Section 5.10. Finally,
a conclusion to the chapter is provided in Section 5.11.
5.1 Previous Works on Robustness
In this section, previous works in Mix Nets where liveness is of major concern
are reviewed. Regarding which, robustness is the liveness property in relation to
successful termination in the presence of faulty mix servers. The first Mix Net
introduced by Chaum [Cha81] is not robust, because in the case where one of the
mix servers refuses to participate or is absent, the execution halts and no output
is obtained. Sako and Kilian [SK95] proposed Mix Net constructions that are not
robust either: if at least one mix server stops responding, then the entire sys-
tem stops without outputting a result. Jakobsson [Jak98] presented a practical
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Mix Net, which was believed to be robust, until Desmedt and Kurosawa [DK00]
found an attack in which one malicious mix server could prevent the Mix Net
from computing the correct result. In these approaches the mixing cannot pro-
ceed if a single mix server is unavailable. Ogata et al. [OKST97] proposed the
first robust Mix Net and similar techniques for achieving robustness were later
employed by Abe [Abe98].
The most common approach to achieving robustness is by using ZKP proto-
cols, which were introduced by Furukawa [Fur04], Furukawa and Sako [FS01]
and Neff [Nef01]. An alternative approach to that proposed in [OKST97] for
achieving robustness was presented by Jakobsson and Juels [JJ01] and Golle et
al. [GZB+02]. They proposed protocols that are more efficient than those where
each mix server proves in zero-knowledge the correctness of the mixing and de-
cryption operations. However, Abe and Imai [AI03] discovered weaknesses in
these two protocols in that their anonymity can be lost either when a sender is
corrupt and all mix servers honest or when a malicious sender collaborates with
the first mix server in the Mix Net (see Section 7.5). Deviating from the use of
ZKP for attaining robustness, Jakobsson, Juels and Rivest [JJR02] introduced
a different approach, where they relaxed the robustness requirement and each
mix server produces strong evidence of correct operation instead of proof of cor-
rectness.
Diverging from what has been described so far for making Mix Nets robust, Jakob-
sson [Jak98] introduced the notion of repetition robustness in which the mixing
phase is performed on blinded inputs twice or more. The result is then sorted
and compared by the mix servers and any cheating is found with overwhelm-
ing probability. The same technique was used in [Jak99] and [MK00]. Another
different approach for achieving robustness was presented by Abe [Abe99] and
Jakobsson and Juels [JJ99]. These Mix Nets rely on an efficient ZKP of cipher-
text and plaintext equivalence and they are useful for small batches of ciphertexts.
All the schemes that have been briefly described so far and others that are anal-
ysed in depth in the following sections, operate in the presence of a secure and
publicly available WBB. As has been mentioned in Section 4.3, this is a strong
assumption. To the best knowledge of this researcher, there is no Mix Net pro-
posal in the literature that works without such a single point of trust. In Part III,
this gap is successfully bridged by showing how to remove the WBB from the
mixing and decryption phases whilst maintaining the robustness of the analysed
Mix Nets. In addition to this, how these Mix Nets satisfy robustness against a
minority of faulty mix servers controlled by a Dolev-Yao-based intruder [DY81],
is explored.
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Staying in this context, when a cheater is identified, in most cases, the whole
execution stops and hence, manual intervention is needed to replace the corrupt
mix server(s) before the protocol can restart. However, this is unsatisfactory be-
haviour, especially in applications like electronic-voting, where the results should
be announced and made public within a predefined period of time, for any delay
could be interpreted by sceptics as an attempt to modify the final result. Hence,
mix server replacement is not a good tactic to succeed in dealing with cheating
and as shown in Part III, the position taken here is that ignoring any dishonest
behaviour, without stopping the execution, is the right solution to this problem.
5.2 Chaum’s First Decryption Mix Net
The first Mix Net was introduced by Chaum [Cha81] in 1981 using the RSA
public-key cryptosystem with random padding [BR94]. This random padding
was employed to avoid the re-encryption attack that occurs in a deterministic
cryptosystem, in which one could take an output message, encrypt it again and
check which input message is obtained. Chaum’s Mix Net was designed to de-
liver an anonymous mail system by allowing the receiver of a message, m, to reply
to the sender by keeping their address and identity untraceable throughout the
communication. Chaum also suggested the use of his Mix Net for designing a
secure electronic voting scheme [Cha88].
Chaum’s proposal is based on the public-key cryptosystem theory, where only
the owner of the secret key, sk, is able to decrypt a message encrypted using the
corresponding public key, pk, as presented in Section 2.3 and Table 2.4. Here,
a sender, S, wishes to send a message, m, to a receiver, R, at address A, using
a cascade of mix servers P1, . . . ,Pn. Each mix server holds its own pair of keys
(pki, ski), for i = 1, . . . , n, of which each pki is known to the sender prior to exe-
cution. Additionally, the receiver’s public key, pkR, and address, A, are publicly
known. When a single mix server is used, the sender prepares the message by
concatenating it with a random bit-string, r0, and sealing it with the receiver’s
public key, thus creating EpkR(m, r0). The sender then appends the receiver’s ad-
dress and encrypts it using the mix server’s public key and a new random value,
r1, thus creating Epk1(EpkR(m, r0), r1, A). This message is fed to the mix server,
which decrypts it using its own secret key, throws away the random value r1 and
outputs EpkR(m, r0), A. This message is then sent to the receiver who decrypts it
with its own secret key, removes the randomness and reads the plaintext message
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m. The whole procedure is illustrated as:
Epk1(EpkR(m, r0), r1, A)→
EpkR(m, r0)→
m
where the two ‘→’ denote the transformation of the input by the mix server and
the receiver, respectively. When more than one mix servers is used, S encrypts
successively the message with the public keys of the mix servers in reverse order,
thus constructing an “onion” (or layers) of encryptions. Similar to the above
procedure, each mix server in turn peels off the outer layer using its own secret
key, discards the random value and forwards the resulting output to the next
mix server in the chain. Finally, R decrypts the inner-most layer and reads the
plaintext message. In this case, the procedure is described as:
Epkn(Epkn−1(. . .Epk1(EpkR(m, r0), r1, A) . . . , rn−1), rn)→
Epkn−1(. . .Epk1(EpkR(m, r0), r1, A) . . . , rn−1)→
...→
Epk1(EpkR(m, r0), r1, A)→
EpkR(m, r0)→
m
What has been described so far allows S to send an anonymous message m to
R. The reverse procedure is now needed, that is, a way for R to reply to S while
keeping the identity of S secret from R. For this reason, the sender needs to
send extra information to the receiver, concatenated with the original message
as described above. This additional information is of the form Epk1(AS , r1), pkS ,
where AS is the sender’s address, r1 is a random value chosen by the sender and
pkS is the sender’s public key. Then, S sends the following return address to R
through the first mix server:
Epk1(AS , r1),EpkR(m, r0)
To process the respond message, the mix server decrypts the left part of the re-
ceived message using its own secret key, encrypts the right part using the random
r1 and sends Er1(EpkS (m, r0)) to the address AS . Only the addressee can decrypt
this message because he created both r1 and pkS . This procedure is illustrated
as:
Epk1(AS , r1),EpkR(m, r0)→
Er1(EpkS (m, r0)), AS →
m
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By using the technique described above and in the case where only one mix server
is used, anonymity is not guaranteed when this mix server is dishonest. This is
because the mix server knows the sender-receiver correspondence and so Chaum
suggested the use of more than one mix server, for in this case, anonymity is
violated only when all of them collude together. Moreover, this construction
does not provide robustness in the situation where one of the mix servers refuses
to forward its output to the next mix server or, for some reason, is not present
during the execution. When the last mix server cheats, it could output anything;
in this case, the senders are able to detect the cheating behaviour, but cannot
perform any action, because then privacy will be violated.
Apart from these drawbacks, Chaum’s Mix Net suffers from others, such as:
• the length of the encrypted messages is proportional to the number of the
mix servers used (this is solved using re-encryption techniques for Mix Nets
as presented in Section 5.3);
• all the mix servers should be present during the execution and their se-
quence cannot be changed (the assumption being made that a threshold
number of mix servers are honest resolves this issue); and
• an attacker can break the Mix Net exploiting the multiplicative homomor-
phism of RSA and trace a certain message as shall be seen in the next
subsection.
5.2.1 Breaking the Chaumian Mix Net
Eight years after the publication of Chaum’s Mix Net, Pfitzmann and Pfitz-
mann [PP89] discovered an attack which is based upon the well-known attack on
RSA and exploits its multiplicative homomorphism property. In this attack, the
aim of the attacker is to trace a particular message which was an input to the
Mix Net. To achieve this, the attacker injects another message that is related to
the message he wishes to trace and the ciphertext relationship results in a plain-
text one; after that, the attacker can detect the input-output correspondence.
For consistency, the notation of the RSA cryptosystem from Subsection 2.3.1 is
used and this procedure is described below.
Let L be the length of an encrypted message, m, b the length of the random
value r and B the length of the actual message (in bits). Then, encrypting a
message, m0, under the public key pk1 and randomness r0, the resulting cipher-
text is of the form:
c0 = Epk1(m0, r0) = (r02
B +m0)
e mod N
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The attacker wants to trace c0, so he chooses a small factor f > 2
B , computes:
c1 = c0Epk1(f)
and inputs it to the Mix Net which decrypts and interprets it as message m1 with
attached randomness r1, i.e as r12
B +m1. Decryption of this message results in
m1. Only the attacker knows how to decrypt c0Epk1(f) because he possesses the
decryption value d and hence:
cd0Epk1(f)
d = cd0f
ed = f(r02
B +m1)
Combining the last equations gives:
m1 − fm0 = fr02B − r12B
and because gcd(2B, N) = 1, the above equation leads to:
(m1 − fm0)2−B = fr0 − r1
The attacker knows both f and 2−B and also that m0 and m1 belong to the
Mix Net’s output set. If the number of inputs is small, the attacker can compute
both sides of the above equation and try to find out which pair of output messages
is the (m0,m1) pair. This type of attack is referred to in the literature as a related
input attack.
5.3 Park et al.’s First Re-encryption Mix Net
The first re-encryption Mix Net was proposed by Park, Itoh and Kurosawa [PIK93]
in 1993, where the El Gamal cryptosystem was employed instead of RSA [RSA78].
Furthermore, an election scheme based on the proposed Mix Net was introduced
in their work. In this scheme, which was an improvement on Chaum’s protocol,
no one obtains any information about all the votes in the case that some of them
are corrupted.
Their proposed Mix Net improved Chaum’s construction in that:
• the size of the encrypted messages is irrelevant to the number of the mix servers
used;
• the mix servers can change their position in the Mix Net; and
• no random padding is needed.
In this proposal, each mix server re-encrypts its own inputs and shuﬄes them
using a new random value instead of concatenating it with the plaintext message
before the execution. Two variants of their scheme were proposed:
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1. re-encryption with joint decryption at the end of the process; and
2. re-encryption with in-phase partial decryption.
Although the second variant is presented as the primary scheme in [PIK93], the
re-encryption-then-decryption approach is easier to understand and consequently
described first here. In what follows, p is a large prime number, g is a generator
of Gp and all arithmetic operations are modulo p. Additionally, each mix server
Mi, for i = 1, . . . , n, generates an El Gamal key pair:
(pki, ski) = (yi, xi) = (g
xi mod p, xi)
where xi is chosen randomly from Zp. Recall from Subsection 2.3.2 the encryption
and re-encryption properties of a message, m, using r and r′ random values from
Zq are given as:
c = Epk(m) = 〈gr, yrm〉
and
c′ = Epk(c, r′) = 〈gr+r′ , yr+r′m〉
respectively.
Variant with Joint Decryption
In this variant, inputs to the Mix Net are proceeded by each mix server in turn.
That is, each mix server receives a list of encrypted messages from the previ-
ous mix server, re-encrypts and shuﬄes them using the Mix Net’s joint public
key and a fresh randomness, subsequently forwarding its output list to the next
mix server. At the end of the mixing operation, the last mix server’s output is
decrypted jointly using El Gamal partial decryption.
The Mix Net’s joint public key is considered as:
PK =
n∏
i=1
pki =
n∏
i=1
yi =
n∏
i=1
gxi mod p = g
∑n
i=1 xi mod p = Y
A sender, Sj , for j = 1, . . . , l, inputs message mj to the Mix Net by encrypting
it using PK and a random value r0,j , which is the input to the first mix server
in the chain. The resulting ciphertext is of the form:
c0,j = EPK(mj)
The first mix server, M1, re-encrypts the received list of ciphertexts, c0,j , using
PK and a new randomness, permutes them based on a secret permutation, pi(1)j,
and finally forwards the resulting ciphertexts to the second mix server:
c1,j = EPK(c0,jpi(1)j , r
′
1,j)
84 CHAPTER 5. CHRONOLOGICAL REVIEW
In its general form, mix serverMi operates onMi−1’s output ci−1,j and outputs
ci,j , for i = 1, . . . , n, as:
ci,j = EPK(ci−1,jpi(i)j , r
′
i,j)
As mentioned earlier, the final output, cn,j , is jointly-decrypted by the mix servers
using El Gamal threshold decryption. It should be noted that the random num-
bers should be unique for each message pair, for otherwise, an attacker can trace
the relationship between inputs and outputs.
Variant with Partial Decryption
A slightly different scheme from that described above was proposed in [PIK93],
in which the decryption operation is performed in-phase with mixing and this
variant exploits Chaum’s idea, as presented in Section 5.2. In this scheme, each
mix server, in turn, partially re-encrypts, shuﬄes and decrypts the input cipher-
texts. A straightforward El Gamal decryption is executed by the last mix server
and the list of plaintext messages is obtained.
In contrast to the above description, where PK is the joint public key of the
entire Mix Net, here, a different approach is followed in which PKi is the joint
public key of a sequence of mix servers starting with Mi:
PKi =
n∏
i′=i
pki′ =
n∏
i′=i
yi′ =
n∏
i′=i
gxi′ mod p = g
∑n
i′=i xi′ mod p = Yi
As stated earlier, when a ciphertext reaches mix server Mi, it is denoted ci−1,j .
Then, Mi, using its own secret key, xi, partially decrypts the ciphertext and
transforms it into a ciphertext encrypted under PKi+1, which is the public key
of the remaining mix servers in the Mix Net. Hence, Mi outputs ci,j after per-
forming the following actions on each ciphertext input ci−1,j :
ci,j = EPKi+1(Dski(ci−1,jpi(i)j , r
′
i,j))
The last mix server’s output list contains the plaintext messages.
5.3.1 Breaking the First Re-encryption Mix Net
Both variants of the Mix Net construction presented here suffer from passive
and active attacks that break them completely, as showed by Pfitzmann [Pfi94]
in 1994. The main idea behind the passive attack is based on the fact that El
Gamal is not semantically secure under the group Z?p, which is because p is a
large prime number and the group order p − 1 is even. Therefore, there always
exist two subgroups: one of order p− 1/2 and one of order 2. As a result, anyone
can test whether a group element z is in the group of order 2 or not by checking
5.4. Sako and Kilian’s First Universally Verifiable Mix Net 85
zp−1/2 = 1 mod p. If there exists another factor f of p − 1 and subsequently a
subgroup of order f, the same check could be expressed as zp−1/f = 1 mod p. To
avoid this attack, the El Gamal parameters should be carefully selected from Z?p.
More precisely, the countermeasure proposed in [Pfi94] and proved by Tsiounis
and Young [TY98], suggests use of a multiplicative group of prime order. This can
be done by generating a prime number q that divides p−1, selecting g as a gener-
ator of the subgroup Z?p of order q and choosing the plaintext message m from Z?p.
The above attack is passive, in that no modification in the messages is performed
by the attacker, who simply exploits the lack of El Gamal’s semantic security and
detects input-output relationships. In addition to the passive attack, an active
attack, which occurs when the inputs to the Mix Net are non-malleable, was
proposed by Pfitzmann. In this context, non-malleability is the property where
given a ciphertext it is impossible to generate a different ciphertext so that the
underlying plaintext messages are related. In this attack, the attacker inserts into
the Mix Net a ciphertext c′i that is related to another ciphertext, ci = 〈gr, yrim〉,
he wishes to trace, where yi =
n∏
i=i+1
gxi mod p and xi is the secret key of the
mix server Mi, under the assumption that a minority of the mix servers are dis-
honest. The attacker generates a ciphertext c′i = 〈grx+ s, yrx+si mx〉. Then, both
ci and c
′
i are two different ciphertexts and they will be decrypted to the different
plaintext messages m and m′, respectively. In this way, only the adversary who
knows the secret value x can trace ci. In a different approach, the ciphertext is
prepared as ci = 〈gr + s, yr+si km〉, where k is a constant value known only to the
attacker. Similarly, the two ciphertexts have different layouts, are decrypted to
two different plaintexts m and km and only the attacker, who knows k, can trace
ci.
As a countermeasure to this kind of attack, Pfitzmann suggests making El Gamal
ciphertexts secure against chosen ciphertext attacks by encrypting the plaintext
messages using non-malleable encryption, as described in [DDN00]. Furthermore,
by using redundancy in the plaintext messages it is much harder for an attacker
to construct a ciphertext that is of the correct form for that ciphertext he wishes
to trace. A way to detect an attack is to ensure that there exists a broadcast
channel and then a mix server chooses its values before seeing the others, for by
so doing, no value can be added, deleted or modified.
5.4 Sako and Kilian’s First Universally Verifiable Mix Net
Both Chaum and Park et al.’s Mix Nets offer individual verifiability in that only
the sender of a message m is able to check whether or not his/her message has
reached its destination, but cannot check whether this is true or not for the
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other senders. In this context, the first Mix Net providing universal verifiability
was introduced by Sako and Kilian [SK95] in 1995, two years after the publica-
tion of Park et al.’s proposal. The major contribution of their scheme, which
is based on the techniques of [PIK93], is that anyone can verify that the entire
procedure has been performed correctly. In order to achieve the universal ver-
ifiability property, each mix server produces a proof of the correctness of the
operation and any observer can verify it. These are IZKP and using the Fiat-
Shamir heuristic [FS86] they can be made non-interactive and combined into a
single one. Additionally, Sako and Kilian proposed the first receipt-free voting
scheme in which the voter can leave the polling station being confident that her
vote has been added to the tally without any modification. The voting schemes
introduced so far in [Cha88, PIK93] do not satisfy the receipt-freeness property,
because the redundant value can be used as a receipt, thus preventing the pos-
sibility of receipt-freeness. In Sako and Kilian’s voting protocol, this property is
achieved under the assumption that there exists a one-way untapped communi-
cation channel between the voters and the election authorities.
To introduce the notion of public verifiability, Sako and Kilian divided their
scheme into two separate phases, in which each mix server provides using IZKP:
1. a proof of correct partial decryption; and
2. a proof of correct re-encryption and shuﬄing.
The same notation as for Section 2.8 is used to analyse the protocol.
Proving Correctness for the Partial Decryption Phase
The partial decryption phase is needed for a mix server, Mi, to prove that the
value K = Gxii has been generated correctly, i.e. it has the same exponential as
gxi . Note that y = gxi is public. The proof of correct partial decryption is a
straightforward execution of the Chaum-Pedersen [CP92] interactive protocol:
1. P chooses s randomly from Zq, calculates y′ = gs mod p and G′ = Gsi
mod p and sends (y′, G′) to V.
The verifier performs a random coin toss and then takes step 2 or step 3 depending
on the outcome.
2. V challenges P to reveal the secret value s and checks that y′ and G′ are
consistent with s.
3. V challenges P to reveal s′ = s− xi and V checks that:
y′ = gs
′ · y mod p = gs · y/gxi mod p = gs mod p
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and
G′ = K ·Gsi mod p = Gsi ·K/Gxii mod p = Gs mod p
Proving Correctness for the Re-encryption and Shuﬄing Phase
The second phase is used to prove the correctness of the re-encryption and shuf-
fling operations, i.e. to prove that a mix server has shuﬄed a list (also called
batch) of ciphertexts correctly. Putting this differently, a mix server should prove
that a batch B1 of ciphertexts is indeed a correct shuﬄe of a batch B of cipher-
texts. In each round of the interactive protocol, the prover calculates another
batch B2, that is also a shuﬄe of the batch B. Therefore, if the following steps:
• with probability 12 , P proves V that B2 is a correct shuﬄe of B; and
• with probability 12 , P proves V that B2 is a correct shuﬄe of B1
are executed several times, the verifier will be convinced that the batch B1 is a
correct shuﬄe of B. Here, a(1)i = Gi and a(2)i = Ji/Ki are defined along with
constant values g and w. Then, the batch B1 is presented as:
B =
(
a
(1)
i
a
(2)
i
)
After being shuﬄed using fresh random values s1, . . . , sn and permuted by random
and secret permutation pi, the resulting batch B1 is defined as:
B1 =
(
a
(1)
pi(i) · gspi(i) mod p
a
(2)
pi(i) · wspi(i) mod p
)
To prove that B1 is a correct shuﬄe of B, the following IZKP protocol is executed
by P and V and it is similar to the protocol presented above:
1. P chooses random values t1, . . . , tn from Zp−1, a random permutation λ
and then a new batch B2 is created as:
B2 =
(
a
(1)
λ(i) · gtλ(i) mod p
a
(2)
λ(i) · wtλ(i) mod p
)
and sent to V.
2. With probability 12 , V challenges P to reveal ti and λ. The verifier checks
that B2 is consistent with A, ti and λ, which means that B2 can be created
from A.
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3. With probability 12 , V asks P to open λ′ = λ ◦ pi−1 as well as t′i = ti − s′i.
The verifier checks that B2 can be generated from B1 as:
B1 =
(
b
(1)
i
b
(2)
i
)
and
B2 =
b(1)λ′(i) · gt′λ′(i) mod p
b
(2)
λ′(i) · w
t′
λ′(i) mod p

5.4.1 Breaking the First Universally Verifiable Mix Net
Despite its importance due to the universal verifiability property, the Sako and
Kilian Mix Net is not perfect and two attacks were found by Michels and Horster
[MH96] in 1996. They pointed out that in the case where only one mix server
is honest, privacy is not guaranteed. This observation contradicts one of the
Mix Nets’ desired requirements, that is, if at least one mix server in the Mix Net
is honest, privacy of the mixed data (votes) is protected. In this attack, the re-
maining n−1 corrupt mix servers are able to decrypt the posted partial decrypted
ciphertexts, because they all know the remaining permutation values and collude
together. The honest mix server’s permutation is not needed for this attack sim-
ply because it has not yet been performed.
Apart from this attack, Michels and Horster discovered that in the case where an
intruder colludes with any mix server, the output of the Mix Net is incorrect and
the attack works as follows. The attacker (also called coercer in electronic voting)
forces a sender (voter) to reveal her secret key and then it is submitted to the
colluding mix server, whereby this is now able to learn the way the voter shuﬄed
the vote. By applying this active attack, the coercer cannot change the result
according to their wishes, but instead makes the vote random, thus violating the
robustness of the protocol.
Furthermore, Sako and Kilian’s Mix Net is vulnerable to the attack proposed
by Pfitzmann [Pfi94], in which the intruder wants to trace, and consequently
learn, how an honest participant has voted. The intruder knows the voter’s en-
crypted message and he injects into the Mix Net his own ciphertext, which is
related to the ciphertext he wishes to trace. If the message he wants to trace is
of the form c = 〈gr, yrm〉, he submits cs as its own ciphertext. Assuming that all
messages are posted on a publicly accessibleWBB, the attacker computes m′s for
all plaintext messages m′ from the WBB and compares it with every plaintext.
If a match is found, then m′ = m with overwhelming probability.
5.5. Ogata et al.’s First Robust Mix Net 89
5.5 Ogata et al.’s First Robust Mix Net
All the Mix Net constructions that have been described so far do not meet the
robustness requirement, in that when a mix server is absent or deviates from
the protocol, then the whole execution stops without producing any output. In
order to resolve this major problem, Ogata et al. [OKST97], in 1997, suggested a
fault-tolerant Mix Net, where robustness and anonymity are maintained even in
the case where a threshold (no more than half) number of mix servers stop or do
not follow the protocol faithfully. There are two threshold protocols introduced
in [OKST97]: one that is based on the Benaloh and Yung’s cipher [BY86] and
another on the El Gamal cryptosystem [Gam84]. Here, only the second proposed
protocol, which was built on Park, Itoh and Kurosawa’s [PIK93] re-encryption-
then-decryption variant, is examined.
To achieve fault-tolerance, prior to the execution, each mix server, Mi, for
i = 1, . . . , n, distributes shares of its secret key, xi, to other mix servers. This
can be done in a verifiable way using the techniques described in [Fel87, Sha79].
To avoid the attack presented in [PP89] and Subsections 5.2.1 and 5.7.1, each
sender, Sj , for j = 1, . . . , l, proves knowledge of the encrypted plaintext mes-
sage mj , cj = 〈Gj ,Mj〉 = 〈gr, yrmj〉. Each mix server re-encrypts and shuﬄes
the input ciphertexts sequentially and proves correctness of the operation us-
ing a straight-forward IZKP protocol, such as in [CP92]. Suppose that at the
end of the shuﬄing the last mix server publishes onto a WBB the list of all
re-encrypted and shuﬄed ciphertexts, 〈G′1,M ′1〉, 〈G′2,M ′2〉, . . . , 〈G′l,M ′l 〉, then, for
each 〈G′,M ′〉, each mix server computes:
Gi = G
′xi mod p
publishes Gi and proves its validity using an IZKP protocol.
At the end of the mixing phase, the decryption phase takes place and each mix
server provides a proof of the correct decryption operation. Anyone can decrypt
the plaintext message mi as:
mi =
Mi
n∏
i=1
Gi
=
yrmi
g
r
n∑
i=1
xi
=
(
n∏
i=1
yi)
rmi
(
n∏
i=1
yi)r
In the case where a corrupt mix server,Mi, refuses to participate in the decryp-
tion (Gi cannot be opened) or its verification fails, then the honest mix servers
jointly reconstruct its secret key, xi, using Shamir’s threshold scheme, make it
public and finally decrypt the outputs in its place.
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5.6 Abe’s Mix Net - Verification Independent of the
Number of mix servers
In what has been reviewed so far in the previous sections, the verification work
depends on the number of mix servers in the Mix Net, i.e. the verifiers will
need to check the honesty of the mix servers one by one. In contrast to this
inefficient technique, Abe [Abe98], introduced, in 1998, an El Gamal-based uni-
versally verifiable and robust Mix Net, where the verification work is independent
(not proportional) of the number of participant mix servers and can be verified
by any verifier. In order to achieve this, the mix servers perform additional tasks
to provide joint proof of the correctness of the mixing and decryption phases.
Consequently, a verifier can verify easily these proofs as if they had been gener-
ated by a single mix server.
Similar to other El Gamal-threshold Mix Nets, each mix server, Mi, for i =
1, . . . , n, possesses a share, xi, of the Mix Net’s secret key, x. The public key,
y, is distributed to mix servers and published to the WBB. Hence, only the ith
mix server knows the key-pair (pki, ski) = (yi, xi) = (g
xi , xi). To keep consistency
with the notation already used, c0,j = 〈G0,j ,M0,j〉 = 〈gr0,j , yr0,jmj〉 is the jth ci-
phertext message appearing on the WBB. Prior to the execution, all duplicate
ciphertexts are removed from the WBB to avoid the attack presented in [Pfi94].
Then, the original list of all valid ciphertexts appearing on the WBB is denoted
as:
L0 ={c0,1, c0,2, . . . , c0,l} =
{〈G0,1,M0,1〉, 〈G0,2,M0,2〉, . . . , 〈G0,l,M0,l〉} =
{〈gr0,1 , yr0,1m1〉, 〈gr0,2 , yr0,2m2〉, . . . , 〈gr0,l , yr0,lml〉}
where l is the total number of senders. The task of the mix servers are di-
vided into two phases (however, the mixing phase covers the main idea of the
proposed scheme; the decryption is similar to the standard Chaum-Pedersen pro-
tocol [CP92]):
1. Randomisation and Permutation
• Randomisation and permutation: Each mix server in turn ran-
domises and shuﬄes the received inputs and keeps the local random
factors and permutations secret;
• Joint proof of permutation: The mix servers work together to
prove the correctness of the output in zero-knowledge. Each mix server
verifies the proof itself and if the proof fails, the corrupt mix servers
are excluded from the protocol and the execution restarts from the
beginning.
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2. Decryption:
• Threshold El Gamal decryption: A set of mix servers collude
together to decrypt the final set of ciphertexts;
• Joint proof of decryption: The mix servers execute together a pro-
tocol to prove correctness of the decryption and if the proof fails, the
corrupt mix servers are excluded from the protocol and the remaining
ones perform the decryption again.
Randomisation and permutation
The original list of ciphertexts, L0, is processed sequentially by all the mix servers.
That is, the first mix server re-encrypts and shuﬄes L0 using its own secret
randomnesses and permutations and produces the set:
L1 ={c1,1, c1,2, . . . , c1,l} =
{〈G1,1,M1,1〉, 〈G1,2,M1,2〉, . . . , 〈G1,l,M1,l〉} =
{〈gr′1,1 , yr′1,1m1〉, 〈gr′1,2 , yr′1,2m2〉, . . . , 〈gr
′
1,l , yr
′
1,lml〉}
Similarly, the second mix server takes as input L1 and produces L2, which is the
input of the third mix server. Finally, the last mix server publishes:
Ln ={cn,1, cn,2, . . . , cn,l} =
{〈Gn,1,Mn,1〉, 〈Gn,2,Mn,2〉, . . . , 〈Gn,l,Mn,l〉} =
{〈grˆn,1 , yrˆn,1m1〉, 〈grˆn,2 , yrˆn,2m2〉, . . . , 〈grˆn,l , yrˆn,lml〉}
Joint proof of permutation
In contrast to Sako and Kilian’s Mix Net [SK95], where different proofs of the
correctness of randomisation and permutation are generated, here, the mix servers
cooperate to create a joint proof. Supposing the existence of an agreed (small)
number k, then the following steps are executed this number of times:
1. Each mix server performs a secondary mix using new permutations and
fresh randomnesses. More precisely, the ith mix server receives L˜i−1 and
outputs:
L˜i ={c˜i,1, c˜i,2, . . . , c˜i,l} =
{〈G˜i,1, M˜i,1〉, 〈G˜i,2, M˜i,2〉, . . . , 〈G˜i,l, M˜i,l〉} =
{〈gr˜i,1 , yr˜i,1m1〉, 〈gr˜i,2 , yr˜i,2m2〉, . . . , 〈gr˜i,l , yr˜i,lml〉}
2. The verifier chooses b at random from {0, 1} and publishes it onto theWBB;
b can be the output of a coin-flipping function [AN90].
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3. If b = 0, each Mi computes a commitment bi = BC(i, λi, r˜i,1, . . . , r˜i,l),
where λi is the secret permutation used in the secondary mix, and dis-
tributes it to the other mix servers. Once all bis have been distributed,Mi
opens bi by distributing λi and r˜i,1, . . . , r˜i,l. The last mix server publishes
λ = λi, . . . , λn and all the secondary randomness. Each verifier checks that
all bis, λ and randomness are correctly made. Otherwise, the protocol stops.
If b = 1, the verifier challenges the difference between the two mixes and in
this case, each mix server reveals the differences in turn.
4. Finally, each server and verifier checks whether the following equations hold:
M˜n,j
M0,λ(j)
= yrˆn,j
and
G˜n,j
G0,λ(j)
= grˆn,j
5.7 Making Mix Nets Robust with Randomised Par-
tial Checking
It has been the case so far that a corrupt mix server can either cheat on the
outputs or be absent from the execution in order to deadlock the whole process.
To solve these problems, different methods have been proposed in the literature
and, as described earlier, most of them employ zero-knowledge proofs to catch
such behaviours. However, the introduced methods are computationally costly
and inefficient. Additionally, the need for protocols to show how the mix servers
pass information among them is evident and to this end, an auditing technique
for making Mix Nets robust is presented in this section.
The Randomised Partial Checking (RPC) technique for auditing and making
Mix Nets robust was introduced by Jakobsson, Juels and Rivest [JJR02] in 2002.
Compared to other Mix Nets, where expensive and slow zero-knowledge proofs
are employed to prove the correctness of the execution, RPC is simpler than
this, for there are no ZKPs, except for the final partial decryption proofs and
instead, each mix server produces strong evidence of the correct operation. This
is achieved by having each mix server revealing up to half of its input-output re-
lationships. The techniques presented in RPC are fast, efficient and can be used
with any public key cryptosystem as well as any category of Mix Nets. Moreover,
in an RPC Mix Net, privacy is not reliant upon the honesty of a single mix server,
but is a global property of the Mix Net and consequently there is no way to con-
nect input-output correspondence, even if some of the mix servers are corrupt.
Adjacent mix servers are paired up in such a way that only complementary links
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are revealed by a pair of mix servers, as illustrated in Figure 5.1. Assuming
that the minority of the mix servers are corrupt, at least one pair is honest, thus
guaranteeing the privacy of the inputs. However, it is shown in Subsection 5.7.1
and in Figure 5.2 that, among others, it is possible to find all the input-output
relationships for each mix server audited using RPC.
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Figure 5.1: Randomised Partial Checking based Mix Net: the original messages
are encrypted under the joint public key of the Mix Net, PK, i.e. c0,j = EPK(mj).
Each mix server in turn re-encrypts and shuﬄes its input ciphertexts and for-
wards them to the next mix server. The joint decryption phase involves a quorum
of mix servers which decrypt and then output the plaintext messages in lexico-
graphical order. The bold red arrows show the links that will be revealed; the
dashed arrows show the links that will remain hidden. Hence, no entire path will
be revealed across the Mix Net.
Furthermore, a voting scheme based on a re-encryption RPC Mix Net was also
presented in [JJR02], where an intruder controlling a minority of the mix servers
can successfully replace k votes without detection, with probability 2−k. In any
case, the penalty for a corrupt mix server is severe and could preclude any cheating
attempt. The Ximix re-encryption Mix Net, which is for the first time described
and formally analysed and verified in CSP in Chapter 8, is based on RPC and it
is one of the basic components used in the vVote scheme [BCH+12a, BCH+12b],
presented in Section 6.4 of the thesis. Apart from Ximix, Mix Nets used in
electronic voting schemes, such as those in [Cha04, CCC+08, PH10], are audited
using the RPC technique. For this reason, it is important to explain how an RPC
Mix Net works and to analyse the issues and attacks found by Bloom and Popove-
niuc [BP09], Popoveniuc and Leontie [PL10] and Khazaei and Wikstro¨m [KW13]
described in Subsection 5.7.1.
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When RPC is used with a re-encryption Mix Net, there is a joint public key,
PK, and the corresponding secret key is verifiably distributed to the mix servers,
in that only a threshold number of them is able to re-construct it. In the case
of a decryption Mix Net, each mix server, Mi, possesses its own pair of keys,
(pki, ski). As with how all Mix Nets are proposed in the literature, an append-
only WBB is assumed here as well, where the original encrypted messages, the
output sequence of each mix server and the final decrypted messages are posted.
The mix servers communicate with each other via this WBB. Each sender, Sj ,
prepares his own message, mj , by encrypting it using a non-malleable encryption
method, resulting in the ciphertext c0,j = EPK(mj). The reason for doing this is
to prevent the attack presented by Pfitzmann [Pfi94] and is explained in Subsec-
tion 5.4.1. Another alternative to this, is to augment the ciphertext c0,j with an
NIZKP of knowledge of the plaintext message mj . In this case, the ZKP does not
need to be passed throughout the Mix Net, but is removed after being checked
initially. When all senders have prepared and submitted their ciphertexts, only
the valid ones appear on theWBB, with duplicates and those with invalid proofs
being discarded. The first mix server reads from the WBB the list of the origi-
nally encrypted messages.
Shifting from senders to mix servers, each Mi, in turn, reads a list of cipher-
texts from the WBB, re-encrypts each element using a different fresh random
value, shuﬄes them by selecting a secret permutation pi(i)j and publishes on the
WBB its output list of ciphertexts:
ci,j = EPK(ci−1,jpi(i)j , ri,j)
along with a commitment to pi(i)j or pi
−1
(i) j, depending on i being even or odd and
thus, it is not a commitment to the overall permutation. A hash function, such
as SHA-1, can be used to instantiate the commitment scheme. There are two
ways for Mi to commit to its secret permutation pi(i) [JJR02]:
1. The first is to express pi(i) in terms of input to output elements mappings,
that is, as a list of commitments to sequence {pi(i)1, . . . , pi(i)l}. This is
described as:
Γ
(in)
i = {ζwj,i [pi(i)j]}lj=1
2. The second is to express pi(i) in terms of output to input element mappings,
that is, as a list of commitments to sequence {pi−1(i) 1, . . . , pi−1(i) l}. Similar to
the scenario above, this is described as:
Γ
(out)
i = {ζwj,i [pi−1(i) j]}lj=1
where, in both cases, ζwj,i denotes a commitment to integers j and i under the
witness value w.
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Having had all the mix servers finish their re-encryption and shuﬄing opera-
tions and posted their data onto the WBB, the next step is to proceed to the
correctness check, by asking each mix server to uncover a random number of
input-output correspondences. Here, each mix server has to demonstrate either
where a ciphertext came from or where it went, by opening up both the commit-
ment and the randomness used in the re-encryption. As such, the checking phase
probabilistically checks both the permutation and the re-encryption. Obviously,
a mix server should not have any control over which input-output relationships
it will be asked to reveal. Unlike Verificatum [Wik14], where the verification is
in-phase with the mixing, here, it occurs after the mixing has been completed.
Before proceeding to the verification phase, the pairwise selection strategy is
briefly explained in the following paragraph.
As mentioned earlier in this section, adjacent mix servers are paired up in such
a way as to ensure that different links shall be revealed. That is, the output
list of an odd-numbered mix server is split into two sets of ciphertexts: the odd-
numbered mix server is challenged with the first half and the even-numbered
mix server with the second. Prior to the verification phase, each mix server com-
mits to a random value Ri and all jointly compute R as the XOR of all Ri’s.
This value can be used to determine which set of challenges each mix server
should answer. An odd-numbered mix server posts a commitment Γ
(in)
i on the
mapping from input to output ciphertexts, whereas an even-numbered one pub-
lishes a commitment Γ
(out)
i on the mapping from output to input ciphertexts.
Suppose thatMi is asked to reveal information that allows anyone to verify that
the input ciphertext ck,i−1 maps to the output ciphertext cj,i. Mi reveals the
triple (k, j, sk,i,j), then sk,i,j contains the necessary information for validating
EPK(ci−1,jpi(i)j , ri,j). In addition to this, in the case where i is odd, Mi reveals
k = pi(i)j; otherwise it reveals j = pi
−1
(i) k. Only when all input-output correspon-
dences are successfully verified does the Mix Net proceed to the joint decryption
phase. Otherwise cheating is found and the operator’s intervention is needed:
the corrupt mix server is replaced and the execution restarts. Finally, assuming
correctness check success, the decryption phase takes place, where the output of
the last mix server is partially decrypted by a set of mix servers and each partial
decryption is accompanied by a verifiable ZKP of the correct decryption.
5.7.1 Attacking a Randomised Partial Checking Mix Net
The attacks presented in this subsection show that the ideas given in RPC are
flawed and not satisfied correctly. More precisely, it is shown that an intruder,
who controls a single mix server, can replace the whole output of the Mix Net
without being detected, as well as break the anonymity of the senders. In addi-
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tion to this, Khazaei and Wikstro¨m [KW13] claimed that an attacker can replace
k ciphertexts without detection, with probability (3/4)k and not (1/2)k, as found
in [JJR02].
As it is described in [KW13], the first attack presented here is based on those
proposed by Pfitzmann and Pfitzmann [PP89] and Pfitzmann [Pfi94]. It exploits
the fact that the first mix server knows the correspondence between the senders
and their ciphertexts: it targets a sender with a submitted ciphertext cj . Then it
chooses an integer δ randomly and replaces one of its outputs by cδj . With prob-
ability 50% this is not detected during RPC. Then it waits until the Mix Net
produces an output, identifies two plaintexts m and m′ that satisfy m′ = mδ,
and concludes that m was submitted by the targeted sender. With more con-
sideration, Pfitzmann’s basic attack can be generalized to break the privacy of n
senders while keeping the probability of detection equal to 50%. To target the
ciphertexts c1, . . . , cn, the first mix server chooses random values δ1, . . . , δn and
replaces one of its outputs by the product
n∏
j=1
c
δj
j . When the mix-net produces
an output, the attacker identifies n+ 1 plaintexts m1, . . . ,mn,m
′ in the final set
that satisfy m′ =
n∏
j=1
m
δj
j . Then it concludes that the jth targeted ciphertext is
an encryption of mj . The attack presented here breaks the privacy of the senders
with detection probability 50% and a modification to this, where the privacy is
broken without any detection, is described in Section 6.1 of [KW13].
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Figure 5.2: Randomised Partial Checking-based Mix Net with revealed path: the
execution is similar to that in Figure 5.1; the only difference is that the bold blue
arrows show a fully revealed path.
Another attack was introduced by Khazaei and Wikstro¨m and is based on the
omission of removing the duplicate ciphertexts from before each mixing. In the
original proposal, Jakobsson, Juels and Rivest did suggest that the initial cipher-
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texts should be prepared using a non-malleable encryption scheme. In the case
where the minority of the senders and the first and last mix servers are corrupted,
the problem is that the first mix server can produce malleable ciphertexts. Fur-
thermore, since the last mix server is controlled by the intruder, the final output
can contain duplicates. This attack is prevented only when every mix server
checks and removes the duplicates before they start operating on their input list
of ciphertexts.
In addition to these attacks, a more theoretic but impractical one was intro-
duced by Bloom and Popoveniuc [BP09], which is based on the fact that only a
small subset of all possible permutations are generated by a mix server and this
exposes enough information to identify its pseudo-random permutations. If all
hidden links for a single mix servers are found, then, repeating the same process
for every mix server will reveal the links for the entire Mix Net, thus violating its
privacy. However, it should be noted that this attack exists only in theory and it
is impractical because it requires the attacker to be computationally unbounded.
Maintenance of a cryptographically secure amount of randomness used for de-
riving the permutations can be employed to avoid this attack, so that attacking
the generation of permutations is as difficult as breaking modern cryptographic
methods.
A way for an RPC Mix Net to provide maximal privacy was proposed by Popove-
niuc and Leontie in [PL10]. Their work was motivated by the Punchscan [PH10]
and Scantegrity’s [CCC+08] electronic voting schemes, where the number of mes-
sages of the last mix server is small and these are only deployed in the Mix Net.
The technique described in [PL10] allows for a better audit partitioning using the
output of the second mix server instead of using random choices on the output
of the first mix server. Here, the output of the Mix Net is equally divided into
two sets, where in each set, the same distribution of messages is contained. More
precisely, the distribution of each unique message in each of these two sets is
the same as the distribution of the entire output set and, in this way, maximal
privacy is guaranteed [PL10].
5.8 An Adaptively Secure Mix Net Without Erasures
As a further example of a non-robust protocol, Wikstro¨m and Groth [WG06]
proposed a re-encryption Mix Net that utilises a WBB to meet its privacy re-
quirements in the presence of so-called adaptive adversaries. In contrast to other
Mix Nets described in this section, this construction is based on the Paillier cryp-
tosystem and uses interactive zero-knowledge proofs to prove correctness of the
re-encryption and decryption operations. The general structure of this protocol
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acts as inspiration for the proposal for the current research in Chapter 10 and
the two schemes are compared in Section 10.7.
The protocol begins with the mix servers accepting messages from a set of senders
wishing to send messages anonymously. The reception of inputs phase results in
the vector of these input ciphertexts being posted to the WBB, such that all
mix servers can read this initial vector and hold a consistent local record of it.
Thereafter, the re-encryption and permutation phase begins, in which the mix
servers take it in turns to perform a re-encryption mix on the commonly known
(but locally recorded) vector of ciphertexts. When it is a mix server’s turn to
mix, it performs a re-encryption mix on its local copy of the vector of ciphertexts,
sorts the output vector in lexicographical order and updates its local copy of the
vector of ciphertexts, accordingly. This is then published on the WBB and an
interactive proof between the mixer and the other mix servers takes place via the
WBB and a coin-flipping algorithm [AN90]. When it is not a mix server’s turn to
mix, it waits until the current mix server communicates its re-encryption mix and
its associated proof via theWBB, and subsequently updates its own local copy of
the vector of ciphertexts only if the proof is verified. The role of this verification
is to check whether the received mix is a mix of the previously locally held mix.
The proof also links the current mix with the last one; that is, the last mix has
to be a mix of the previously held local copy of the mix. Otherwise, the proof
is not verified and the new local copy of the mix is not updated. Once all mix
servers have taken their turn in the re-encryption and permutation phase, all mix
servers proceed to the joint re-encryption phase, which is used to accommodate
the adaptive adversary model.
The joint re-encryption without a permutation step at the end of the re-encryption
and a permutation phase was used in [WG06] to accommodate the adaptive ad-
versary model. In [NSK04], the authors presented a Paillier-based re-encryption
Mix Net that does not perform the final joint re-encryption without a permu-
tation step. This researcher believes that it is possible to have a Paillier-based
Mix Net without this joint re-encryption and this is included in [WG06] to pro-
vide a way of performing the adaptive adversary analysis. Generally, the adaptive
adversary differs from the static adversary in how it selects the subset of corrupt
mix servers, not in terms of being able to corrupt more mix servers or to be able
to switch between honest and dishonest. More specifically, the adaptive adver-
sary chooses which mix servers to corrupt based on the knowledge gained during
the execution of the protocol, whereas the static one selects the mix servers to
corrupt independently of any information learned during running the protocol.
However, in terms of the modelling in Section 10.5, these two cases cannot be dis-
tinguished, because every eventuality is checked, with the dishonest mix servers
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taking the role of each possible tuple of the minority groups. If it were possible
to break the protocol by strategically picking the minority to corrupt based on
posterior knowledge, it would show up in the analysis in Section 10.6, and so the
adaptive case has been covered as well as the static one.
Finally, the mix servers participate in the partial decryption phase, when each
mix server partially decrypts its final record of the vector of ciphertexts and sub-
mits the result to the WBB alongside a proof of correctness of the decryption
operation. The mix servers wait until all have posted such information to the
WBB and once they all have, they proceed to verify the correctness of these par-
tial decryptions. In the case where all the proofs check out, the final sorted vector
of plaintext messages is computed from the full set of partial decryptions, which
forms the output of the Mix Net. However, if any of the proofs fails, a recovery
phase starts, where the honest mix servers recover the dishonest mix server’s se-
cret key and compute its partial decryption [WG06].
The reader may appreciate that it should be assumed that it is possible for a
dishonest mix server to refuse to communicate at all and in this case, once it be-
comes its turn to mix, all other mix servers perpetually wait to observe a message
on the WBB that never arrives. This is not an assumed behaviour of the dishon-
est mix server in [WG06], but this lack of robustness is the primary concern in
this thesis. However, if the amount of time each mix server has to compute and
prove a re-encryption mix is restricted, then the protocol may easily be corrected
in this regard. Moreover, another aim of this thesis is to remove the need for the
WBB beyond the reception of inputs phase, whilst also guaranteeing termina-
tion in the presence of a minority of dishonest mix servers and maintaining the
anonymity of the senders.
5.9 Verificatum Mix Net
Verificatum is a free and open source implementation of an El Gamal-based
Mix Net. It was implemented in Java by Douglas Wikstro¨m [Wik14] and its
source code is available under a research licence. It was used in the 2013 Nor-
wegian Parliamentary elections [Gjø10] as well as in student elections at Tel
Aviv University [RTRBN14] and uses Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS86] to produce an
universally verifiable proof of correctness of the execution of the protocol. Wik-
stro¨m [Wik04], proved that his Mix Net is secure in the universal composability
symbolic model [Can01], but his analysis excluded constructions with proof of
shuﬄes. Moreover, his scheme does not satisfy the robustness property, as when
a mix server raises a complaint about another’s honesty, then the whole execution
stops and manual intervention is needed in order to exclude the faulty mix server.
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In Chapter 9, it is demonstrated how to make it robust and remove the assumed
WBB.
In Verificatum, the re-encryption approach of Sako and Kilian’s [SK95] Mix Net
is used, combined with the techniques presented in [Wik09] and [TW10]. Similar
to other re-encryption based Mix Net constructions, each sender prepares his/her
plaintext message by encrypting it under the joint public key of the Mix Net and
in order to preserve privacy, each sender should prove knowledge of the plaintext-
ciphertext relation. When all the senders have prepared their input messages,
the list of the ciphertexts is posted on the WBB and sent to the first mix server.
Unlike other Mix Net proposals, where verification of the correctness of the execu-
tion occurs at the end of the mixing phase, in Verificatum this happens in-phase
with the mixing. Expressed simply, each mix server checks consistency of the
intermediate results and the proofs posted by other mix servers on the WBB,
raising a complaint when the verification fails. However, Verificatum can become
more efficient by using the RPC technique [JJR02], as presented in Section 5.7.
Regarding which, having produced a list L0 of ciphertexts, the ith mix server
proceeds as follows for j = 1, . . . , n:
1. If j = i, then the ith mix server re-encrypts each ciphertext in Lj−1, shuﬄes
them and posts them on theWBB as Lj . To prove the correctness of the re-
encryption and shuﬄing, it produces and publishes a non-interactive zero-
knowledge proof (NIZKP), thus showing knowledge of the re-encryption
and permutation values.
2. If j 6= i, it waits until the jth mix server publishes its Lj along with an
NIZKP of knowledge of the re-encryption and permutation values. In the
case where the proof is rejected, then Lj−1 becomes Lj . Otherwise, the
process proceeds to the decryption phase in Step 3.
3. A quorum of mix servers is required to decrypt partially the final list Ln of
ciphertexts produced by the last mix server. The ith mix server computes
a partial decryption of each ciphertext in Ln and the corresponding NIZKP
of knowledge of the decryption-key xj . If the proof is rejected, then xj is
recovered by a set of mix servers and the partial decryption is decrypted in
the open.
Carefully looking at the above description, it can be seen why the robustness
requirement is not met in Verificatum. That is, in the case where a dishonest
mix server refuses to participate in the mixing phase, Wikstro¨m requires the
other mix servers to wait indefinitely to receive a message from this dishonest
mix server, so the whole Mix Net stops without producing an output. Clearly,
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limiting the time allowed to publish their output list of ciphertexts to the WBB
would suffice to ensure that the mixing phase terminated successfully, but still
using the WBB. In Chapter 9 it is demonstrated how to solve this problem
effectively.
5.10 Relation to this Research
In this section the reasons behind the selection and analysis of the Mix Nets
described in the sections above are presented. The first Mix Net proposed by
Chaum was the basis for all the other proposals in the literature and it is thus
pertinent to analyse it and in any case the attacks regarding it are applicable to
many other constructions. In the current research the focus is on re-encryption
Mix Nets and this is why the first Mix Net of this category was examined in Sec-
tion 5.3. This scheme, as well as Chaum’s, offers individual verifiability in that
only the sender of a message can check whether it has reached the destination.
However, robustness relies on a stronger requirement in that the Mix Net should,
upon termination, provide a proof of the correctness of the operation; everyone
should be able to verify the proof. In this context, Sako and Kilian introduced the
notion of universal verifiability in their protocol and work presented in Chapters 9
and 10 for this study uses the same approach of verifiability, where the proofs
of correct mixing and shuﬄing are travelling between the mix servers. This is
achieved by using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic for constructing non-interactive zero-
knowledge proofs of knowledge of the re-encryption and decryption factors.
In contrast to NIZKP protocols used in Section 5.4, the first robust Mix Net
introduced by Ogata et al. in Section 5.5 uses an IKZP under the assumption
that a threshold (minority) number of mix servers can deviate from the protocol.
Threshold Mix Nets exist to counter this threat and real implementations, such
as Ximix, which is described and evaluated in Chapter 8, have been following this
trend. The work presented in Chapters 8, 9 and 10 is based on the assumption
that strictly less than half of the mix servers are dishonest and refuse to carry out
their duties. Another approach for achieving robustness in mixing was described
in Section 5.7, which is utilised in the Ximix Mix Net and because of this it is
entirely related to the study conducted in Chapter 8. Moreover, the Mix Net
presented in Section 5.8 inspired the work in Chapter 10 owing to the in-phase
verification (verification in-phase with mixing) and the fact that the Verificatum
Mix Net uses some of the techniques described there. Actually, this Mix Net is
based on all the techniques described so far in this chapter and this is enough to
make it a fertile area of research. Further, verifying the robustness of the Ximix
Mix Net in Chapter 8 is challenging due to the significant omissions in its initial
design. The following table summarises and compares all the Mix Nets described
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in Section 5.2 to 5.9.
Mix Net Year Inherits from Attacks Robustness Verifiability Proofs
Chaumian [Cha81] 1981 - [PP89] No Individual No
Park et al. [PIK93] 1993 - [Pfi94, SK95] No Individual No
Sako-Kilian [SK95] 1995 [PIK93] [MH96] No Universal IZKP
Ogata et al. [OKST97] 1997 [PIK93, SK95] - Yes Universal IZKP
Abe [Abe98] 1998 [PIK93, SK95] - Yes Universal IZKP
RPC [JJR02] 2002 [Cha81] [BP09, PL10, KW13] Yes Universal Evidence
Adaptively Secure [WG06] 2006 [Wik04] - Yes Universal NIZKP
Verificatum [Wik14] 2010 [SK95] - Yes Universal NIZKP
Ximix [Xim14] 2014 [JJR02] This thesis Yes No IZKP
Table 5.1: Summary and comparison of Mix Net protocols: ordered chronologi-
cally, each one being listed alongside the year of proposal, the protocol from which
it inherits its characteristics, the found attacks, the robustness and verifiability
properties, and the type of proofs used.
5.11 Summary
In this chapter, some of the most important Mix Nets in the literature and those
that inspired formal analysis and verification in Part III have been described. To
begin with, in Section 5.1 a survey of the literature where robustness is the main
concern was presented. From Section 5.2 to 5.9, how the research in Mix Nets
has changed throughout the years and how the new characteristics affect their
security requirements was covered. However, the attacks described in Subsec-
tion 5.2.1 and 5.7.1 are not relevant to the formal modelling and analysis of
Mix Net implementations presented in this thesis, since their scope is related to
cryptography. Finally, in Section 5.10, the reasons for selecting and analysing
these specific Mix Nets and how relevant they are to the current research were
explained. Being an essential and vital component in constructing verifiable elec-
tronic voting schemes, the next chapter investigates how they are used to build
such systems. A number of different voting protocols are presented and the role
of Mix Nets is highlighted.
Chapter 6
Mix Nets in Commercial
Applications
In the previous chapter, an exhaustive review on Mix Nets was given and the
significant role they play in constructing cryptographic electronic voting schemes
[SK95, MH96, Nef01, Cha04, CRS05, AR06, ECCP07, Hea07, CCC+08, Adi08,
CCM08, SDW08, Gjø11, BFL+12, BCH+12a, BCH+12b, BBE+13], was also
pointed out. In this chapter, how Mix Nets are used in such schemes as well as
in other commercial applications [Tor14b, JM98, GJJS04] is described. However,
it should be made clear that for the purposes of this thesis, how these schemes
work need not be explained in detail, because the interest is in the involvement of
Mix Nets in helping them to satisfy their security requirements. With regard to
electronic voting schemes, the use of Mix Nets is not the only method employed
for anonymising and tallying the votes; systems based on homomorphic tallying
have also been proposed in the literature [CF85, BY86, BT94, SK94, CFSY96,
BFP+01]. These schemes as well as a comparison between these two methods
are described in Section 6.5. For completeness, it should be noted that non-
cryptographic voting schemes have also been proposed in the research [Smi07]
and aim to provide the properties that cryptographic ones achieve.
Despite the numerous different voting schemes that have been proposed in the lit-
erature, only a few of them have been deployed in real-world elections. Regarding
this and in chronological order, the Helios [Adi08] Web-based scheme was used in
student government elections in both the United States and Europe. Scantegrity
II [CCC+08] was the first scheme used in local government elections in 2009, in
Takoma Park, Maryland, United States. However, the electorate was relatively
small, with around 1800 voters. In Norway, in 2011, local government elections
were run using an Internet voting protocol [Gjø11], with around 25,000 voters
participating. The Wombat [RTRBN14, BFL+12] scheme has been used since
2011 in university student elections as well as for electing the leader of a political
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party in Israel; in total, using this system, around 4,500 votes have been cast.
STAR-Vote [BBE+13] is another booth-based electronic voting system which was
designed for use in the Travis County, Texas, United States, in November 2014.
Compared with the previous schemes, the electorate will be much larger; over
450,000 registered voters it is estimated will participate in the elections. Finally,
the vVote scheme [BCH+12a, BCH+12b], is the first system to be used in large-
scale elections, in Victoria State, Australia, in November 2014. This scheme is
described in Section 6.4, and its Mix Net formally analysed and verified in Chap-
ter 8.
This chapter is structured as follows. In Section 6.1, how Mix Nets have been
utilised in electronic voting schemes throughout the years is presented. In par-
ticular, from Section 6.2 to Section 6.4, attention is given to some specific voting
schemes and the use of Mix Nets is spotlighted. As pointed out above, these
schemes have been used in real-world elections and for this reason it is important
to analyse their constructions and properties, in the presence of their associated
Mix Nets. In Section 6.5, a brief introduction to homomorphic encryption and
its use in voting schemes is given, whilst the applicability of Mix Net protocols in
other domains is discussed in Section 6.6. Finally, the conclusion to this chapter
is given in Section 6.7.
6.1 Mix Nets in Electronic Voting
Owing to their importance in providing anonymity to the communicating entities,
the main application of Mix Nets is in electronic voting, where they are used to
ensure that no one can track and reveal a voter’s vote, thereby guaranteeing the
privacy of the vote and the anonymity of the voter. The latest developments in
election schemes is with regard to systems where (i) the tallying phase is publicly
verified and (ii) anyone, at any time, can check that her vote has been cast as
intended. Such schemes like [Cha04, RP05, AR06, CCM08, CCC+08, BCH+12a]
are called trustworthy voting schemes and when constructing a new system, these
properties should be kept in mind. Dozens of different voting schemes proposals
exist in the literature and in Sections 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 some of them have been
selected according to their importance and/or use in real-world elections.
6.2 Preˆt a` Voter Voting System
The Preˆt a` Voter (PaV) voting scheme was introduced by Ryan et al. [CRS05,
RP05] in 2005, as an improvement to Chaum’s verifiable SureVote scheme [Cha04].
Through the years, further developments have extended the original proposal by
using different techniques in mixing and casting the votes, some of which are
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presented in [CRS05, RS06, Hea07, Rya08, Ram10, XCH+10, DHvdG+13]. The
latest enhancement, considers write-ins, which allow the voter to enter option-
ally a write-in candidate of her choice [SSC+11]. In addition, an analysis of
the feasibility of using PaV in the German Federal elections has been performed
in [DHR+11] and the vVote [BCH+12a, BCH+12b] scheme that will be used in
the Victorian State elections in November 2014, is based on this system. Voting
with Preˆt a` Voter is similar to conventional non-cryptographic paper-based elec-
tion schemes, where the voter, after being authorised by the election authorities
in the polling station, is given a random ballot form in an envelope and then
enters the voting booth. In the following paragraphs, the voting procedure of the
original PaV proposal, with decryption Mix Nets, is explained.
Ballot Design. A typical filled PaV ballot form is shown in Figure 6.1, and
it is noted that its appearance looks familiar to a normal one voter in that it
consists of two columns (also called halves) that will be detached after the vote
is cast.
Alex
Mary
Nick
Fenia ×
Sofia
bh57k84pl2
Figure 6.1: A filled Preˆt a` Voter ballot with one cryptographic onion.
The candidate list on the left hand side is printed out in a random order after
the voters arrival at the polling station and therefore, it is difficult for someone
to predict it, which as a consequence prevents coercive attacks on the system.
On the right hand side of the ballot paper there are the boxes, where the voter
marks an ‘×’ against the candidate she wishes to vote for. An extra piece of
information is included at the bottom of this half, which is an encrypted value,
called the teller onion, and will be used to reconstruct the candidate list in the
left column of the ballot if it is properly decrypted. It is, however, encrypted in a
threshold fashion, i.e. no single machine can perform the decryption alone. For
the integrity of the elections, all the ballots are generated by the authorities the
day before the elections and are kept sealed in a safe place.
Ballot Casting. Upon receiving a ballot form, the authenticated voter enters
the voting booth and marks an ‘×’ in the box that corresponds to the candidate
she wishes to vote for. She then tears the two halves down the perforation line and
destroys the left half using a shredding machine provided in the booth. Having
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done this, she now exits the booth and presents the right half to the election
authorities, who, in the presence of the voter, scan, sign and then return it to
her; this signed half of the ballot is her ballot receipt. Once the election has closed,
all the scanned ballots (receipts) appear on a WBB and the voter can now check
whether her vote has been recorded correctly by checking whether or not her
receipt is displayed on the WBB. If not, she raises a complaint to the authorities
and they act accordingly; otherwise, she leaves the polling station and takes the
receipt with her. As the WBB is publicly accessible, she can, at any time, check
whether her receipt still appears on it.
Ballot Construction. Having described the design of the ballot as well as the
casting phase, it is important to explain how the ballots are generated, which is
where Mix Nets are involved. The original PaV scheme [CRS05], uses the idea
of decryption Mix Nets (see Section 5.2), where a deterministic public-key cryp-
tosystem, such as RSA, is employed.
Suppose the number of mix servers (also called tellers in the voting literature)
in the Mix Net is k and each generates its own RSA key pairs. Their pub-
lic keys are published on the WBB and their secret keys are distributed to the
other mix servers in a threshold manner. For each ballot, 2n random values
(g0, g1, . . . , g2n−1) are selected from a large set. Now, as happens in Chaum’s
decryption Mix Net, each onion is encrypted using each mix server’s public key
in reverse order as Di+1 = Epki(gi, Di), for i = 0, 1, . . . , 2n − 1, where pki is the
ith mix server’s public key and D0 a random nonce-like random value. The final
output is denoted as D2n and is the onion:
D2n = Epk2n−1(g2n−1,Epk2n−2(g2n−2, . . .Epk1(g1,Epk0(g0, D0)), . . . ))
Additionally, the random values (g0, g1, . . . , g2n−1) are used to specify the random
order of the candidates on the left half of the ballots. Taken from [CRS05], the
procedure is as follows. The alphabetical list of candidates is shifted by an offset
θ, which is calculated as:
θ =
2n−1∑
i=0
di mod t
In this equation, t is the number of candidates and di = H(gi) mod t is the
value obtained after applying a hash function to each of the random values
(g0, g1, . . . , g2n−1) and the result is taken as modulo t.
Tallying. In the tallying phase, the role of the tellers (mix servers) is to anonymise
(shuﬄe) the ballots posted on the WBB and finally decrypt them. The shuﬄing
is performed to ensure that the decrypted votes cannot be linked to the encrypted
receipts, showing as inputs to the tallying process. The decryption-then-shuﬄing
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process follows the standard techniques used in all Chaumian type Mix Nets and
for a full account the reader is referred to [CRS05, Cha81].
6.2.1 Preˆt a` Voter with Re-encryption Mix Nets
What has been described so far considers the original PaV proposal with decryp-
tion Mix Nets. An improved version of the system, which utilises the advantages
of re-encryption Mix Nets, was proposed by Ryan and Schneider [RS06] in 2006
and any conventional re-encryption Mix Net, from those presented in Chapter 5,
can be used in this approach. However, due to the inexpensive auditing tech-
nique, a RPC-based Mix Net is suggested. The new scheme does not affect the
voter’s experience in casting a ballot, but does improve the security of the system
described above in a number of ways. For example, in [CRS05], a single entity
constructs the ballot forms, whereas in [RS06] this happens in a distributed man-
ner by a number of election authorities, called clerks, in order to eliminate single
points of failure. To allow this, a probabilistic cryptosystem, such as El Gamal
or Paillier is employed and an analysis of the PaV with the Paillier cryptosystem
can be found in [XSHT08]. For a complete comparison with the original proposal
analysed above, the same structure in the analysis of the new scheme is followed.
Ballot Design. The design of a ballot paper is similar to that in Figure 6.1,
apart from an extra cryptographic onion on the bottom of the left half, called
the registrar onion, as illustrated in Figure 6.2.
Alex
Mary
Nick
Fenia ×
Sofia
9df25fc1qk bh57k84pl2
Figure 6.2: A filled Preˆt a` Voter ballot with two cryptographic onions.
The onion in the left column can be decrypted by the voting machine, which can
then print, on demand, the decrypted list of candidates and hence, the voter can
check whether or not the list of candidates on her ballot matches the decrypted
one. In the simplest case, the secret key to decrypt the registrar onion could
be held in the priniting devices in the booths. Comparing this with the teller
onion found in the original scheme, where the information hidden was encrypted
using each mix server’s public key in reverse order, here, it is hidden using the
threshold public key of the tellers. At the end of the process, as an additional
precaution, it might be separately destroyed.
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Ballot Casting. The ballot casting procedure is exactly the same as the one
described above and for this reason is not recapitulated.
In what follows, for the distributed ballot construction and threshold tallying
phases, it is assumed that there are (i) a number of independent authorities
(clerks), who are responsible for constructing the ballots and (ii) a set of mix servers,
which shuﬄe and re-encrypt the ballot receipts posted on the WBB. For sim-
plicity, it is taken that the re-encryption tellers can also perform the decryption
operation. In order to allow distributed ballot construction, several clerks collude
and each of them contributes to the creation of the cryptographic onions found
at the bottom of the ballots. Similarly, only when a threshold number of tellers
collude together, can the teller onion be eventually decrypted, which is why it
is encrypted under the distributed secret key shared among the mix servers and
how this is achieved is described below.
Ballot Construction. Recall from Subsection 2.3.2 the El Gamal parameters:
let p and q be two prime numbers, such that p = 2q+ 1 and let g be a generator
in Gq. The secret key is the randomly chosen value x ∈ Zp and the corresponding
public key is calculated as y = gx mod p. These parameters (g, p, q) are made
public in advance. A set of tellers creates the secret key xT ∈ Zp in a threshold
fashion, as has been described in Section 2.7, and the corresponding public key
〈p, y, g〉 = 〈p, gxT , g〉 is made public in order to generate the teller onion. Addi-
tionally, the voting machine chooses a secret key, xR ∈ Zp, and its public key,
〈p, gxR , g〉, is made public. For clarity and consistency with [RS06], an abbrevi-
ation to these keys is given and they are denoted as βT = g
xT and βR = g
xR ,
respectively.
Once all keys have been created, the first clerk, C0, generates a batch of val-
ues, r0i , (called seeds), randomly chosen from a binomial distribution and now,
each clerk generates a batch of onion pairs as:
{(gx0i , βx0iR , gs
0
i ), (gy
0
i , β
y0i
T , g
s0i )}
where, x0i and y
0
i are randomly drawn from Zp. The behaviour of the remaining
clerks is as follows. Each, in turn, performs a re-encryption on the pair he received
from the previous clerk (via theWBB) using fresh seed values in such a way that
the same randomness is added to each onion pair, which is done to ensure that
these values continue to match. Upon receipt of:
{(gxj−1i , βx
j−1
i
R , g
sj−1i ), (gy
j−1
i , β
yj−1i
T , g
sj−1i )}
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from the previous clerk, the jth re-encrypts it using newly generated random
values x¯ji and y¯
j
i , and outputs:
{(gxji , βx
j
i
R , g
sji ), (gy
j
i , β
yji
T , g
sji )}
Having performed this transformation for each onion pair, he then shuﬄes them
using a secret permutation and forwards (through the WBB) the final output to
the next clerk, Cj+1. At the end of the mixing phase, and once all the clerks
have contributed to this, the final output for the registrar onion is (gx
t
i , β
xti
R , g
sti)
and (gy
t
i , β
yti
T , g
sti) for the teller onion, where t is the identity of the last clerk.
Tallying. After the election day all the ballot receipts are collected by the
election authorities. For each ballot, some calculations (in public) are performed
in order to remove each voter’s choice and the resulting values are fed into a
resilient re-encryption Mix Net. Following this, a threshold number of mix servers
will carry out the decryption operation and finally, the plaintext votes are posted
onto the WBB and the election results are announced. The correctness of the
re-encryption can be audited using the RPC technique described in [JJR02], and
that of the decryption operation can be proved using techniques similar to the
Chaum-Pedersen protocol [CP92] (see Subsection 2.8.1).
6.3 Helios Voting System
The Helios voting system [Adi08] is the first Web-based scheme that allows voters
to track their ballots, with the results being open for public verification (auditing).
It was proposed by Ben Adida in 2008 and since then, further developments have
improved the original proposal. For example, its current fourth version, Helios
v.4, is under construction and will not support Mix Nets, but its data structures
will eventually be able to support them. Due to its ease in setting up an election
and verifying the results, the system has been widely used in small-scale elections
and more than 100,000 votes have been cast using it. For example, a few student
government elections in the United States and in Europe were based on Helios
and those organised by the International Association for Cryptographic Research
(IACR) use it as well. An analysis of the real-world use of Helios is presented
in [dMPQ09].
In this section, an overview of the first version of Helios, as in [Adi08], which
utilises a re-encryption Mix Net for anonymising the ballots, is given. For more
details about the source code and documentation of all the versions, the reader is
referred to https://vote.heliosvoting.org. In general, there are four phases
in voting with this system: (i) setting up an election; (ii) ballot casting ; (iii)
tallying ; and (iv) auditing.
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Setting up an Election. Anyone can create an election after being registered
on the Helios Web-page. Upon creation, Helios generates an El Gamal key pair
for this specific election, where only the secret key is kept locally secret. Then,
accessing a simple Web-page interface (any modern browser suffices), the cre-
ator, who is also called the administrator of the election, can edit as many ballot
questions as he wants. Once the ballot questions have been edited, the admin-
istrator can invite voters to participate in the elections; each voter receives an
email, where her password and additional information regarding the elections are
displayed. When everything is ready, all the voters receive an additional email,
which contains a hash value of all the election parameters, the URL leading to the
election Web-page as well as their usernames and randomly generated passwords;
they are now ready to cast their votes.
Ballot Casting. Having opened the received URL for the election, all the
election parameters are loaded into the voter’s browser. She can now fill out the
ballots by answering the corresponding questions and after double-checking her
options, she chooses to seal her ballot, whereby all her selections will be encrypted
using the election’s public key. On top of this, a fingerprint (hash value) of the
resulting ciphertext appears on her screen and she is now prompted to cast her
ballot. After clicking on the “cast” button, a confirmation email is sent to her
containing the ciphertext and its hash value.
Anonymisation and Tallying. Similar to all electronic voting schemes, in
Helios, a WBB is maintained for publishing all the ballots, which is run by a sin-
gle server called the Helios server. Once the election is closed, the administrator
can click on the “shuﬄe” button to trigger the mixing operation. For this pur-
pose, the first provable El Gamal re-encryption Mix Net proposed by Sako and
Kilian in [SK95] is employed and how it works has been presented in Section 5.4.
The Mix Net consists of a number of mix servers which, in turn, re-encrypt
and permute the encrypted ballots using fresh random values. All the interme-
diate shuﬄed ciphertexts are posted onto the WBB and each mix server in the
sequence reads and operates on them. After all the mix servers have mixed the
inputs, the final set of ciphertexts is posted on the WBB. In order to prove
the correctness of the mixing and shuﬄing operation, each mix server produces,
when requested, a proof of shuﬄe. In the Sako-Kilian Mix Net this is performed
using interactive zero-knowledge proofs between the verifier (anyone can act as
verifier) and the prover (mix servers). However, in Helios, in order to avoid
the heavy computational cost when producing these expensive proofs, the Fiat-
Shamir heuristic [FS86] is deployed. That is, the challenge values are now com-
puted as the hash of the mix and are embedded in the mix message travelling
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among the mix servers. After a reasonable complaint period to let auditors (any-
one can act as auditor) check the mixing and shuﬄing, Helios decrypts the final
set of ciphertexts, produces a proof of decryption for each of them and finally
tallies the decrypted votes.
The decryption operation follows the standard El Gamal threshold decryption
(see Subsection 2.7.2), where a threshold number of mix servers should collude to
re-construct the secret key and decrypt the votes. This operation can be proved
using the Chaum-Pedersen [CP92] protocol regarding the equality of discrete
logarithms. As above, in Helios, this is transformed into a non-interactive zero-
knowledge protocol using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic. Finally, the administrator
clicks on the “tally” button to activate the counting of all the decrypted votes
and the results are announced. Earlier in this section, it was pointed out that
Helios offers public auditing in that anyone can verify the generated proofs and
subsequently the correctness of the results; a process analysed below.
Auditing. In Helios, the voter is given the option to audit either her single
encrypted vote or to download the entire election data and verify all the mixing,
decryption and tallying operations. When choosing to inspect her encrypted vote,
the ciphertext and the randomness used to create it are revealed to the voter.
She can now save them locally and use either her own code to check whether
the encryption was correct or can trust the Helios verification program. After
doing this, a new window appears in her browser and she is asked whether she
wishes to update (change) her selections or to seal the already made ones. In
either case, a new ciphertext, with different randomness is created and displayed
to her. On the other hand, when choosing to audit the entire election, the voter
downloads the election parameters and all the produced data, i.e. those posted
on the WBB as well as the proofs of mixing and decryption. Then, the in-
built verification program checks the proofs and re-counts the votes based on the
decryptions. Eventually, the voter posts the output onto theWBB and if enough
auditors check as well as re-publish the ballots, the voters will be assured that
their preferences were correctly captured and the tally was correctly performed.
6.4 vVote Voting System
The vVote end-to-end verifiable voting scheme [BCH+12a, BCH+12b], will be
used for the upcoming elections in the Victoria State, Australia, in November
2014. It is a paper-based electronic system based on Preˆt a` Voter (PaV) de-
scribed above and handles a large number of ranked vote choices. However, a
number of modifications have been applied to PaV in order to accommodate the
complexity of the Australian election system. In this regard, the first overview of
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the scheme, alongside the required modifications to PaV, was given in [BCH+12a]
and a more detailed description of the cryptographic protocols, for dealing with
some unusual aspects of Victorian voting, was provided in [BCH+12b]. In particu-
lar, regarding the cryptographic mixing and tallying processes, different Mix Nets
have been examined for the scheme; however, none of them corresponds to the
actual Mix Net construction, called Ximix, that shall eventually be used in the
elections. This Mix Net is presented and formally analysed in Chapter 8. Due to
its complexity and the introduction of many new components to assist the voting
process, in the remainder of this section, a brief overview of the vVote scheme is
presented. For valid comparison with the previously described schemes, the same
phases in the voting procedure are maintained.
Ballot Design. The vVote ballot form is similar to a PaV one. In the left
column, there is a randomly permuted candidate list and a “quick response”
code, QR, at the bottom, which records the permuted candidate order. In the
right column, there are marking boxes, a unique serial number on the top and
another QR code at the bottom, which corresponds to the cryptographic onion
that embeds the candidate order.
Ballot Casting. Upon being authenticated in the polling station, the voter
enters the voting booth and starts interacting with the voting machine to receive
a printed ballot paper; this machine is called the print on-demand service (POD).
The voter can now scan the received ballot to the provided equipment and can
see and cast her ballot in an electronic environment. This machine, called the
electronic ballot marker, (EBM), communicates with the WBB to submit the
vote and receives a receipt, digitally signed by the WBB. This receipt is printed,
given to the voter as her ballot receipt and she then leaves the voting booth.
Ballot Construction. The ballot generation in vVote can be seen either as a
single operation, in which each printer in the voting booth prints the ballot form
or a distributed one, similar to that in [Ram10], in which a set of candidate list
mixers shuﬄe the candidate names for each vote [BCH+12b].
Anonymisation and Tallying. After the elections have finished and the poll
workers have checked that the number of people who voted matches the num-
ber posted on the WBB, the votes are received and fed into a Mix Net for
anonymisation and shuﬄing. For this purpose, in [BCH+12b], the Verificatum
Mix Net [Wik14] was employed. During the mixing, the mix servers check the
proofs produced by each other and as a result when the mixing phase completes
all checks have been completed. Additionally, the Verificatum system supports
decryption of the ciphertexts, where each mix server posts the decrypted votes
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onto the WBB for public verification and the election results are calculated.
However, owing to the way the proofs are generated, this method of mixing and
decryption is expensive if the number of candidates is large. Consequently, the
Victorian Election Committee (VEC) has decided to outsource the construction
of a more efficient Mix Net, and as will be seen in the next part of this thesis,
the produced Mix Net is based on the RPC proposal.
Auditing. As it inherits from PaV, the vVote system offers the important
public verifiability property. More specifically, in vVote, the voter can verify the
correctness of the procedure in multiple ways, such as by confirming the ballot’s
correctness, by checking the signature on her receipt, by making sure whether or
not her receipt appears intact on the WBB or by checking that the EBM printed
receipt matches her preference(s). It should be noted that the voter is allowed
to perform any of these audits as many times as she wishes. However, when
choosing to do so, she is prompted to vote again and the audited ballot shall not
be used anywhere in the process. In the case where any of these checks fails, she
should raise a complaint with the election officials (without, of course, revealing
how she voted) and this would have serious implications for the integrity of the
vote.
6.5 Homomorphism in Electronic Voting
In the earlier sections in this chapter, the role that Mix Nets play in construct-
ing trustworthy electronic voting schemes was highlighted by describing some of
the most well-known schemes. However, not only Mix Nets have been used in
the literature for implementing such systems. That is, there are schemes [CF85,
BY86, BT94, SK94, CFSY96, BFP+01] that exploit the additive homomorphic
encryption properties offered by cryptosystems, such as El Gamal, Paillier and
Benaloh’s cipher (see Section 2.3), in order to achieve the desired requirements
that a voting scheme should meet. For the purposes of this thesis, these schemes
are of no interest; however, for completeness, how they operate is briefly pre-
sented.
The main idea behind the use of homomorphism in voting schemes is as follows.
Suppose that there are n candidates (C1, C2, . . . , Cn) on a ballot form and the
voter needs to vote only for one. Under these circumstances, each voter encrypts
her vote and submits it to the election officials; selection of the jth candidate
results in the cipherext EPK(j), where PK is the election’s public key. Once the
election is closed and all the encrypted ballots have been collected, thanks to the
additive homomorphic property, the officials can aggregate all the ciphertexts
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into a single one, as follows:
EPK(i) . . .EPK(j) . . .EPK(k) = EPK(i+ · · ·+ j + · · ·+ k)
where, i, j and k represent the ith, jth and kth candidate in the ballot. Finally,
the decryption of this ciphertext directly leads to the election results. Using
this method and assuming honesty of the officials, the privacy of the votes is
maintained, as no single one is decrypted separately. Additionally, the public
verifiability property holds, as anyone can combine all the ciphertexts posted on
the WBB, perform the cryptographic operations and can check the outcome.
Despite the simplicity in aggregating the ciphertexts into one and decrypting
it, this method when compared to Mix Nets suffers from several drawbacks. For
example, the technique proposed in [CF85, BY86, BT94], can handle only one-
out-of-two elections, in which the voter simply chooses “yes” or “no”. Addition-
ally, in [CF85, SK94], privacy is not protected against a single election official.
To address this problem, a further development in [BY86] has suggested the dis-
tribution of the encrypted votes to a number of officials, whereby only when a
set of them collude can they decrypt the ciphertexts. Moreover, the work pre-
sented in [CFSY96], recommends the use of the verifiable secret sharing technique
instead of the threshold sharing method employed in [SK94]. It is clear that dif-
ferent methods have been put forward by researchers for distributing a secret
among a number of officials. Choosing between them is not an easy task and
should involve consideration of a number of parameters, such as the number of
voters, the characteristics of the voting system and the computational complex-
ity when calculating the corresponding proofs of the correctness of the applied
operations.
6.6 Mix Nets in other Domains
So far in this chapter, only the significant role of Mix Nets in building secure
electronic voting schemes has been covered. However, this is not the only domain
where Mix Nets are deployed; since they were introduced in 1981, they remain the
only realistic way of ensuring privacy in settings like the Internet. Additionally,
in many different applications, Mix Nets are used implicitly, by the assumption of
an anonymous channel and in the following paragraphs some of the most salient
applications are presented.
The first Mix Net [Cha81], was proposed for use in electronic mail, in order
to hide the correspondence between the sender and the receiver. In this con-
text, later email constructions like Babel [GT96], Mixminion [DDM03] and Mix-
master [Mix14], tried to preserve the anonymity of the communicating entities.
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However, these systems achieve their purposes at high cost by introducing high-
latency networks. By contrast, there are low-latency network implementations
for achieving anonymity, with the most characteristic ones being the onion rout-
ing (Tor) project [Tor14b, GRS96, SGR97, STRL00], PipeNet [BMS01] and
Anonymiser [ano14]. Apart from these applications, research in Mix Nets has
spanned other domains, such as in allowing anonymous cash payments [JM98]
and in anonymising Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) tags [GJJS04] where
in both, privacy is derived solely from the use of a this type of protocol. In the
next paragraph, due to its importance and real-world applicability, the Tor tool
is further analysed.
Tor was developed by the US Naval Research Laboratory and is now free soft-
ware. It is an open network that protects the users against traffic analysis, keeps
their identities secret, prevents other people from learning their location, and
provides privacy and security when browsing on the Internet. It has been used
for many years by journalists, activists, non-governmental organisations, as well
as by individuals as a safe way of untraceable communication. However, it has
also been associated with illegal activities [Tor14a, Tor14c], and national secu-
rity agencies are working on finding bugs in its implementation in order to be
able to find and prosecute the criminal elements. The main idea behind its im-
plementation follows a decryption Mix Net’s construction: users choose a path
through the network (consisting of a large number of nodes), where each node
knows only its predecessor and successor. The sent message is encrypted and
travels in the network, where each node, in turn, unwraps the outer layer and
relays the inner (encrypted) message to the next. In this setting, it is easy to
see that in the case where one of the nodes crashes, the service is lost and the
transmission restarts. For a complete account on Tor, the reader is referred
to [Tor14b, GRS96, SGR97, STRL00].
6.7 Summary
This chapter has highlighted the importance of using Mix Nets in real-world ap-
plications. As they are the main building blocks in designing trustworthy voting
protocols, their involvement has been illustrated via some specific examples. To
this end, three of the most well-known voting schemes were briefly analysed.
Additionally, other applications where Mix Nets have been deployed in order to
preserve the privacy of the communicating entities have been referred to. In sum,
this chapter has had the aim of preparing the reader for the next part of the the-
sis, where different Mix Net protocols are formally analysed and verified against
their security and safety requirements.

Conclusion to Part II
In this part of the thesis, an exhaustive analysis of Mix Net protocols has been
provided. Additionally, Mix Nets were categorised based on how they process
their input messages and the security properties they should satisfy were exam-
ined. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that all the proposals in the literature
achieve their robustness requirements assuming the existence of a single entity,
via which the mix servers communicate with each other. Consequently, it can be
perceived as a broadcast channel providing the same services to all mix servers.
Regarding this, a number of different implementations were reviewed and its
weaknesses highlighted. However, as will be seen in the following chapters of the
thesis, this is an unrealistic assumption in that, if it is unavailable, the whole
process terminates without producing an output. In this regard, the work that
has been conducted in the Part III of the thesis, shall confirm that real Mix Net
implementations can be proved to be robust even in the absence of this single
point of trust.
With respect to the liveness and safety requirements, a complete literature review
on how these were achieved throughout the years has been given. For this pur-
pose, starting from the first proposal, introduced in 1981, a survey that covered
over 30 years of research on Mix Nets was presented. Moreover, the schemes that
have inspired many other constructions as well as some of the implementations
that will be modelled, formally analysed and verified against the aforementioned
requirements, in the chapters in the next part of this thesis, have been scrutinised.
Of greater utility than pure analysis, is Mix Nets usage when considering them
as components in real-life applications. Owing to their importance in providing
anonymity to communicating entities, they have been utilised as essential compo-
nents when designing trustworthy electronic voting schemes. To this end, some
of the most well-known voting systems have been selected for analysis and the
role of Mix Nets emphasised. Along with explanation of their usage in voting
schemes, a survey on their applicability in other commercial applications has also
been provided. In sum, this part of the thesis has contained a complete study
of Mix Nets, with the aim being to supply the reader with as many details as
117
118 CHAPTER 6. MIX NETS IN COMMERCIAL APPLICATIONS
possible, so when moving on to the next chapters, the modelling, analysis and
verification of the proposed protocols is easier to comprehend.
Part III
Modelling and Formal Analysis
of Mix Nets
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Chapter 7
Introduction
In the preceding part, an exhaustive review of Mix Net protocols was presented
and it was shown how their characteristics have changed over time. Addition-
ally, the proposals that have inspired the current work were examined in detail.
In particular, the problem that most of the recent constructions are not robust
or that they achieve this requirement under some strong assumptions was high-
lighted. Furthermore, it was pointed out that owing to their importance in pro-
viding anonymity to the communicating parties, Mix Nets play a significant role
in building systems where security requirements, such as privacy, should hold. In
this context, in Chapter 6, it was demonstrated how they are used in applications,
such as electronic voting as well as in other domains.
A variety of electronic voting schemes have been modelled and formally anal-
ysed in the literature [DRS08, DKR09, KRS10, CcCK12, CS11, MH13, MHS14],
but they have not considered modelling and formalising the security of Mix Net
protocols. Mix Net analyses have invariably focused on safety properties, and
important liveness properties, such as robustness (deadlock freedom) are wholly
neglected, which is a regrettable omission. To address this gap in the litera-
ture, modelling, formal analysis and automated verification of the liveness and
safety properties of different Mix Net protocols have been carried out. This work
is novel in that it is the first time such modelling and analysis have been con-
ducted. The Mix Nets modelled in this part of the thesis not have only theoretic
interest, but also practical usage; in this case for elections. That is, the Ximix
Mix Net [Xim14], that it is described and modelled in Chapter 8, will be used in
the upcoming real large-scale elections in Victoria State, Australia, in November
2014.
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7.1 Overview
In this part of the thesis, novel work regarding modelling, formal analysis and
automated verification of different Mix Net implementations in CSP/FDR is pre-
sented. It is shown what modifications to the existing implementations are re-
quired in order to make them robust and provide privacy to the communicating
entities. Additionally, to scrutinise the analysis further, the models are verified in
the presence of an active intruder, who can perform a number of different attacks
and corrupt a small (minority) number of mix servers. Regarding the verifica-
tion, experimental results demonstrate that the models under analysis succeed
in meeting their requirements and the number of mix servers used suffices for
applications like electronic voting. However, before proceeding to the literature
review, notation and analysis of the threat model that follow in this chapter, it
is pertinent to give an overview of the whole part of the thesis by explaining the
progression of the work within it.
To start with, the work presented in Chapter 8, describes, models, formally
analyses and verifies the Ximix Mix Net. Ximix, is an RPC-based Mix Net im-
plementation with local bulletin boards, where the whole execution is supervised
by a trusted party. Although this is a strong and undesirable trust require-
ment, it has a great deal of power and, in the case where it misbehaves, it can
perform numerous attacks that can violate the robustness of the protocol. In Sec-
tion 8.6, how Ximix deviates from the original RPC construction is described as
well as what changes are required to overcome these issues. Furthermore, under
faithful modelling, the analysis shows that, in its current implementation, Ximix
does not meet the desired requirements and to address this, sound solutions are
proposed. In this regard, by removing the trust on the integrity of the single
component, namely a Visible Board, VB, and instead allowing direct communi-
cations between the mix servers, the trust is distributed and the robustness is
maintained. However, this is not enough and in order to be confident that the
proposed solution covers different corrupt scenarios, a simplified variation of the
Dolev-Yao [DY81] intruder, as introduced in Section 7.5, is added to the Ximix
model. In any scenario, the FDR verification results demonstrate that the mod-
ified Ximix terminates and produces provably valid output in the presence of a
dishonest component.
It has just been briefly explained that Ximix fails to follow the original scheme
from which it is derived, for many unnecessary components have been introduced.
All these additional elements have had an impact on its robustness and increase
the complexity of the system. Additionally, Ximix’s design is not in line with
the common Mix Net proposals existing in the literature, where only a single
and publicly accessible bulletin board, namely a Web Bulletin Board, WBB, is
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used to record the messages produced during the mixing and decryption phases.
This centralised entity for data sharing deters a dishonest mix server from cheat-
ing on its outputs, as it will be caught by the honest ones and then excluded
from the process. The novelty of the work presented in Chapter 9, is the con-
struction, analysis and automated verification of a new Mix Net, inspired by the
Verificatum [Wik14] implementation, which removes reliance on the publicWBB
during the mixing process and then gives the mix servers the power to decide
about other mix servers’ honesty. By removing the WBB, the ability of the in-
truder is strengthened and he is now able to send different messages to different
mix servers, in order to make them disagree about a common output; a notion
of the WBB is maintained only for publishing the common output. Since the
WBB approach is the common one in constructing Mix Nets, the work presented
in Chapter 9 can be applied to all Mix Nets of this category.
Staying with the WBB approach, the work presented in Chapter 10, substan-
tially extends the work presented in Chapter 9, with a new Mix Net proposal
being modelled, analysed and verified against the liveness and privacy require-
ments. Although the core method for making the new Mix Net robust has been
inherited from that in Chapter 9, an interesting and more efficient way of achiev-
ing this is given. That is, the new protocol avoids unnecessary long messages
being broadcast among the mix servers in the mixing phase and totally removes
the need for aWBB from the partial decryption phase. The impact this approach
has on the state-space reduction is also demonstrated. Additionally, compared
to the work presented in Chapter 9, where the same output is agreed between a
majority of the mix servers, the approach taken here does not guarantee the same
output is shared by all the honest mix servers, but does ensure that each honest
mix server will produce a provably valid output, i.e. that the output messages
are a permutation of the input messages. This does not break the requirements
of the protocol, since the outputs are equivalent except for their ordering, so they
will be the same when sorted lexicographically.
This chapter is organised as follows. To begin with, in Section 7.2, previous work
on formal modelling and automated verification of electronic voting schemes and
Mix Nets is discussed. Next, the approach to modelling them adopted for this
research and the necessary assumptions are covered in Section 7.3. In Section 7.4,
the notation that will be used throughout this part of the thesis is defined. In
Section 7.5, the threat model that will be used for providing a rigorous analysis
of the Mix Nets presented in the following chapters is introduced. The structure
of this part of the thesis is given in Section 7.6, and finally, a conclusion to this
chapter is provided in Section 7.7.
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7.2 Previous Work
In this section, previous work pertaining to modelling Mix Nets and electronic
voting schemes are reviewed as well as their security and safety properties as-
sessed. Process algebras, like CSP [Hoa78] and pi-calculus [AF01], have been used
to analyse electronic voting schemes with very limited reference to Mix Nets.
Moran and Heather [MH13] presented an automated verification of the vVote
scheme in the presence of a Dolev-Yao [DY81] intruder. They modelled and
verified the system from the anonymity point of view, but did not consider ro-
bustness and for their work they also assumed a correct Mix Net. Elsewhere,
Moran et al. [MHS14] gave a formal analysis and verification of the anonymity
of the Preˆt a` Voter system. In their abstraction, they assumed that the Mix Net
was operating correctly and did not reveal any information about the mapping
from its input to output messages, whereby the Mix Net behaves as an encryption
oracle, which, given a set of inputs, it simply re-encrypts and correctly shuﬄes
them. Kremer et al. [KRS10] and Delaune et al. [DKR09] used the pi-calculus
language to model and analyse important voting properties, like voter privacy
and anonymity, coercion-resistance, receipt-freeness and verifiability in the pres-
ence of an ideal WBB-based Mix Net. Whilst Chadha et al. [CcCK12] verified
the Fujioka et al. [FOO92] and Okamoto [Oka97] voting schemes, but it is not
clear how the Mix Nets presented in these works were modelled.
Staying with electronic voting schemes, Cortier and Smyth [CS11] formally anal-
ysed the ballot secrecy in the Helios voting scheme using the pi-calculus algebra
and the software tool ProVerif [Bla01]. They discovered an attack that relies on
ballot independence and presented a solution to the problem. With respect to
this thesis, the relationship between ballot independence and privacy is apparent
and ballot independence is important because it prevents the voting system from
influencing a voter’s behaviour. Stating differently, ballot independence requires
that observation of the voting system does not leak information that may af-
fect a voter’s decision. Furthermore, the ballot independence attack, as it has
been described in [CS11], does not have any effect to the work presented in this
thesis as it is assumed that inputs to the Mix Net are non-malleable. However,
their analysis was performed on a version of the Helios system which uses ho-
momorphic tallying rather Mix Nets. In another work, Smyth et al. [SRKK10]
presented a symbolic definition of different notions of verifiability in electronic
voting systems and applied them to the Fujioka et al. [FOO92] and [JCJ05] voting
schemes. They omitted formalising the security of the Mix Nets included in these
schemes in their modelling which clearly violated the privacy properties of the
aforementioned protocols. The Fujioka et al. voting scheme was also used in work
conducted by Kremer and Ryan [KR05] in which they modelled the protocol and
formalised its fairness, eligibility and privacy requirements. However, their verifi-
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cation was not fully automated, for based on the way the privacy requirement is
formulated, ProVerif could not prove it automatically and hence, manual proofs
had to be employed. Similarly, Delaune et al. [DRS08] verified voter privacy of
the same scheme with an additional compiler, (ProSwapper), but it lacked proof
of its soundness. Despite this prior research regarding elections, no attention to
modelling Mix Nets has been afforded and given that they are mainly used for
achieving voter anonymity and vote secrecy in conventional voting schemes in the
elections context, the lack of their modelling and verification is a serious omission.
In this context, the first re-encryption Mix Net was modelled by Stathakidis
et al. [SWH13], where they present an automated verification of the robustness
and privacy properties of a typicalWBB-based re-encryption Mix Net in the pres-
ence of a realistic intruder, using the CSP process algebra and the FDR model
checker, and they showed the necessary modifications that are needed in order to
make such a Mix Net robust. The Mix Net verified in their work was inspired by
Verificatum [Wik14]. Ku¨sters et al. [KTV14], provided a formal security analysis
of Chaumian RPC Mix Nets. They proposed a new security definition, called
accountability, which allows for the precise measurement of the level of privacy
and verifiability of such a Mix Net. Their analysis is interesting, but it was not
automated. Ku¨sters et al.’s results showed that Chaumian RPC Mix Nets offer
a high level of privacy and that they are still an interesting option for the use in
electronic voting systems. However, for the purposes of this thesis, privacy is not
part of the modelling and analysis and the emphasis is given to the robustness
security requirement. In what follows in this part of the thesis, it is assumed that
the majority of the mix servers follow the protocol without deviating from it and
then the Mix Net remains private.
7.3 Modelling Assumptions for the Current Research
In modelling the Mix Nets in the following chapters, the typical approach to se-
curity properties is adopted, whereby cryptographic primitives, such as digital
signatures, encryption and decryption, are treated as symbolic operations with
the appropriate algebraic properties. Additionally, each component in these pro-
tocols is modelled as an individual process alongside its own alphabet, which is
a standard technique when modelling complex systems consisting of subsystems
interacting with each other. Moreover, all the communications between the par-
ticipants are synchronous and over authenticated channels. In this context, it is
assumed that the Diffie-Hellman [DH76] problem holds and only the owner of a
secret key can decrypt a message encrypted with the corresponding public key.
The relevant assumptions necessary for modelling the different Mix Nets in the
following chapters are explained as they arise.
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7.4 Notation
Here, for convenience, the names, sets, data and functions used throughout this
part of the thesis are detailed. The set of all mix servers is denoted by P and
is defined to be H ∪ D, where H (resp. D) denotes the set of all honest (resp.
dishonest) mix servers. The dishonest mix server with the highest identity is
denoted by max(D). The cardinality of a set A is represented by |A| and A8B
is used to signify set difference, obtained by subtracting all elements of a set B
from a set A. Honest mix servers send broadcast messages to all the others at
once, whereas the intruder is able to send different messages to individual mix
ones and thus, it is useful to define a set R = {X ∈ PP | |X| = N − 1 or |X| = 1}
of the possible message recipients, where N is the total number of mix servers.
PA signifies the powerset function as applied to a set A. c is used to denote
the unmixed vector of inputs and Mj(m) represents the vector m mixed using
mix server j’s secret permutation values, where m is either the unmixed vector
c or some received signed mixed vector thereof. Additionally, the vector of de-
crypted mixed messages is denoted by p.
The set of all messages that can be feasibly sent and received in a protocol run
is signified by M. Messages do not require every mix server to be included, by
signing some sub-chain within the chain, but the signatures throughout a chain
are required to be in a strictly increasing order. Moreover, it is not possible for a
mix server to deduce how a vector of values has been mixed, even with knowledge
of the values before and after mixing as well as the zero knowledge proof. An
honest mix server will never sign a mix chain unless it has produced the final mix
in the chain, which is not necessarily true for dishonest mix servers. The message
space of M takes these properties into account, omitting messages that could
not feasibly be sent in a protocol run. Additionally, the length of a message m
is denoted by #m and is calculated by counting the layers of signatures and it
cannot be longer than the total number of mix servers. The outer signatory of a
message is verified using the corresponding public key and a function outer(m) is
used to return the signatory of a given message m. Likewise, the function seq(m)
returns the outer mix sequence of m. The function val(id) returns the index of a
given mix server in the shuﬄe plan and the function prev(id) returns the identity
of the preceding mix server.
In Chapter 8, messages have the form Sj(skj ,Mj(m)), where skj is the jth
mix server’s secret key and the set of all commitments to the secret permuta-
tion values is denoted by C. When sending to a mix server, these commitments
are individually hashed, with each having a hash value, h(commit). For ex-
ample, consider the channel name comm of type P × PP × M × C. In this
scenario, comm.1.{2, 3}.S1(sk1,M1(m)).S1(sk1, h(commit)) may be an event in-
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dicating that a vector of messages, m, has been mixed by the mix server 1 and
then sent to {2, 3}.
In Chapters 9 and 10, ρ(Mj(m)) denotes the zero knowledge proof that the oper-
ation producing Mj(m) from m was performed as attested. Mix messages, also
referred to as chains, then have the form Sj(Mj(m), ρ(Mj(m)), s), where s is the
corresponding sub-chain of this message. Chains are so called, because they are
extended at each mixing stage, although a better analogy is that of a Russian
(Matryoshka) nesting doll. The mixed value from a previously received chain
(or c in the base case) is mixed, the mixing operation attested to and the whole
of the previously received chain are signed together, such that a proof of each
operation in the chain is nested within each ‘layer’ of the message. Moreover, in
Chapter 10 the use of multisets is required such that the items within the multiset
with specific labels can be counted. The multiset sum is denoted by AunionmultiB, where
{a, b} unionmulti {b, c} = {a, b, b, c}, and the cardinality with respect to a is represented
by |A|a, where |{a, b, b, c}|b = 2. Additionally, once a chain is of some threshold
length, no longer will it be sent as one message, but instead a check message of
the form Si(Sj(Mj(m), ρ(Mj(m)), s)), where Sj(Mj(m), ρ(Mj(m)), s) is the chain
of threshold length. The sets of all mix messages and check messages are denoted
byMM andMC , respectively, and together make up all of the possible messages
sent during the mixing phase of the protocol.
Furthermore, in Chapters 8 and 10, messages of a slightly different format are re-
quired. That is, in these cases partial/threshold decryption techniques are used,
whereby a secret key is shared among several parties and ciphertexts decrypted
with a threshold number of the shares of the secret key being combined to dis-
cern the plaintext. The partial decryption of an encrypted mix is denoted as
Pj(ptj , seq(m), zkp), where ptj is the jth mix server’s share of the distributed
secret key and zkp is the associated zero-knowledge proof, thus proving the cor-
rectness of the partial decryption. The set of all partial decryptions is signified by
MP and is taken to be {Pj(ptj , seq(m), zkp) | m ∈ M}. In both the aforemen-
tioned chapters, the set of all possible fully decrypted messages, O, is considered
to be {dec(m) | m ∈MP }, where dec(m) is a function that decrypts a permuted
vector of ciphertexts into a permuted vector of plaintexts. In sum, the set of
all messages in Chapter 8 is specified to be M = MM ∪ MP , in Chapter 9,
M =MM , and in Chapter 10, M =MM ∪MC ∪MP .
7.5 Threat Model
In order to perform a rigorous analysis of the systems presented in the following
chapters an intruder model must be included. To this end, in this section, the
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threat model is introduced and all the necessary information regarding the ac-
tions the intruder can perform is provided. As the protocols presented later in
this part have just a few common characteristics, the behaviour of the intruder
differs in each of them. Accordingly, in this section, the actions that are com-
mon to all of them are described and the more specific behaviours are introduced
where appropriate in the following chapters.
Roscoe and Goldsmith’s perfect Spy process [RG97, Ros98], more specifically
its encoding in [Ros98], is used as the basis of the intruder (dishonest mix server)
behaviour, although with some modifications (different renamings) as no Dolev-
Yao attacker [DY81] is being considered. Consequently, the Spy used is not as
powerful as in the original Roscoe and Goldsmith version, which is in complete
control of the whole network. Obviously, that would be pointless in the current
cases, as it would clearly violate the robustness requirement. In what follows,
the Spy plays the role of a dishonest mix server that can receive messages sent
to it over learn, infer events based on messages received and its initial knowl-
edge, with say messages inferring that these may be accepted by the honest mix
servers. Figure 7.1 illustrates this behaviour.
Spy
say
learn
infer
snd
rcv
Figure 7.1: Upon receipt of a message over the rcv channel, the Spy learns that
message, can infer and then say the inferred messages over the channel snd. The
channels rcv and snd (within the green circle) show how the Spy communicates
with the network. The channels within the red circle are internal to Spy.
Upon receipt of a message, the intruder can sometimes make a number of in-
dependent inferences in any order. However, Roscoe and Goldsmith’s perfect
Spy avoids refinement checking the unnecessarily large state space caused by this
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combinatorial explosion. That is, whenever an inference is made, the intruder
does not lose the ability to perform any action that could be carried out prior to
the inference, which allows for the intruder to be immediately forced to perform
every possible inference in some arbitrary order before taking any other action.
This causes no observable difference in the intruder’s behaviour, but avoids an
otherwise troublesome state space explosion. Additionally, the intruder cannot
impersonate an honest mix server in order to disrupt the protocol but instead it
chooses which mix server to corrupt before the execution starts.
In order to allow the intruder to construct messages, there are a number of
deduction rules that can be made upon receipt of a message sent by an honest
mix server. As described in [Ros98], a deduction rule is a pair (X , f ), where X is
a finite set of facts and f is one that everyone in possession of the whole X can
construct. However, it should be ensured that the intruder deals with a finite
set of facts because FDR cannot handle an infinite number of states and hence,
nesting of encryptions and sequences needs to be avoided. Furthermore, deduc-
tions need only be made for the misbehaving agent’s set of learnable facts. That
is, the intruder can never learn a fact that he knew to start with or that cannot
be deduced from his initial knowledge and all the messages he can hear. Roscoe
and Goldsmith’s Spy elegantly omits inferences of such facts, with a deduction
function operating on a subset of the set of facts conforming to a particular type.
Three deduction rules are common throughout this part, which are presented in
Table 7.1. The first two allow for a signed fact to be learnt (composed - SIGN-
CMP) from knowledge of it and the signing key as well as deducing (decompose
- SIGN-DCMP) the same fact from knowledge of it and the signatory’s public
key, whereas the third rule permits a sub-chain to be deduced (decomposed -
CHAIN-DCMP) from a chain.
SIGN-CMP. {m, ski} ` Si(m) Si(m) ∈M
SIGN-DCMP. {Si(m), pki} ` m Si(m) ∈M
CHAIN-DCMP. {m,m′} ` m′ (m,m′) ∈M
Table 7.1: Intruder’s basic deduction rules.
The last one should be clear in the following example. Upon receipt of a message
of the form S2(M2(M1(c)), ρ(M2(M1(c))), S1(M1(c), ρ(M1(c)), c)), from knowl-
edge of this message and mix server 2’s public key, the intruder can extract a
sequence of three values: the mix, the proof, and the sub-chain. Even with knowl-
edge of the mixed values before and after this round (round 2) of mixing, as well
as the zero knowledge proof, the mix server’s secret permutation value is not re-
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vealed. Hence, in the abstract representation of this message, S2(M2, S1(M1, c)),
the intruder cannot deduce the value M2, but can deduce the sub-chain included
in this chain, or the chain as signed by him, or he can extend the chain with an
extra mix signed him. However, the extraction of M2 does not provide any in-
formation about the secret permutations applied. That is, the digital signatures
scheme with message recovery that is used in this work, allows a message to be
extracted using the signer’s pubic key. In order to simplify the model, a recover-
able signatures scheme is assumed, so that the contents of the message and the
signature are sent only once, whereas in the case where a different scheme is used,
this information will be sent outside the signature as well. Thus, this deduction
rule is not used as part of the protocol, but rather is used as part of the model
to replicate real world protocols efficiently. For consistency with what follows in
the following chapters of this part of the thesis, these deduction rules are written
as:
deductions1(X ) = {({m, ski}, Si(m)), ({Si(m), dual(ski)},m) | Si(m) ∈ X}
deductions2(X ) = {({m,m′}, (m,m′)), ({(m,m′)},m′) | (m,m′) ∈ X}
where, dual is a function such that given the ith mix server’s secret key, ski, (resp.
public key pki), it returns the corresponding public key, pki, (resp. secret key ski).
Another change made to Spy for the current work is to redefine the intruder’s
initial knowledge. In the general case, this consists of all mix server identities, the
secret permutation values and the secret key(s) of the dishonest mix server(s),
all the mix servers’ public keys for verifying signatures, and the initial unmixed
vector of values.
InitialKnowledge = P ∪ {Mi, ski | i ∈ D} ∪ {pki | i ∈ P} ∪ {c}
Having defined the intruder’s basic deduction rules and his initial knowledge,
the SPY process is gradually built. To start with, the intruder needs a way to
identify the facts that are relevant to the messages,M, and this is made possible
using the function explode, which can be applied to all messages in the set M.
This is described by the set AllFacts below.
AllFacts =
⋃{explode(m) | m←M}
All of the intruder’s possible deductions can be found by applying all these facts
to the deductions function, which takes as parameters the set of messages and
returns the possible deductions according to the rules displayed in Table 7.1.
AllDeductions = deductions(AllFacts)
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Following this approach, the Spy ’s state-space is exponential in the number of
interesting facts. However, most of these states are never reached and should be
omitted. This is achieved by creating a parallel network, which has one process
for every fact the intruder does not initially know and yet could learn during the
execution [Ros98]. These facts are contained in the LearnableFacts set.
PossibleBasicKnowledge = InitialKnowlege ∪M
KnowableFacts = Close(PossibleBasicKnowledge)
LearnableFacts = KnowableFacts8InitialKnowlege
Next, the new deductions can be defined by discarding all those that lead to
something that the Spy already knows or something that is never knowable to
him.
Deductions = {(X , f) | (X , f)← AllDeductions,
f ∈ LearnableFacts,
f /∈ X ,
X 8KnowableFacts = ∅}
The set of deductions and facts can be further reduced by omitting facts that
cannot be reachable given the initial knowledge using the following procedure.
The Close function recursively makes all possible deductions from a set of facts,
using the finite set of all interesting facts, AllFacts and then, the finite set of all
knowable facts, Known, is constructed by closing the set of the initial knowledge.
Close(S) =let
S ′ = {f | (X , f)← AllDeductions,X 8S = ∅}
within
ifS ′8S = ∅ then S else Close(S ∪ S ′)
Known = Close(InitialKnowledge)
Having described and defined the deductions as well as the knowledge of the
intruder, the next step is to define the processes that actually form the in-
truder model. This starts with IGNORANT, which ensures that a fact, f ∈
LearnableFacts, can be always learnt but said only once it is known.
IGNORANT(f) = f ∈M&learn.f → KNOWS(f)
2
infer?t : {(X , f ′) | (X , f ′)← Deductions, f ′ == f} → KNOWS(f)
KNOWS(f) = f ∈M&say.f → KNOWS(f)
2
f ∈M&learn.f → KNOWS(f)
2
infer?t : {(X , f ′) | (X , f ′)← Deductions, f ′ == f} → KNOWS(f)
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Finally, the SPY process can now be constructed as the parallel composition of
facts and all the infer events are hidden, since they are internal actions of this
parallel inference system [Ros98].
SPY = chase( ‖
f :LearnableFacts
(IGNORANT(f),AlphaL(f))) \ {| infer |} |||SAY KNOWN
where AlphaL denotes the alphabet of each fact. The process SAY KNOWN, is
employed to ensure that messages that are already known are learned and said,
since the facts that are of relevance to the InitialKnowledge are not included in
the LearnableFacts and AllDeductions. Moreover, the compression function chase
is utilised to increase the speed of the model checking of the confluent nature of
the inference of knowledge, without affecting the results of the checks. Should a
state be reached in the process being compressed with one or more outgoing τ
transitions, the chase operator selects one to traverse immediately [Ros10].
SAY KNOWN = say.f ∈ Known ∩M→ SAY KNOWN
2
learn.f ∈ Known ∩M→ SAY KNOWN
7.6 Structure
The rest of this part of the thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 8, for
the first time in the literature, a formal model is constructed and an automated
verification of the Ximix Mix Net is presented, which will be used in the real large-
scale elections in Victoria State, Australia, in November 2014. It will be shown
that in its current implementation the protocol does not satisfy the robustness
requirement. To address this, a method for making it robust is proposed, and
it is verified in FDR that the proposed solution is sound, thereby providing the
necessary robustness. Following this, in Chapter 9, the first formal analysis and
verification of a conventional WBB-based re-encryption Mix Net is presented.
The protocol verified is inspired by the Verificatum Mix Net [Wik14] and re-
moves the reliance on a WBB during the mixing process. Moreover, the protocol
presented in Chapter 10 significantly extends the work presented in Chapter 9:
it removes the need of the WBB from the decryption phase and provides a dif-
ferent interesting approach to constructing the Mix Net presented in Chapter 9.
The experimental results show that all the protocols guarantee termination and
produce a correct output in the presence of an active intruder who can corrupt
a minority of mix servers. Finally, this part of the thesis is concluded with a
summary of findings.
7.7. Summary 133
7.7 Summary
This chapter has provided all the information that is necessary for constructing
the models of Mix Nets in the next chapters. It began by seeking gaps in the
literature and in Section 7.2, the key one identified was the omission of modelling
Mix Nets when analysing electronic voting schemes. Additionally, the notation
that will be used in the following chapters was explained and the threat model
employed was introduced in Section 7.5. In the next chapter, the modelling and
automated verification of the Ximix Mix Net is presented.

Chapter 8
Ximix: An RPC Mix Net
Implementation with Local
Bulletin Boards
In the previous chapter, the lack of modelling and verification of Mix Net pro-
tocols was highlighted. In this chapter∗ for the first time in the literature
a formal model is constructed and an automated verification of the Ximix†
Mix Net [Xim14] is presented, which will be used in the real large-scale elec-
tions in Victoria State, Australia, in November 2014. The Victorian Electoral
Commission’s (VEC) vVote voting system, which uses Ximix, is based on the
Preˆt a` Voter [CRS05] voting scheme and how it works is presented in [BCH+12a,
BCH+12b] and shown in Figure 8.1. These schemes have been described in Sec-
tions 6.2 and 6.4, respectively. It is a requirement that Ximix be robust and able
to produce a correct result provided that a threshold number of mix servers
are available as well as follow the protocol without deviating from it. Au-
diting in Ximix is performed according to the Randomised Partial Checking
(RPC) auditing technique [JJR02] and its source code is available at http:
//www.cryptoworkshop.com/ximix/doku.php.
This chapter makes several contributions. First, a faithful model of Ximix is
produced using the CSP process algebra and the FDR model checker. Secondly,
the protocol is modelled and analysed in the presence of a realistic intruder based
on Roscoe and Goldsmith’s perfect Spy [RG97]. A detailed description of the
intruder is given in Section 7.5. It is also shown that with the current implemen-
tation the protocol does not satisfy the robustness requirement. Consequently, a
∗This chapter is an extended version of the published work for the 1st International Con-
ference on Research in Security Standardisation (SSR 2014) [SSH14].
†The modelling has been performed on a snapshot of the Ximix source code taken on 7th
January 2014. This researcher has checked the published code and can confirm that any changes
since then have no effect on this work.
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method for making it robust is proposed, which is verified in FDR as providing
this robustness. Along the way, the omissions and deviations from the original
RPC proposal attributed to Ximix are highlighted, for Mix Net protocols are
extremely fragile and seemingly benign changes may result in security flaws. The
experimental results show that, with the proposed modification, Ximix guaran-
tees termination and produces a correct output in the presence of an intruder
who can corrupt a minority of mix servers.
Figure 8.1: Position of Ximix within the vVote system.
This chapter is structured as follows. The Ximix Mix Net is described in Sec-
tion 8.1 and in Section 8.2 a faithful CSP model is constructed. In Section 8.3,
the threat model is introduced and then Ximix is modelled as well as being anal-
ysed against it. Additionally, in Section 8.4, the changes that are required in
order for Ximix to satisfy the liveness properties are described and the modified
protocol is verified. The experimental results and their analysis are given in Sec-
tion 8.5. How Ximix deviates from the RPC Mix Net and the omissions found in
this version of the source code are described in Section 8.6. The challenges faced
in this work and the approach taken in order to overcome them, are presented in
Section 8.7 and Section 8.8 concludes the chapter with a summary of findings.
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8.1 Ximix Mix Net Outline
Ximix is an Elliptic Curve El Gamal-based re-encryption Mix Net written in
Java, with the main idea behind its design following the RPC auditing technique.
It consists of a number of execution phases: (i) initialisation; (ii) mixing ; (iii)
checking ; and (iv) decryption. Owing to the different approach to implementation
for the current research when compared with the original RPC proposal, it is
deemed here that it is pertinent to analyse each of these separately. There are
two additional important components of Ximix that are not present in the RPC:
1. The Command Service; and
2. A Transient Board for each mix server.
The Command Service (CS) is the central trusted component of the system,
which is responsible for talking to the mix servers and instructing them to mix,
transmit their output list of ciphertexts to another mix server and to create
Transient Boards (T B) to host their produced data. The CS, which is under
the control of the VEC, has a great deal of power, for it controls the data flow,
controls the whole process and specifies the execution plan (also called shuﬄe
plan). In a setting with four mix servers, 1, 2, 3 and 4, the shuﬄe plan looks
like 〈1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 4, 4〉. However, this is a programmer invented unnecessary add
on and is used to emulate the RPC pairing of mix servers. The shuﬄe plan
describes how the data flow from the CS to the mix servers. In this case, the
plan 〈1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 4, 4〉 describes that the CS first sends the input data and in-
structions to mix server 1, it receives the result data and sends them to 1 (the
second occurrence of the first mix server in the shuﬄe plan), receives the results
from mix server 1, sends them and the instructions to mix server 2 and so on.
Robustness in the Ximix implementation relies heavily on the CS, as it is a single
point of trust and a single point of failure. Any misbehaviour could potentially
lead to the Mix Net’s crash, thus violating the robustness requirement.
Additionally, in Ximix, the mix servers exist to provide services, including board
hosting. That is, as the shuﬄe plan progresses, a new T B is created by the appro-
priate mix server (as specified in the shuﬄe plan) to host the intermediate and
output data (shuﬄed messages and commitments to the secret permutations).
The primary mix server is responsible for sending the unmixed data to the first
mix server in the shuﬄe plan and it is also responsible for maintaining a Visible
Board (VB), which differs from its internal T B, in that all the mix servers have
read access to this. At the end of the process, the contents of the last mix server’s
T B, as well as all the partially decrypted messages are posted to the VB. How
these components interact with each other in the case where all faithfully follow
the protocol, is illustrated (for the case of two mix servers) in Figure 8.2. It
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is noted that actions internal to the mix servers and the CS, such as receiving
a message, mixing and then posting it onto the corresponding T B, have been
abstracted away and are shown as self messages. Additionally, for clarity, all the
instructions the CS can send and that the mix servers are willing to accept, have
been presented as instruct events.
8.1.1 Ximix Message Communication Diagram
For clarity, the diagram in Figure 8.2 illustrates how the data flows in a faithful
run of Ximix with two mix servers.
Initialisation Phase
When the execution starts, the CS selects the shuﬄe plan and chooses the primary
mix server. The original unmixed data are handed to the Mix Net by the VEC
authorities and the CS instructs the primary mix server to transmit them to the
head of the shuﬄe plan. The mixing phase now begins.
Mixing Phase
The mixing phase starts with the first mix server in the shuﬄe plan re-encrypting
and shuﬄing its input data using fresh randomness and secret permutation val-
ues. As the shuﬄe progresses, each mix server is asked by the CS to create a T B
to store its own shuﬄed messages and its commitments to secret permutations.
Once the data have been stored on the T B, the CS instructs the mix server that
is currently mixing to transmit them to the next mix server in the plan. Obvi-
ously, a dishonest CS can change the order of the execution and break robustness
by refusing to send commands to the mix servers. When the mixing phase is
complete, only the shuﬄed data of the last transient board in the plan are copied
onto the VB. Currently, a significant omission is that neither the data transmit-
ted between the mix servers nor the final sequence of mixes is posted anywhere
for public verification. Consequently, Ximix does not currently provide universal
verifiability.
Checking Phase
The Mix Net uses static verification, i.e. each mix server maintains separate sets
of commitments to the secret permutation values. At the end of the mixing phase,
these commitments are downloaded by the CS and checked for consistency. No
attempt to verify anything is made during the actual mixing phase (verification
not in-phase with mixing). This stands in contrast to the approach taken by
Verificatum [Wik14], where checking is in-phase with mixing and each mix server
checks the received data before proceeding to the mixing phase. In Ximix, the
8.1. Ximix Mix Net Outline 139
CS Server 1
Primary
Server 2 VB
Initialisation Phase
send.S2(c).S2(h(commit))
Mixing Phase
instruct.1
recv, mix, post
send.S1(M1(c)).S1(h(commit))
instruct.2
recv, mix, post
postDataToVB.2.S2(M2(S1(M1(c)))).S2(h(commit))
mixing success
Checking Phase
checking success
Decryption and Combination Phases
readFromVBData.1?
decrypt
postPartDec.1.P1(pt1,M2(M1(c)))
readFromVBData.2?
decrypt
postPartDec.2.P2(pt2,M2(M1(c)))
CSreadFromVBData?
combine
publish.M2(M1(p))
Faithful run of Ximix
2
Figure 8.2: Message flow in Ximix with two honest servers.
checking is done in the order of the mixing, but after all commitments have been
downloaded. The CS issues periodic RPC challenges as it goes, and up to half the
140
CHAPTER 8. XIMIX: AN RPC MIX NET IMPLEMENTATION WITH LOCAL
BULLETIN BOARDS
input-output relationships are revealed for each mix server. This is done using an
interactive zero-knowledge protocol [CP92] between the CS and the mix servers,
but the produced proof convinces only the verifier (CS), which interacts with the
prover (mix servers). As a consequence, the CS cannot prove to a third party the
correctness of the execution, even if all the mix servers have faithfully followed
the protocol. If cheating is found, the whole process stops and an operator’s
intervention is required; the corrupt mix server is replaced and the whole process
restarts. Otherwise, the execution proceeds with the decryption phase.
Decryption Phase
Assuming checking success, the data from the VB are downloaded by the CS
and decrypted by a quorum (threshold number) of mix servers using El Gamal
threshold decryption, whereby each is asked to provide a partial decryption of the
final list of encrypted data. In this phase, mix servers act as decryption oracles,
in that they partially decrypt what has been output by the last mix server and
they send their partial decryptions only to the CS. Once the CS has received
a threshold number of partial decryptions for each message, it assembles them
into plaintext messages and publishes the fully decrypted one(s). As part of the
decryption process, periodic challenges are issued against the partial decryptions,
using an interactive zero-knowledge proof protocol (IZKP) between the CS and
the mix servers.
8.2 Modelling and Formal Analysis
In the preceding section, Ximix was described based on how it operates and the
way it processes the input messages. In this section, the processes modelling the
individual components of Ximix are presented, as well as how these are composed
into models to be checked for robustness. Before proceeding to the modelling, it
is pertinent to discuss the modelling decisions and assumptions made that apply
throughout this chapter.
Modelling Decisions, Abstractions and Assumptions. Each component
in Ximix is modelled as an individual process, which is a standard technique
when modelling complex systems consisting of subsystems interacting with each
other. When a mix server re-encrypts and shuﬄes a received message, the per-
mutations used are individually hashed, stored locally and kept secret. Taking
this into account, they are abstracted away and instead a symbolic representa-
tion, h(commit), is used, which enables the focus be on the actual data flow and
does not compromise the robustness requirement. In addition, this leads to a
state-space reduction, as not all of the possible permutations that a mix server
can perform are considered, but it is assumed that some valid permutations have
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been applied. Additionally, the cryptographic primitives have been abstracted
away and it is now a matter of encrypting and decrypting the mixed messages.
Furthermore, as it has been described in Section 7.5, the intruder cannot imper-
sonate an honest mix server and cannot produce invalid zero-knowledge proofs
but instead he can generate valid messages that deviate from the protocol. In
this case, the corresponding zero-knowledge proofs are modelled as being correct
and the corrupt mix server cannot be caught and thrown out of the execution.
Moreover, it is assumed that the checking phase will always succeed and for this
reason it is not modelled. No participant wishes to be expelled from the protocol,
and so they provide the checker with valid commitments to secret permutations
when asked to reveal a subset of them.
8.2.1 Channels
In Table 8.1, the channels used to construct the events and processes in this
chapter are described.
8.2.2 Faithful Model of Ximix
Ximix will be used under the strong assumption that all its components faithfully
follow the protocol without deviating from it. Additionally, VEC can tolerate
failure of one mix server, which provides the threshold value. Before the execution
starts, the shuﬄe plan is fed to the mix servers so they know their position
and those of their neighbouring mix servers. Next, each component of Ximix
is modelled and analysed. The complete script for this model can be found at
http://www.tvsproject.org/csp/Ximix faithful.csp.
Command Service. The CS sends instructions to the mix servers and an-
nounces the phase’s success or failure. The instructions are sent in the following
order and sequentially to the mix servers, starting from the head of the shuﬄe
plan, and at the end of the execution of each phase a success event indicates its
successful completion. For example, upon mixing completion, a mixing success
event is performed.
CS(〈〉) = mixing success→ STOP
CS(〈id〉ˆ ids) =
CS instructsToCopy.id→
CS instructsToShuﬄe.id→
CS instructsToCreateTB.id→
CS(ids)

The CS process could have been defined in a more abstract way as an interleaving
process with a sequence of all three events. However, the reason behind its
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Channel Name Type Description
recv M×C Internal to the mix servers and Spy. It is used
to receive a message and renamed to comm.
send M×C Internal to the mix servers and Spy. It is used
to send a message and renamed to comm.
comm P × PP ×M× C Actual communication between the
mix servers and the Spy.
CS instructsToCopy P The CS instructs a mix server to copy the
message sent by another mix server.
CS instructsToShuﬄe P The CS instructs a mix server to mix and
shuﬄe the received message.
CS instructsToCreateTB P The CS instructs a mix server to create a T B
to post the received/produced messages.
postInData P ×M× C The mix servers post the received data onto
their own T B.
postInterData P ×M× C The mix servers post the intermediate pro-
duced data onto their own T B.
postOutData P ×M× C The mix servers post the final produced data
onto their own T B.
postDataToVB P ×M× C The last mix server posts its final produced
data onto the VB.
readFromVBData P ×M The mix servers read from the VB the mes-
sage posted by the last mix server.
postPartDec P ×M The mix servers post a partial decryption of
the message posted by the last mix server
onto the VB.
CSreadFromVBPartDec PMP The CS reads the set of all partial decryptions
from the VB.
publish O The CS combines the partial decryptions for
the same message and publishes it.
Table 8.1: Channels used in constructing the processes for the Ximix Mix Net.
modelling as a recursive process here is because it cuts down the unnecessary
permutations and reduces the produced state space.
Honest mix servers. An honest mix server waits for an instruction sent by
the CS to be received and then starts to operate. It is willing to receive any
structurally correct message signed by the previous mix server in the plan and
then posts that message on its T B. Obviously, the first mix server in the shuﬄe
plan is willing to receive the unmixed vector of messages signed by the primary
mix server. Here, the length of the original unmixed vector of messages is defined
as zero. This behaviour is represented in HON SRVR by the external choice
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over the set of the messages signed by the sender and the set of the hashed
commitments. Then, the CS instructs the first mix server to copy and then
shuﬄe the received message and the execution proceeds to the mixing phase.
HON SRVR(id) =
if id == primaryServer then
2
m∈{m′∈M|#m′=0},
commit∈C
 send.Sid(skid,m).Sid(skid, h(commit))→MIX(id, 1,m);
MIX(id, 1,m)

else
2
m∈{m′∈M|outer(m′)=prev(id)},
commit∈C

CS instructsToCopy.id→
recv.m.commit→
MIX(id, val(id),m);
MIX(id, val(id),m)

Mixing. The mix servers receive an instruction sent by the CS to mix the
received data twice (in order to emulate the RPC pairing) and then the CS
instructs each of them to create a T B on which to store their received data,
the intermediate produced mixed messages as well as the output mixed messages
and all the commitments to the secret permutations for future verification. Once
this has been done, the CS requests the mix servers to transmit only the output
message and the commitments to the secret permutations to the next mix server
in the shuﬄe plan. This is modelled in the MIX process below. Here, the
toBeMixed value indicates the message received from the previous mix server,
which will be mixed twice by the one that is currently in the process of mixing.
The rnd symbolises the round number of the mixing; a mix server proceeds to
the mixing phase only when this value equals its own number in the shuﬄe plan.
MIX(id, rnd, toBeMixed) =
if rnd == val(id) then
2
interData,outData∈M,
commit,interCommit∈C,
finalCommit∈C

CS instructsToShuﬄe.id→
CS instructsToCreateTB.id→
postInData!id!toBeMixed.commit→
postInterData!id.interData.interCommit→
postOutData!id.outData.finalCommit→
send.Sid(skid, outData).Sid(skid, h(finalCommit))→
SKIP

else
2
m∈{m′∈M|outer(m′)=rnd},
commit∈C
 CS instructsToCopy.id→recv.m.commit→
MIX(id, rnd+ 1,m)

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In the case where the round number equals its own index in the shuﬄe plan, the
mix server enters the mixing phase, which is described in the first branch of the
if-else statement above. That is, the mix server is willing to receive instructions
from the CS, stores all the produced data to its transient board and broadcasts
the mixed message (modelled by the send event). Otherwise, if the round number
does not equal its own index, it is willing to receive a mixed message, the round
number is increased by one and the execution returns to the MIX process.
Transient and Visible Board. As has been described earlier, each mix server
maintains a T B, which always allows post and read requests from the correspond-
ing (owner) mix server. The other mix servers are blind to what has been posted
to the other T Bs and when the execution starts, both boards are empty. It will
be made clear later on this chapter that the T B is not being used in the analysis
of the assertions. However, for sake of completeness and due to the fact that a
faithful model of Ximix must be analysed, it is explicitly modelled in this section.
Hence, in the process below and similar to the CS definition, the T B has been
modelled as a sequence of post events in a given order, which resembles the way
it has been implemented by the programmers.
TB(id, inData, interData, outData, interCommit, outCommit) =
2
inD,interD,outD∈M,
inC,outC∈C

postInData!id.inD.inC →
postInterData!id.interD.interC →
postOutData!id.outD.outC →
TB(id, inData
⋃ {inD}, interD, outD, interC, outCommit⋃ {inC})

Compared to the T B, which is visible only to the owner mix server, the VB
can be seen by all the mix servers as well as the CS. The mix servers read
what has been posted there and post their partial decryptions. The CS reads all
the partially decrypted messages, combines them and outputs (posts) the fully
decrypted messages on the VB. In this case, the partial decryption and the
combination processes are run on the CS’s side.
VB(primaryServer, outData, outCommit, partDec) =
2
id∈P,outD∈M,
outC∈C,newPartDec∈MP

postDataToVB.id.outD.outC → VB(. . . , outD, outC, . . . )
2 readFromVBData.id!outData→ VB(. . . )
2 postPartDec.id.newPartDec→ VB(. . . , partDec⋃ {newPartDec})
2 CSreadFromVBPartDec!partDec→ VB(. . . )

Decryption. Following checking success, the execution proceeds to the decryp-
tion phase, where each mix server is asked to provide a partial decryption of the
final list of encrypted data. Each mix server, in turn, reads them and posts a
partial decryption of those messages of threshold or greater length. After all
the mix servers have posted a partial decryption on the VB, the CS announces
8.2. Modelling and Formal Analysis 145
decryption success, by performing a decryption success event. This is illustrated
in the DECRYPT and PART DEC processes below.
DECRYPT = checking success→ PART DEC(ShuﬄePlan)
PART DEC(〈〉) = decryption success→ STOP
PART DEC(〈id〉ˆ ids) =
readFromVBData.id?m : {m′ ∈M | outer(m′) = last(ShuﬄePlan)} →

if #m ≥ threshold then
postPartDec.id!Pid(ptid, seq(m), zkp)→
PART DEC(ids)
else
SKIP

Combination. Finally, following decryption success, the CS reads from the
VB the set of all posted partial decryptions. Once a threshold number of par-
tial decryptions for each message has been posted on the VB, the CS combines
(assembles) them into the plaintext messages and publishes the fully decrypted
one(s). In this subsection, it is assumed that all the mix servers are honest and
thus, the set PartDecryptMessages contains partial decryptions of length equal to
the number of mix servers, N . The published message shows that the plaintext
has been mixed by all the (honest) mix servers in the shuﬄe plan.
COMBINE = decryption success→
CSreadFromVBPartDec?partDecData→
publish.MN (MN−1(. . .M1(p) . . . ))→
STOP
Putting the Network Together. A global perspective of the honest mix server
does not perform just send and recv messages, but rather, is defined in terms
of the connections a mix server shares with others. In this case, each send is
renamed to an outgoing comm.id.{x} and forwards the sent message only to the
next mix server, x. Likewise, each recv is renamed to an incoming comm.x.{id},
where x is the previous mix server. The importance of renaming the send and
recv events is that the honest mix servers do not know the incoming messages
and how they arrived: they see the protocol only in terms of the HON SRVR
process. When the system is analysed, however, the renaming of these events
allows for the protocol to be seen from a networking perspective.
The HON SRVR process is renamed to renHON SRVR, as shown below. Obvi-
ously, the last mix server in the shuﬄe plan does not do any send, but instead
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posts its output data onto the VB. Similarly, the first mix server is willing to
receive only the unmixed messages from the primary mix server.
renHON SRVR(id) = HON SRVR(id)
[[ comm.id.{x}.m.c/send.m.c m∈M,c∈C,val(x)=val(id)+1 ]]
[[ comm.x.{id}.m.c/recv.m.c m∈M,c∈C,x=prev(id) ]]
Using alphabetised parallel, each mix server is put in parallel with the associated
T B, constructing then the OP process.
OP(id) = renHON SRVR(id) αrenHON SRVRid‖αTBid TB(id, ∅, empty, empty, empty, ∅)
Note that ∅ symbolises an empty set and the data-type value empty represents
the initial empty state of the board. Now that an OP process has been created
for each mix server, the next step is to combine them together, synchronised over
the common comm events. The resulting MIXING NO CS process is described
below.
MIXING NO CS = ‖
id∈H[
⋃
αrenHON SRVRid, αTBid] OP(id)
Adding the CS is the next step in building the system and the resulting MIXING
process is depicted in Figure 8.3.
MIXING = MIXING NO CS ⋃
id αrenHON SRVRid,αTBid
‖αCS CS(ShuﬄePlan)
Based on the modelling assumptions presented earlier in this section, and con-
necting the channels of the various processes so they can synchronise, the final
SYSTEMXimix process can be produced, which is defined in terms of the parallel
composition of all the following processes, synchronised on their common events.
SYSTEMXimix = MIXING ‖ DECRYPT ‖ COMBINE ‖ VB(primaryServer, empty, empty, ∅)
Robustness Check. Now it is necessary to verify whether the system satis-
fies the robustness requirement or not and to check this requires determining
whether a fully decrypted message is always output. For this purpose, the spec-
ification process RBST is created, which always performs an output event. The
Failures/Divergences model, FD, is used to check that it is not possible for the
model to diverge or deadlock before the occurrence of an output event. As all
events other than publish have been hidden and all publish events renamed to
output, this checks that no loops or deadlocks exist prior to the performance of
some publish. Hence, this captures the robustness requirement that output of a
valid and fully decrypted message is guaranteed. Supplementary sanity checks as
well as the analysis of interesting traces and the produced state-space are covered
in Section 8.5.
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Figure 8.3: Ximix’s MIXING process, where mix server 2 plays the primary role.
Here, each green dashed circle represents an OP process. For clarity, all post
events a mix server can perform have been renamed to a single post event, and
the instructions sent by the CS to a single instruct.id event, where id is the
index of the mix server, which the CS talks to. It should be noted that in this
sequential execution, the last mix server, 3, does not perform a send event, but
instead, posts its output data onto the VB.
RBST = output→ (RBSTuSTOP)
RBST vFD (SYSTEMXimix \ Σ8{| publish |})[[output/publish.m |m∈O]]
To perform a rigorous analysis of the system an intruder model must be included.
To this end, in the next section, such a model is placed in parallel with the
SYSTEMXimix process defined here. How the intruder can violate the robustness
requirement is investigated as well as other attacks it can mount. Additionally,
the system in the presence of a dishonest CS is analysed.
8.3 Adapting the Intruder Model
In the previous section, Ximix was modelled and verified under the assumption
that all the components are honest. However, this is a strong assumption; a sys-
tem consisting of honest participants is of little interest. In this section, Roscoe
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and Goldsmith’s perfect Spy [RG97, Ros98] is used as the basis of the threat
model and whether Ximix still meets the robustness requirement is investigated.
A detailed analysis of the Spy has been given in Section 7.5, where it was men-
tioned that a dishonest mix server cannot masquerade (impersonate) as an honest
mix server. This can be described in the following scenario. In a Mix Net with
three mix servers, two of them are honest and one dishonest. In the case where
the Spy could impersonate an honest mix server, he could then disrupt the result
by removing the honest participants and use an invalid mix as output. However,
this is not an acceptable behaviour in the protocol described here because the
intruder cannot masquerade as an honest mix server. The Spy described in this
section will also be used in Section 8.4, subject to some minor modifications, so
as to accommodate the behaviour of the proposed scheme. The complete script
for this model can be found at http://www.tvsproject.org/csp/Ximix Spy.csp
Here, the Spy plays the role of a mix server that can receive ingoing messages
over a learn channel, infer events based on received messages as well as its initial
knowledge and then say messages that it has inferred. This intruder model pro-
vides active attacks against the system, by blocking outgoing messages and send-
ing those that deviate from the protocol. The Spy is constructed using the same
approach as that taken by Roscoe and Goldsmith, with respect to the messages
of the Ximix system. A slight modification to the intruder’s initial knowledge is
required, that is, it now contains the assigned share of the distributed secret key,
pt.
InitialKnowledge = P ∪ {Mi, ski, pti | i ∈ D} ∪ {pki | i ∈ P} ∪ {c}
This additional knowledge leads to another deduction rule, as shown below.
deduction(X) = {({m, pti},Pi(m, pti, zkp)) | Pi(m, pti, zkp) ∈ X ,m ∈M}
This rule permits a partially decrypted message to be constructed from the knowl-
edge of the message and the share of the secret key. Consequently, the intruder is
able to post any partially decrypted message onto the VB in order to confuse the
combiner. However, it is not possible for him to decompose an already partially
decrypted message. Nevertheless, he should provide evidence of the correctness
of the operation, otherwise, he will be caught and removed from the protocol;
however, this behaviour is not captured in the modelling. That is, although he
is able to construct any partial decryption, he gains no benefit from posting an
invalid message.
Apart from the channels learn, say and infer, that allow messages to be re-
ceived, sent and internally inferred, the Spy has in its alphabet all the events
that an honest mix server can perform, so it can communicate with the other
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components. Furthermore, the Spy can ignore the instructions sent by the CS
by absorbing them and carrying on its operation. An efficient way of doing this
is to have the Spy interleaved with the RUN process, which can always commu-
nicate with any member of the specified set [Ros98] and the process RESOLVE
demonstrates how this is achieved.
RUN(X ) = x : X @ x→ RUN(X )
RESOLVE = renSPY |||RUN(instruct.id | id ∈ D)
In order to compose the Spy with the honest mix server processes renHON SRVR
as well as with the other processes, it must be renamed such that it appropriately
communicates with all the components in SYSTEMXimix.
renSPY = Spy [[ comm.x.{y}.m.c/learn.m.c m∈M,x∈H,y∈D,c∈C,val(x)=val(y)−1 ]]
[[ comm.y.{x}.m.c/say.m.c m∈M,x∈H,y∈D,c∈C,val(x)=val(y)+1 ]]
[[ postDataToVB.y.m.c/say.m.c m∈M,y∈D,c∈C ]]
[[ postPartDec.y.m/say.m.c m∈MP ,y∈D,c∈C ]]
[[ readFromVBData.y.m/learn.m.c m∈M,y∈D,c∈C ]]
In this model of Ximix, the intruder learns messages sent to him only from the
previous mix server and says to the next one in the shuﬄe plan. In the case
where he is the last mix server in the plan, an additional say event is renamed
to postDataToVB and he can post any message that has been learnt. In the
same manner, a say event is renamed to postPartDec, which means that he can
post partial decryptions of messages that he has received. In the next section,
it is shown that the intruder learns all the messages sent to any of the honest
mix servers and he can choose to send different messages to different mix servers,
so each message can be potentially be sent to an individual mix server, that is,
to the singleton {x}, where x is the identity of some honest mix server. The new
SYSTEMSpy process is now defined in terms of the parallel composition of the
SYSTEMXimix and the RESOLVE processes.
SYSTEMSpy = SYSTEMXimix αSYSTEMXimix‖αrenSPY RESOLVE
where, αSYSTEMXimix and αrenSPY, are the alphabets containing all the events
these processes can engage in. Using the assertion presented in Section 8.2, it is
checked that SYSTEMSpy does not satisfy its liveness property, and in Section 8.5
some interesting traces illustrating this behaviour are presented.
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Attack 1: Crashing Spy. Another possible behaviour of the intruder is to
refuse the sending or posting of any message, which is the worst action that the
Spy can take and is modelled here as the SPY CRASH process. In this scenario,
the intruder continues to learn and infer messages, but he can choose to refuse to
communicate any of them, thus resulting in an unstable condition (divergence, in
CSP terms) and the modifications required to achieve this are shown as follows.
First, recall in Section 7.5, the SPY process was described as:
SPY = chase( ‖
f :LearnableFacts
(IGNORANT(f),AlphaL(f))) \ {| infer |} |||SAY KNOWN
Another process, SPY CRASH, is now created, which is described in terms of
the parallel composition of the SPY and CRASH processes, synchronised on the
common say and learn events.
SPY CRASH = SPY ‖
{|say, learn|}
CRASH
where CRASH is defined as:
CRASH = say? ? → CRASH
2
learn? ? → CRASH
2
crash→ CRASH 2
CRASH 2 = learn? ? → CRASH 2
2
crash→ CRASH 2
Here, when composing the SYSTEMSpy, the SPY CRASH process should be
used instead of SPY and the crash event should be added to Spy ’s alphabet.
Figure 8.4 illustrates this intruder’s behaviour and shows that when he decides
to crash, no comm events between the mix servers can occur and hence, the
whole system halts. Here, as can be seen in Figure 8.3, mix server 2 plays the
role of the primary mix server and mix server 1 the role of the Spy. The primary
mix server initialises the Mix Net by communicating the unmixed messages to
the first mix server and the Spy receives the messages, makes the inferences, but
crashes without sending any message to mix server 2. All the other mix servers
are willing to receive a message and then perform their actions, but one never
arrives. In the following section, how this attack can be avoided is shown.
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Figure 8.4: Ximix’s MIXING process in the presence of an intruder who crashes.
In this scenario, no further progress is possible and the whole system diverges.
Attack 2: Denial of Service and Defence. The Spy can also mount a
Denial of Service (DoS ) attack, by perpetually posting messages to the VB, thus
leading the system to a divergence, and one defence against this is to add an
extra constraint that allows only one post (per event) for a dishonest mix server.
This is defined by the NO DIV process.
NO DIV = VB(primaryServer, empty, empty, ∅) |||(post.x? → STOP | x ∈ D)
where, post is an abbreviation for the postDataToVB and postPartDec events the
intruder can perform and “ ” allows any message of the appropriate form.
Attack 3: Dishonest CS. A misbehaving CS can also break robustness. For
example, it can refuse to send instructions to a specific mix server, making it wait
indefinitely, hence causing a deadlock. Additionally, upon receiving a threshold
number of partially decrypted data, it can either refuse to combine them or out-
put an unrelated message. This attack is described in more detail in Section 8.5,
along with the associated traces.
So far, it is apparent that the proposed Ximix is not resilient in the current
implementation, for it is vulnerable to attacks carried out by an intruder and a
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dishonest CS. FDR confirms that the RBST assertion specified in Section 8.2
does not hold. However, there are more attacks than these described in this sec-
tion as these could have been seen easily informally without any formal model.
In the following section, how to make the system robust and what modifications
are needed in order to achieve this are shown.
8.4 Making Ximix Robust
In this section, the changes required to guarantee successful termination in the
presence of the intruder described above are presented. In the modified Ximix,
upon termination, a valid and fully decrypted message is published and any
external party interested in verifying its correctness can do so. One of the pur-
poses of a Mix Net is to distribute the trust among the mix servers, so that
the whole system does not rely on the integrity of a single component. How-
ever, Ximix relies critically on the availability and honesty of the CS. Hence,
the first step in making it robust is to remove the CS and instead, allow the
mix servers to broadcast their messages. In this context, an honest mix server
sends the same message to all the mix servers, while a dishonest one may send
different messages to different mix servers, or refuse to send to some of them.
Also, any external party interested in checking and combining the partial de-
cryptions is allowed to do so, in order to check the fully decrypted messages.
A number of changes to the previous model are needed to accommodate these
decisions, which are described below and the complete script can be found at
http://www.tvsproject.org/csp/Ximix robust.csp.
Honest mix servers. An honest mix server is willing to receive messages from
another mix server, but can timeout before or after receiving it. Here, it is
assumed that the timeout value is sufficiently large that an honest mix server
will have sufficient time to complete its mixing and send the mixed message out.
Adding this behaviour in the system, allows for the execution to continue even
when a dishonest mix server refuses to send messages to some of the honest
ones (simply times out without performing any action). In this case, the honest
mix servers will absorb the timeout and continue to operate. At the end of the
mixing phase, the honest mix servers will have posted on their T Bs at least one
message of threshold length, mixed by the majority of the mix servers. The
requisite changes in the HON SRVR and renHON SRVR processes are shown
below.
HON SRVR(id) =
if id == primaryServer then
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2
m∈{m′∈M|#m′=0},
commit∈C
 send.Sid(skid,m).Sid(skid, h(commit))→timeout→
MIX(id, 1,m)

else
timeout→ MIX(id, val(id),m)
2 2
m∈{m′∈M|outer(m′)=rnd},
commit∈C
 recv.m.commit→timeout→
MIX(id, val(id),m)

The (non-replicated) external choice in the HON SRVR process models the abil-
ity of an honest mix server to timeout before receiving a message, which will only
occur where a dishonest mix server refuses to send anything. Minor changes are
required when renaming this process.
renHON SRVR(id) = HON SRVR(id)[[ comm.id.P 8{id}.m.c/send.m.c m∈M,c∈C ]]
[[ comm.P 8{id}.z.m.c/recv.m.c m∈M,c∈C,z∈P ]]
Here, each send is renamed to a comm.id.P8{id}, broadcasting a message to all
mix servers other than id. Each recv is renamed to an incoming comm.P8{id}.z,
where z can be either a singleton containing only id or a set of mix servers.
Dishonest mix servers. A dishonest mix server learns all messages sent to any
of the honest mix servers (due to the broadcasting manner of communication),
so learn events are renamed to incoming comm.x.P8{id}, where x is an honest
mix server. The renaming of say events is slightly more complicated in that the
Spy is permitted to send messages only to individual servers (singleton sets).
Without loss of generality, this simplifies the modelling: if the intruder wants
to send different messages to different mix servers, he can now do so, and if he
wishes to send the same message to all mix servers, he can send it to each of
them separately.
renSpy = Spy[[ comm.x.P 8{x}.m.c/learn.m.c m∈M,x∈H,c∈C ]]
[[ comm.y.{x}.m.c/say.m.c m∈M,x∈H,y∈D,c∈C ]]
[[ postDataToVB.y.m.c/say.m.c m∈M,y∈D,c∈C ]]
[[ postPartDec.y.m/say.m.c m∈MP ,y∈D,c∈C ]]
[[ readFromVBData.y.m/learn.m.c m∈M,y∈D,c∈C ]]
Mixing. The MIX process shown below is based on that presented in Sec-
tion 8.2, but with the absence of the CS and the addition of timeout. That is,
when it is its turn to mix, an honest mix server shuﬄes the received message,
broadcasts its output message and then times out, which indicates the completion
of its mixing. When it is not its turn to mix, it is willing to perform two actions:
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1. it can timeout and then the round number is incremented by one;
2. it can receive a message from the mix server which is currently mixing, and
then times out by incrementing the round number by one.
MIX(id, rnd, toBeMixed) =
if rnd == val(id) then
2
interData,outData∈M,
commit,interCommit∈C,
finalCommit∈C

postInData!id!toBeMixed.commit→
postInterData!id.interData.interCommit→
postOutData!id.outData.finalCommit→
send.Sid(skid, outData).Sid(skid, h(finalCommit))→
timeout→
MIX(id, rnd+ 1, outData)

else
timeout→ MIX(id, rnd+ 1, toBeMixed)
2 2
m∈{m′∈M|outer(m′)=rnd},
commit∈C
 recv.m.commit→timeout→
MIX(id, rnd+ 1,m)

Decryption. Following checking success, the execution proceeds to the decryp-
tion phase. Here, this is different to what was presented in Section 8.2, where each
mix server was required to decrypt partially the final list of encrypted messages
posted on the VB. Now, having recorded all the messages received in each round
of the mixing phase, the mix servers read these messages, as well as those mixed
and output by them, from their own T Bs, and partially decrypt those of length
equal or greater to the threshold. Two additional channels are introduced for this
reason in this section. The readInData channel of type P × PM, is used by the
mix servers to read the set of all input messages that have been received during
the execution of the protocol. Likewise, the readOutData channel of type P×M,
is used by the mix servers to read, from the associated T B, their output messages.
Obviously, the construction of the T B should now include them and so a new
version of that described in Section 8.2 is presented below.
TB(id, inData, interData, outData, interCommit, outCommit) =
2
inD,interD,outD∈M
inC,outC∈C

postInData!id.inD.inC →
postInterData!id.interD.interC →
postOutData!id.outD.outC →
readInData!id.inData→
readOutData!id.outData→
TB(id, inData
⋃ {inD}, interD, outD, interC, outCommit⋃ {inC})

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The decryption process, DECRYPT, is now defined as the interleaving of the new
PART DEC process for the honest mix servers. Interleaving is employed in order
to highlight the absence of the CS: after mixing and checking, each mix server can
now independently build the set Cand of the messages that have been read and
output during the process and proceed to partial decryption of those of threshold
or greater length. Of course, a dishonest mix server can post, at any time, a
partial decryption of any message, and for this reason is not involved in this
process.
DECRYPT = checking success→
|||
id∈H
PART DEC(id)→
decryption success→
STOP
PART DEC (id) =
2
inData∈PM,
outData∈M
 readInData!id.inData→readOutData!id.outData→
DEC(id, inData
⋃{outData}) ; SKIP

DEC (id, Cand) =
2
m∈Cand

if |Cand| 6= 0 then
if #m ≥ threshold then
postPartDec.id!Pid(ptid, seq(m), zkp)→
DEC(id,Cand8{m})
else
DEC(id,Cand8{m})
else
SKIP

Combination. So far, how the system behaves without the existence of the CS
has been described and as has been explained, this should not affect verification of
the decryption phase. Consequently the ability should be given to any interested
party to verify its correctness. In addition to this, once the partially decrypted
messages have been posted onto the VB, anyone should be able to assemble
them so as to produce the fully decrypted message(s). Having said this, a new
channel is introduced here to accommodate this behaviour. That is, the channel
readFromVBPartDec of type PMP replaces the CSreadFromVBPartDec channel
and it is now part of the COMBINE and VB processes.
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COMBINE = decryption success→
readFromVBPartDec?partDecData→
publish.MN (MN−1(. . .M1(p) . . . ))→
STOP
Ideally, the COMBINE process should not be part of the system, in that it is
sufficient to check whether the same message(s) has/have been partially decrypted
by the honest mix servers, for this guarantees that some valid message(s) will be
fully decrypted. The justification and a detailed description of this idea, as well
as a new robustness assertion are presented in Section 8.5.
Putting the Network Together. The final SYSTEMXimixNoCS process is
now defined in terms of the parallel composition of the new MIXING, DECRYPT,
COMBINE and renSpy processes, as well as the NO DIV process defined in the
previous section.
SYSTEMXimixNoCS = MIXING ‖ DECRYPT ‖ COMBINE ‖ NO DIV ‖ renSpy
Eventually, using the RBST assertion defined in Section 8.2, a check is made to
ensure that the robustness of the system is maintained and the traces described
in the next section provide support for this being the case.
8.5 Results and Analysis
In this section, the protocols are verified against the liveness property and inter-
esting traces illustrating their behaviour are also presented. Each of the traces dis-
cussed in Subsection 8.5.1 were obtained via simulation of the models in ProBE, a
CSP animator (built into FDR3), which allows the user to explore the behaviour
of a process. Due to the number of events occurring in the traces, only those
highlighting the importance of the trace have been kept. For clarity, throughout
this section, traces using three mix servers are given, the shuﬄe plan is always
〈11, 22, 33〉 and 2 is the primary mix server. There are numerous possible cor-
ruption scenarios that can be modelled and analysed, so the most representative
ones have been chosen. Moreover, in Subsection 8.5.2, the state-space explosion
problem is discussed and a solution proposed.
8.5.1 Interesting Traces
To start with, a trace of the SYSTEMXimix process, which is a faithful model of
Ximix where all the components are honest, is considered.
〈CS instructsToCopy.1,
comm.2.{1}.S2(c).S2(h(commit)),
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CS instructsToShuﬄe.1,
CS instructsToCreateTB.1,
postInData.1.S2(c).S2(h(commit)),
postInterData.1.S1(M1(c)).S1(h(commit)),
postOutData.1.S1(M1(c)).S1(h(commit)),
CS instructsToCopy.2,
comm.1.{2}.S1(M1(c)).S1(h(commit)),
. . .
comm.2.{3}.S2(M2(S1(M1(c)))).S2(h(commit)),
. . .
postDataToVB.3.S3(M3(S2(M2(S1(M1(c)))))).S3(h(commit)),
mixing success,
checking success,
readFromVBData.1.S3(M3(S2(M2(S1(M1(c)))))),
postPartDec.1.P1(pt1,M3(M2(M1(c))), zkp),
. . .
decryption success,
CSreadFromVBPartDec.{P1(pt1,M3(M2(M1(c))), zkp), . . . },
publish.M3(M2(M1(p))) 〉
In general, after the decryption success event, the CS combines all the partial de-
cryptions of length greater than or equal to the threshold with preference being
given to longer messages. Hence, in this case, where all the mix servers are hon-
est, M3(M2(M1(p))) is considered the published output as it is of length greater
than the threshold (= 2). Of course, more interesting traces result from checking
the protocol under the existence of the Spy.
In SYSTEMSpy, consider the case where the intruder is the primary mix server,
2, and he starts by sending the unmixed data to the first mix server. The first
mix server is honest, mixes twice the original data, produces its own mixed mes-
sages and communicates them to 2. Now, the intruder decides to act dishonestly
and instead of sending to 3 that received by the first mix server, he sends the
original unmixed data. At this point, the third mix server, being unable to dis-
tinguish which of the preceding mix servers misbehaved, accepts what 2 has sent
and operates on them. As mix server 3 is the last in the shuﬄe plan, it posts a
mixed message of length 1 (mixed only by 3) to the VB. Each server is now in-
structed by the CS to read the posted message and partially decrypt it. However,
none of them will post any partial decryption of the posted message, because it is
of length less than the threshold. Consequently, the CS cannot read or combine
any partial decryptions and the whole process stops without publishing anything,
which clearly violates the robustness requirement. This is demonstrated in the
trace below.
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〈CS instructsToCopy.1,
comm.2.{1}.S2(c).S2(h(commit)),
. . .
CS instructsToCopy.2,
. . .
comm.2.{3}.S2(c).S2(h(commit)),
. . .
postDataToVB.3.S3(M3(c)).S3(h(commit)),
readFromVBData.1.S3(M3(c)),
postPartDec.1.nothing,
. . .
CSreadFromVBPartDec.∅,
STOP〉
A similar behaviour arises when the last mix server is the intruder. Upon receiving
a message from the second mix server, he ignores it, mixes the initial data and
posts them on the VB. No one can now partially decrypt the posted message and
the CS cannot publish anything. In a different scenario described in the trace
below, the intruder, 2, sends the unmixed data to the first mix server and absorbs
the instructions sent by the CS, but refuses to transmit the received messages to
3, thus resulting in deadlock. This is because the last mix server is waiting to
receive a message from 2, but it never arrives.
〈. . .
comm.1.{2}.S1(M1(c)).S1(h(commit)),
. . .
CS instructsToCopy.2,
. . .
CS instructsToCopy.3,
×〉
The intruder can also crash without communicating any message. In this case,
the whole system diverges and this is illustrated in the trace below.
〈crash,
crash,
. . .
crash,
. . . 〉
However, as has been seen in Section 8.3, the CS can also break the robustness.
That is, the empty trace 〈×〉 illustrates the scenario in which the CS does not
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send a copy instruction to the first mix server. Although the mix server is al-
ways waiting to receive and execute it, such an instruction never arrives and the
SYSTEMSpy deadlocks without performing even one event.
In the revised system, SYSTEMXimixNoCS , in the trace below, the intruder,
acting as a dishonest mix server, 1, times out without sending any message in the
mixing phase, but this does not prevent the other mix servers from continuing to
operate.
〈. . .
comm.2.{1, 3}.S2(c).S2(h(commit)), timeout,
timeout,
comm.2.{1, 3}.S2(M2(c)).S2(h(commit)), timeout,
. . .
comm.3.{1, 2}.S3(M3(S2(M2(c)))).S3(h(commit)), timeout,
. . .
postPartDec.1.P1(pt1,M2(c), zkp),
postPartDec.2.P2(pt2,M3(M2(c)), zkp),
postPartDec.3.P3(pt3,M3(M2(c)), zkp),
readFromVBPartDec.{P1(pt1,M2(c), zkp),P2(pt2,M2(M2(c)), zkp),
P3(pt3,M3(M2(c)), zkp)},
publish.M3(M2(p))〉
Having received nothing from the first mix server, mix server 2 mixes the origi-
nal data (which are visible to everyone on the VB) and broadcasts them to {1,
3}. Honest 3 operates similar to mix server 2 and posts its own mixed data
onto the VB. All the mix servers now proceed with the partial decryption of the
messages that they have received during the mixing phase and post them onto
the VB. The intruder can choose either to post a valid partial decryption of a
message of correct length or a partial decryption of a message of different length
or not to post anything. None of these actions can violate the robustness of the
system: enough partial decryptions of the same message (posted by the honest
mix servers) appear on the VB. For example, with this trace he chooses to post
a partial decryption of the message received by the second mix server and it is
of length 1. Any external party can now combine these and publish the fully
decrypted message, in this case M3(M2(p)).
A more interesting behaviour occurs when the intruder sends different messages
to different mix servers, or does not send to some of them, in order to cause a dis-
pute among them. More specifically, the intruder acting as dishonest mix server
2, refuses to communicate the initial data to the first mix server and times out.
Honest mix server 1 reads the initial data from the VB, mixes and broadcasts
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them to {2, 3}. Now, dishonest 2 chooses to send different mixed messages to
1 and 3: he sends a mix of the received messages to 1 and a mix of the initial
data to mix server 3. At this point, mix server 3 cannot work out which of 1 or
2 has misbehaved. When receiving S2(M2(c)) from mix server 2, he might think
that mix server 1 did not mix the initial output and simply forwarded it to 2 (or
timed out). On the other hand, he might think that 2 has ignored the message
from 1 and that the former has mixed the initial data and transmitted them to
him, which is shown in the following trace.
〈timeout,
. . .
comm.1.{2, 3}.S1(M1(c)).S1(h(commit)), timeout,
. . .
comm.2.{1}.S2(M2(S1(M1(c)))).S2(h(commit)),
comm.2.{3}.S2(M2(c)).S2(h(commit)), timeout,
. . .
comm.3.{1, 2}.S3(M3(S2(M2(c)))).S3(h(commit)), timeout,
. . .
postPartDec.1.P1(pt1,M3(M2(c)), zkp),
postPartDec.2.P2(pt2,M2(M1(c)), zkp),
postPartDec.3.P3(pt3,M3(M2(c)), zkp),
readFromVBPartDec.{P1(pt1,M3(M2(c)), zkp),P2(pt2,M2(M1(c)), zkp),
P3(pt3,M3(M2(c)), zkp)},
publish.M3(M2(p))〉
In the partial decryption phase, dishonest 2 is able to post two different par-
tially decrypted messages, both of threshold length: P2(pt2,M2(M1(c)), zkp) and
P2(pt2,M3(M1(c)), zkp). Honest mix server 1 has seen two different messages,
both of threshold length and he partially decrypts the latest to arrive. On the
other hand, honest 3 has enough information to decrypt partially only one mes-
sage and finally, the output is M3(M2(p)).
All these traces describe some of the possible behaviours of the system, and
might not have been appreciated without this analysis. It is easy for the intruder
to break the robustness of the original protocol by choosing not to perform some
specific actions. Regarding the contributions to making the system robust, the
above traces illustrate that whatever actions an intruder is willing to perform,
the robustness of the protocol remains intact. Moreover, in order to make sure
that the proposed changes for making Ximix robust are sound, the system has
been analysed in the presence of a stronger intruder, who controls more than
the threshold number of mix servers (that is, two). As expected, and verified in
FDR, the modified Ximix is not robust in this setting, for under FDR a trace is
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provided whereby two dishonest servers (out of three) can prevent the Mix Net
from completing. The following trace demonstrates this scenario. Here, dishonest
mix servers 1 and 2 simply time out before sending (resp. posting) any message
to honest 3 (resp. VB). Honest 3 mixes the initial data, broadcasts them to {1,
2} and then posts them onto the VB. The dishonest mix servers do not post any
partial decryption on the VB, so the combiner does not have anything to combine
and consequently, the whole execution stops.
〈timeout,
timeout,
timeout,
. . .
comm.3.{1, 2}.S3(M3(c)).S3(h(commit)), timeout,
. . .
postPartDec.3.nothing,
. . .
readFromVBPartDec.∅,
STOP〉
The automated verification of the models, with three mix servers, completes
in a matter of minutes on a modern laptop. However, when adding an extra
mix server, the state space escalates quickly. This problem is explained in the
following section alongside a proposed solution.
8.5.2 State-space Explosion Problem and Solution
Individual checks were performed for each possible instantiation of the models,
with a minority of mix servers being dishonest, with the aim being to test the
inevitability of an output being produced. For the case where three mix servers
were used, six models were checked in total (three for SYSTEMSpy and three for
SYSTEMXimixNoCS). Similarly, in the case where four mix servers were partici-
pating in the process, eight checks, in total, were performed. All checks verified
the inevitability of a publish event, regardless of the behaviour of the dishonest
mix servers and in all these checks, the second mix server was always playing the
role of the primary mix server. An honest mix server is required to post onto
(resp. read from) its internal T B all the received messages, as well as to post
(resp. read) the intermediate and ouputted messages. In a similar fashion, the
mix servers post their partially decrypted messages onto the VB and internally,
the Spy does not need to maintain a T B, as he is able to say any received (or
mixed by him) message. All these communications between the mix servers and
the boards are computationally expensive and increase the overall state-space.
All the checks shown in Table 8.2 have been performed using the robustness
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assertion presented in Section 8.2 and under the existence of the COMBINE pro-
cess, which is responsible for reading and then assembling the partial decryptions
posted onto the VB. In the way the models are constructed, COMBINE is the
most demanding process. That is, the combiner (the CS in SYSTEMSpy and any
interested party in SYSTEMXimixNoCS) is responsible for reading all the par-
tial decryptions from the VB, checking the associated generated zero-knowledge
proofs, combining them into a fully decrypted plaintext message and finally pub-
lishing it. Hence, it is willing to read all the possible sets of partially decrypted
messages and the correct way for implementing it in CSP involves the use of
powersets. Here, each of the honest mix servers is able to decrypt partially any
received message of length greater than or equal to the threshold (in this case,
three). By contrast, the intruder as well as being able to partially decrypt any
message can do so for any length and then post it onto the VB.
PPPPPPPPH,D
System SYSTEMXimix SYSTEMSpy SYSTEMXimixNoCS
RBST States RBST States RBST States
{1, 2, 3} X 45 - - - -
{1, 2, 3, 4} X 56 - - - -
{2, 3}, {1} - - × 5680 NA NA
{1, 3}, {2} - - × 13544 NA NA
{1, 2}, {3} - - × 11882 NA NA
{1}, {2, 3} - - × 57869 NA NA
{2, 3, 4}, {1} - - NA NA NA NA
{1, 3, 4}, {2} - - NA NA NA NA
{1, 2, 4}, {3} - - NA NA NA NA
{1, 2, 3}, {4} - - NA NA NA NA
{1, 2}, {3, 4} - - NA NA NA NA
Table 8.2: The FDR verification results for the models of Ximix. As the state-
space increases quickly with the number of mix servers and the number of partially
decrypted messages, it is not possible for FDR to handle such huge states and
hence, these are denoted as “NA” in the table.
However, in the case when four mix servers are taking part in the SYSTEMSpy
process as well as when three or four mix servers are taking part in the process
SYSTEMXimixNoCS , FDR cannot handle the state-space produced. Using the
assumption that messages are in strictly increasing order, i.e. a mix server can
mix only a message signed by a preceding one, the cardinality of the set contain-
ing all the possible partially decrypted messages increases with the number of
the mix servers and so too the ability of the dishonest mix server to decrypt par-
tially messages of any length. Under this circumstance, and in the case with four
mix servers, in SYSTEMSpy, the cardinality of the set containing all the possible
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partially decrypted messages, PartDecryptMessages, is |PartDecryptMessages| =
15. In this scenario, the combiner is prepared to read any possible combination of
these 15 messages, that is, P(15) = 215 ' 32K, but FDR struggles when perform-
ing such calculations with very big sets. Similarly, in the SYSTEMXimixNoCS ,
and in the cases with three or four mix servers, |PartDecryptMessages| = 12 or
|PartDecryptMessages| = 20, respectively.
An interesting approach to solving this problem, without sacrificing the robust-
ness of the system, is presented here. It has been stated in Section 8.4, that when
removing the CS from the SYSTEMSpy, the combining process is open to public,
which means that it is no more part of the resulting SYSTEMXimixNoCS . Hence,
instead of checking the inevitability of a publish event, what matters is that at
least one (the same) message has been posted onto the VB by the majority of
the mix servers. Having said this and based on the fact that a threshold number
of mix servers is honest, this message will be a correct message and a strong
candidate for being fully decrypted and then published. For this reason, the new
assertion presented below has been used to check whether this is true or not.
On top of this, the combination process is now publicly verifiable, which satisfies
the universal verifiability requirement a Mix Net should comply with. Table 8.3,
shows a significant reduction to the produced state-space and hence that, with
three mix servers a successful verification check of the SYSTEMXimixNoCS is
achieved.
New Robustness Check. So far, all the models of Ximix have been verified
using the robustness check and assertion presented in Section 8.2 that there is in-
evitability of a publish event. Here, as explained above, whether the same message
has been partially decrypted and posted onto the VB by the honest mix servers
is checked. Then, anyone can fully decrypt this message and eventually publish
it. The approach to achieve this is described below.
To start with, a process, LOOP is created, which takes as a parameter a partially
decrypted message, m, and checks whether it is the same with another, n, from
the set of the partially decrypted messages and in the case where they are the
same, the message n is posted onto the VB.
LOOP(m) =
2
n∈MP ,
id∈H
m == n & postPartDec.id.n→ LOOP(n)
The next step is to create a process, RESTRICT, that allows an honest mix server
to post a partially decrypted message onto the VB and then the execution pro-
ceeds to the LOOP process in this message.
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RESTRICT =
2
m∈MP ,
id∈H
postPartDec.id.m→ LOOP(m)
The RESTRICT process should now be placed in parallel with the SYSTEMSpy
and SYSTEMXimixNoCS processes, synchronised on the common events, which
are verified using the new assertion below. The alphabet of the RESTRICT
process contains all the postPartDec events that an honest mix server is willing
to perform. Recall from Section 8.2 that:
RBST = output→ (RBSTuSTOP)
RBST vFD (SYSTEMXimix \ Σ8{| publish |})[[output/publish.m |m∈O]]
Similar to this assertion, here, all events other than postPartDec events that the
honest mix servers can perform are hidden and all the postPartDec events that the
honest mix servers can execute are renamed to output. Then, the new assertion
holds only when the honest mix servers have posted a partial decryption of the
same message onto the VB. In what follows in this section, this new assertion is
used.
RBST vFD (SYSTEMSpy/XimixNoCS \ Σ8{| postPartDec.id | id ∈ H |})
[[output/postPartDec.id.m |m∈MP ,id∈H]]
PPPPPPPPH,D
System SYSTEMXimix SYSTEMSpy SYSTEMXimixNoCS
RBST States RBST States RBST States
{1, 2, 3} X 45 - - - -
{1, 2, 3, 4} X 56 - - - -
{2, 3}, {1} - - × 1858 X 289
{1, 3}, {2} - - × 4400 X 2679
{1, 2}, {3} - - × 3434 X 2060
{1}, {2, 3} - - × 5663 × 1695
{2, 3, 4}, {1} - - NA NA NA NA
{1, 3, 4}, {2} - - NA NA NA NA
{1, 2, 4}, {3} - - NA NA NA NA
{1, 2, 3}, {4} - - NA NA NA NA
{1, 2}, {3, 4} - - NA NA NA NA
Table 8.3: The FDR verification results for the models of Ximix after removing
the COMBINE process. As previously, the honest mix servers are able to posting
partial decryptions of messages of length greater than or equal to the threshold,
while the intruder can post any message of any length.
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A further improvement can be made when restricting the intruder to having the
same behaviour as the honest mix servers only when decrypting messages, in
which case he is able to decrypt only messages of length greater than or equal
to the threshold. However, this does not change his ability to post a message
of a length different to that received. Table 8.4 shows this reduction in the
intruder’s capacity and that it is possible to verify the SYSTEMSpy with four
mix servers, but still feasible to verify the SYSTEMXimixNoCS with this number
of mix servers. Nevertheless, it can be seen that three mix servers are sufficient
to show that the modified Ximix satisfies the robustness requirement.
PPPPPPPPH,D
System SYSTEMXimix SYSTEMSpy SYSTEMXimixNoCS
RBST States RBST States RBST States
{1, 2, 3} X 45 - - - -
{1, 2, 3, 4} X 56 - - - -
{2, 3}, {1} - - × 1858 X 289
{1, 3}, {2} - - × 4400 X 2679
{1, 2}, {3} - - × 3434 X 2060
{1}, {2, 3} - - × 5663 × 1695
{2, 3, 4}, {1} - - × 4906 NA NA
{1, 3, 4}, {2} - - × 11490 NA NA
{1, 2, 4}, {3} - - × 10797 NA NA
{1, 2, 3}, {4} - - × 7186 NA NA
{1, 2}, {3, 4} - - × 27432 NA NA
Table 8.4: The FDR verification results for the models of Ximix after remov-
ing the COMBINE process and restricting the intruder to posting only partial
decryptions of messages of length greater than or equal to the threshold. Addi-
tionally, here, the new robustness assertion is used.
8.6 Omissions and Deviation from the RPC Mix Net
In this section, the omissions found in the snapshot of the source code (taken on
7th January 2014) are pointed out and how they affect the security requirements,
as presented in Section 4.2, is investigated. In addition to this, how Ximix devi-
ates from the original RPC Mix Net [JJR02], and what are the consequences are
covered. However, it should be highlighted that the models of Ximix presented
earlier in this chapter, are based on this version of the source code. All the fol-
lowing findings enhance the belief of this researcher that these omissions should
be addressed before Ximix is used in November 2014.
Currently, the mix servers do not check the integrity of the instructions com-
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ing from the CS, in that they are willing to follow them without assessing their
correctness. For example, as they do not have any control over which commit-
ments to the secret permutations need to be revealed in the checking phase, they
would obey CS’s request for giving out more than half or even all the input-output
correspondence. Clearly, this would break the secrecy of the mixing and there-
fore the secrecy of the elections without being noticed. Apart from this anomaly,
the use of interactive zero-knowledge proofs violates the universal verifiability
property, because they convince only the involved parties about the validity of a
statement and cannot be passed to another verifier. That is, the execution of the
protocol is only a game of two, the prover (here, the mix servers), and the verifier
(here, the CS). On the other hand, a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof can
be shared among all the participants and checked by everyone for its correctness.
For this reason, the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS86] is a strong candidate for achiev-
ing this desired behaviour.
Staying with the public verifiability property, there are a few more oversights
that support this researcher’s argument that Ximix, in this snapshot of the code,
does not satisfy the public verifiability property. For instance, currently, the
CS chooses random commitments to audit, issues periodic challenges as it goes
and checks values without posting them anywhere. In addition to this, when a
mix server finishes its mixing operation, it should publish the produced messages
and commitments on the VB or at least send them to the other servers, preferably
before the auditing phase begins. Ergo, what is posted on the publicly accessible
VB is a crucial theoretical and practical problem in Ximix.
All of the aforementioned omissions found can be addressed with a few changes
to the source code. However, the overall design of Ximix varies significantly to
the original RPC scheme [JJR02], but the proposed changes will have no effect
on the former. One difference between these two original schemes is the use of
transient boards, where the mix servers store their intermediate mixed messages
and the commitments to their secret permutations. In [JJR02], the mix servers
communicate with each other via the WBB, which can be seen as an authenti-
cated broadcast channel. That is, what each mix server produces is signed and
posted on the WBB, alongside a NIZKP of correctness, for public verification.
Contrasting with this, in Ximix, the mix servers are blind to what messages are
stored on the other transient boards and only the decrypted messages are posted
onto the VB. Moreover, only the messages produced by the last mix server in the
shuﬄe plan are posted onto the VB and are visible to all. Consequently, no one
can verify the intermediate messages produced by the other mix servers.
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8.7 Challenges Faced in Modelling
Having described the omissions found in Ximix and how it deviates from the
original RPC proposal, this section presents the challenges faced during its mod-
elling and automated verification. The ultimate challenge is to produce a faithful
model of Ximix. For this reason, the snapshot of the source code taken on 7th
January 2014 was examined, with this being taken as the starting point for the
modelling. However, many changes have been made since then but none of them
affect the architecture of the system. For example, this researcher is aware of the
transformation of the used interactive zero-knowledge proofs to non-interactive
ones (using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic) as well as the fact that the mix servers
do check the integrity of the instructions sent by the CS. Still, even under those
changes, how the messages travel within Ximix remains unaltered and do not
have any effect on the modelling and analysis presented in this chapter.
Another challenge is to model Ximix in a way that is efficient for automated
verification, because the number of states of a CSP system can increase very
quickly, especially for complex systems that consist of a number of components
interacting with each other and placed in parallel. In order to overcome this
challenge, the method followed involved removing the COMBINE process from
the system. In doing so, not only was the current implementation of Ximix with
four mix servers successfully verified, but also the system was made publicly
verifiable, as explained in Section 8.5. It is notable that the number of states ex-
plored in order to check the robustness assertion of the models is relatively small.
However, the way that FDR works in building in advance the whole state-space
and then exploring those states needed for the specified refinement check, makes
it difficult for the SYSTEMXimixNoCS to run with four mix servers. Neverthe-
less, in the current case this restriction does not affect the analysis of the systems.
In the same context, a more sophisticated and efficient construction of the VB
could solve this problem. In its current implementation, when a new element is
posted onto the VB, it is added in an associated set, which consists of elements
of the same type. It is easy to understand that as the cardinality of such sets
increases, FDR struggles in performing calculations with big sets. As seen earlier,
in the case with four mix servers, the cardinality of such a set is 20, which means
the number of all possible subsets is P(20) ' 1M . A more efficient approach
in implementing the VB, would be to handle each of these sets as an individual
process. Then, the VB would be defined in terms of the parallel composition of
all these processes.
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8.8 Summary
In this chapter, a formal modelling and verification of the Ximix Mix Net that
will be used in real large-scale elections in Victoria, Australia, in November 2014,
has been described and conducted. The aim was to be explicit about all the
subtleties of the protocol and to apply sufficient rigour in ensuring its robustness.
It has been demonstrated that Ximix is not robust in the presence of an intruder,
based on Roscoe and Goldsmith’s perfect Spy, and the modifications that are
needed in order to satisfy this liveness requirement have been described. In the
revised Ximix, the election does not rely on the integrity of a single component,
but instead distributes the trust among them. Through a number of examples for
different corruption scenarios, the analysis has demonstrated that Ximix guar-
antees completion and produces a valid output in the presence of a dishonest
component, as it has been described in Section 7.5.
However, from the analysis performed in Section 8.5 it became clearer that the
limitations of the Spy model meant that the security analysis was limited. When
modelling the Ximix Mix Net in this chapter of the thesis, the typical abstractions
to security properties were adopted, whereby cryptographic primitives, such as
digital signatures, encryption and decryption, are treated as symbolic operations
with the appropriate algebraic properties. Additionally, it was assumed that the
intruder cannot impersonate an honest mix server and he decides which to cor-
rupt before the execution starts. Another assumption taken here considers the
use of valid zero-knowledge proofs regardless the honesty of a mix server. That
is, each mix server always produces valid proofs, showing the correctness of the
mixing and shuﬄing operations. In the case where a stronger intruder model is
considered (i.e. a full Dolev-Yao model), all these abstractions should be removed
and explicitly modelled. On top of that, a stronger intruder could intercept and
block every message; this would clearly violate the desired robustness require-
ment. Obviously, weakening the abstractions would result in a stronger security
analysis to find more attacks to the protocol and a bigger state-space.
Additionally, in Subsection 5.7.1 some attacks on the RPC auditing method were
described. Assuming that Ximix correctly checks the permutation commitments,
the scope of the attacks detailed in [KW13] is fairly limited. One of the protec-
tions that vVote has, and to some extent Preˆt a` Voter, is that the ciphertexts are
pre-generated and audited (ballot generation audit). Therefore, there is a very
high assurance that the ciphertexts that are going into the Mix Net are genuine
and unique ciphertexts - since the probability of generating invalid ciphers and
not getting caught is extremely low. The ciphertexts are also pre-committed so
cannot be altered at the time of voting. As such, the attacks which are based on
corrupt senders or modified ciphertexts being submitted are not applicable for
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vVote. Obviously, Ximix is not strictly limited to vVote and could be used in a
different setting where such attacks are applicable. Therefore the attacks that are
applicable are ones that substitute output ciphertexts. Generally, these attacks
alter the number of ciphertexts that can be manipulated with a low probability
of detection, however, even in such circumstances, the probability of getting away
with significant changes decreases rapidly. The overall impact on the schemes as
a whole is also quite limited. RPC is just one type of Mix-Net and neither Preˆt
a` Voter, nor vVote, require RPC to run. A different, proof based, Mix Net could
be substituted in without any significant impact on vVote.
In the next chapter, the first formal analysis and verification of a conventional
WBB-based re-encryption Mix Net is presented. In such Mix Nets, the mix servers
communicate via a trusted WBB that records all the messages posted there.
Hence, they have the same view on what has been posted and can check the
validity of the messages before proceeding to their mixing. The protocol verified
is inspired by the Verificatum Mix Net [Wik14] and removes the reliance on a
WBB during the mixing process.

Chapter 9
A New Mix Net Construction
without a Centralised
Component
In the preceding chapter, a real implementation of a Mix Net protocol was de-
scribed and formally analysed. The whole execution depended on the honesty of
a single entity, which was responsible for sending instructions to the mix servers
to perform some specific operations. Additionally, only the last mix server was
allowed to post the final mixed messages onto the VB. In that setting, it was
not possible for the mix servers to maintain a common view of the intermediate
produced data, as they were stored on the local bulletin boards and the other
mix servers were blind to what posted on them. Regarding this, Ximix’s design
was not in line with the common Mix Net proposals in the extant literature, where
a centralised WBB is used to record the messages produced during the mixing
and decryption phases, and all mix servers have the same view of what has been
posted by the others. The novelty of the work presented in this chapter∗, is the
construction, analysis and automated verification of a new Mix Net inspired by
the Verificatum [Wik14] implementation, which solves a different problem from
that in Chapter 8. That is, it removes the reliance on the public WBB during
the mixing process and instead gives the mix servers the power to decide about
other mix servers’ honesty. Under this approach, the ability of the intruder is
strengthened and he is now able to send different messages to different mix servers
in order to make them disagree upon an agreed output; the notion of a WBB
is maintained only for publishing the final agreed mix message. Since the WBB
approach is the common one in constructing Mix Nets, the work presented in this
chapter can be applied to all Mix Nets of this category.
∗This chapter is mainly based on the published work for the 13th International Workshop
on Automated Verification of Critical Systems (AVoCS 2013) [SWH13].
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The first contribution of this chapter is the formal analysis of a new Mix Net
that performs mixing with no centralised trusted authority in place, but instead,
enables direct communication between the mix servers using authenticated chan-
nels. Rather than posting to and reading from a central WBB that records a
consistent record of all messages sent, each mix server maintains its own local
perspective throughout the rounds of mixing, receiving signed messages broad-
cast to them by other mix servers and broadcasting their own signed messages to
all others. Secondly, it is verified that the proposed protocol meets its require-
ments using the CSP process algebra and the FDR model checker, when in the
presence of a realistic intruder model, based on Roscoe and Goldsmith’s perfect
Spy [RG97]. It is important to analyse Mix Nets’ security properties before us-
ing them, as many constructions have been broken after they were introduced.
Combined, the results show that the proposed protocol guarantees termination
and consensus among a majority of mix servers of the final chain of mixes in
the presence of a minority of dishonest mix servers that do not faithfully follow
this protocol. Before proceeding to the description of the proposed Mix Net,
it is worthwhile explaining the advantages and disadvantages of a WBB-based
Mix Net.
Most of the Mix Net proposals in the literature work under the assumption
that the mix servers communicate via a trusted WBB. With this concept, each
mix server reads what is posted on the WBB, operates according to what is read
and posts back to the WBB. This is illustrated in Figure 9.1, where it can easily
be seen that both robustness and privacy requirements are guaranteed.
WBB
1 2 3
postread postread postread
inputs outputs
Figure 9.1: A conventional WBB-based Mix Net with all components being hon-
est; this is illustrated by colouring them green.
It is clear that no direct communications between the mix servers exist, which is
because theWBB acts as a broadcast channel, broadcasting the same information
to all mix servers. Most of the constructions are based on the strong assump-
173
tion that the WBB is authenticated, tamper-proof and resistant to Denial of
Service (DoS) attacks. Wikstro¨m and Groth [WG06] proposed an adaptively se-
cure Mix Net based on ideal functionalities for aWBB [Wik04]. The Verificatum
Mix Net [Wik14] uses ideas from these works and has inspired the work presented
in this chapter of the thesis. Staying in this context, it is of interest to inves-
tigate how such a Mix Net behaves in the presence of a minority of dishonest
mix servers that refuse to post their data onto the WBB and Figure 9.2 depicts
this behaviour.
WBB
1 2 3
postread 5read post postread
inputs outputs
Figure 9.2: A conventional WBB-based Mix Net with two honest and one dis-
honest mix servers. The honest components are coloured green and the dishonest
red.
Here, the intruder, acting as dishonest mix server 2, reads data from the WBB
but does not post anything. The sketched protocol is not robust in the case where
the honest mix server 3 is perceptually waiting for a message from the dishonest 2
to be posted onto theWBB and hence, the Mix Net does not produce an output.
As will be seen later on in this chapter, this can be fixed by limiting the time
required for a mix server to operate on the read data and post them back onto
the WBB. In this scenario, and in the case where a majority of the mix servers
follow the protocol faithfully, the Mix Net is robust, produces an output and
the privacy of the messages is preserved. Nevertheless, the existence of such a
publicly verifiable site is not realistic and practical in real-life applications, as it
is a single point of failure. That is, if it is unavailable, the entire process stops
and the Mix Net does not complete, thus producing no output, which is clearly
shown in Figure 9.3.
Here, from a modelling point of view, the honest mix servers are willing to per-
form read and post events but they are never offered by theWBB. Consequently,
a deadlock occurs and the whole execution stops, thus violating the robustness,
and subsequently the privacy requirements.
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WBB 5
1 2 3
5 5 5
inputs
outputs
Figure 9.3: A conventional WBB-based Mix Net with a faulty WBB.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 9.1 contains a description of the
proposed protocol that removes the need for a WBB during mixing and this
is followed by the construction of a CSP model of the Mix Net in Section 9.2.
In Section 9.3, the threat model for this part of the research is introduced and
then different models are constructed with the aim of capturing all the intruder’s
possible behaviours. In addition, the extent to which these systems satisfy the
robustness and privacy requirements is reported upon. Interesting traces and
experimental results of the formal analysis of the models are given in Section 9.4.
The challenges faced in this work and the approach taken in order to overcome
them, are discussed in Section 9.5. Finally, the chapter concludes with Section 9.6
which contains a summary of the findings.
9.1 Proposed Mix Net Protocol
In this chapter, a Mix Net that avoids use of a WBB for communication be-
tween mix servers during the mixing process is proposed, which is guaranteed
to terminate in the presence of a dishonest minority. Upon termination of the
mixing process, the mix servers post partial decryptions to the WBB and at
least one valid chain of threshold length will be fully decrypted/agreed upon by
a majority of the mix servers. In other work, distributed consensus protocols,
such as [PSL80], guarantee agreement on a vector of values that includes those
of all honest nodes. However, the requirements of the Mix Nets for the proposed
protocol do not need to be this strong: only some mix of threshold length has
to be agreed by a majority of mix servers and not all honest mix servers’ mixes
need to be included.
The primary difference to the Mix Nets found in the literature is that each mix
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server maintains its own ‘local’ record of the chain of mixes instead of maintain-
ing a consistent ‘global’ record via the WBB. Recall from Section 4.3, that in
this chapter, some notion of aWBB was retained only for publication of the final
mixed data from each mix server and was not involved in the mixing phase. This
is simply because the final results of the mix need somehow to be published, for
obviously, if there is no way at all of making something available permanently
for public consumption then there is no way of effectively completing the mix.
Figure 9.4 illustrates how the data flows in a conventional WBB-based Mix Net
with three honest mix servers.
9.1.1 Requirements
An honest mix server follows the protocol without deviating from it as well as
producing correct shuﬄes and valid proofs of the correctness of the operation.
It sends the same message to all other mix servers using authenticated chan-
nels. Conversely, a dishonest mix server tries to disrupt the protocol such that
it does not terminate, or otherwise, upon termination, causes a dispute among
the honest mix servers. To try and achieve these goals, the intruder acts as a
Byzantine [LSP82] faulty node under the limitation of a perfect cryptography as-
sumption, i.e. he can refuse to send messages, he does not need to send messages
to all other mix servers, and he can try to send messages that he has constructed
that do not necessarily follow the protocol. He can also send different messages
to different mix servers. Moreover, the authenticated broadcast channels en-
able each honest mix server to communicate the same message to all the other
mix servers and then to identify the generator (sender). Finally, if any mix server
receives a message via this channel all others will receive the same message, i.e.
the relation between a WBB and the broadcast channels is close.
The output of a Mix Net should be a complete chain of provably valid mixes.
A chain is considered complete if its length is strictly greater than N2 , where N
is the number of servers, and each mix is a proven valid mix in its sub-chain.
Applying the threshold approach to Mix Nets has been inspired by Chaum et
al. [CCD88] and the multi-party computation problem [Yao82], which is based
on authenticated communication channels without messages losses. Under this
assumption, they proved that if at least 2N3 of the participants are honest, the
desired security properties hold. Similarly, Tabin and Ben-Or [RB89], presented
work based on broadcast channels, where a set of up to half dishonest parties
cannot disrupt the execution and the final output is correct. For the current
research, it is considered that the Mix Net is robust if it always returns such
output, regardless of the behaviour of the dishonest minority. It is conceivable
that not every honest server has a mix represented in the final chain; it is a re-
quirement, however, that at least one mix has been produced by an honest server
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Server 1 Server 2 Server 3 WBB
Initialisation Phase
read.c
Mixing Phase
send.S1(M1, c)
recv.S1(M1, c)
check and update check and update
send.S2(M2,S1(M1, c))
recv.S2(M2,S1(M1, c))
check and update check and update
send.S3(M3,S2(M2,S1(M1, c)))
recv.S3(M3,S2(M2,S1(M1, c)))
check and update check and update
Posting onto the WBB
post.M3(M2(M1(c)))
post.M3(M2(M1(c)))
post.M3(M2(M1(c)))
agree.{1, 2, 3}.M3(M2(M1(c)))
Conventional WBB-based Mix Net
Figure 9.4: Message flow in a conventionalWBB-based Mix Net with three honest
mix servers.
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so as to maintain privacy. Having at least one honest mix server in the Mix Net,
the desired privacy requirement is not always maintained. This is highlighted in
Section 9.4 where a majority of corrupt mix servers can violate both the privacy
and robustness requirements by excluding the honest minority from the protocol
run and subsequently from the final output message. However, this is not possi-
ble to happen when the majority of the mix servers are honest and therefore it is
guaranteed that there will always be one honest mix server included in the final
output. In this case, no protocol participant is able to reveal the correspondence
between its input and output messages and privacy is maintained.
9.1.2 Protocol description
When the protocol starts, all mix servers are provided with the initial list of un-
mixed ciphertexts, c, as the initial candidate mix to be mixed. Each mix server
has a unique identity between 1 and their total number N . Mix server 1 is the
first mixer and all mix servers maintain a counter to record the identity of the
current mix server. Initially, mix server 1 re-encrypts c using new randomness
and shuﬄes using its own local and secret permutation values, thus producing the
mix M1(c). To prove the correctness of the re-encryption and shuﬄing, it proves,
in zero-knowledge, that M1(c) was formed correctly from c, producing the proof
ρ(M1(c)). Different methods for proving the correctness of such operations have
been proposed in the literature [JJR02, GMR85]. In this work, Fiat-Shamir’s
heuristic [FS86] is employed, where the challenge/response messages can be re-
placed with a single message. It then signs these two values along with c, with its
own signing key, to produce S1(M1(c), ρ(M1(c)), c). Such messages, called chains
in this work, are attributed a length 1, as it has just one layer of mixing and
signing.
The other mix servers acting as checkers wait to receive the first mixer’s signed
output or for a timeout to occur. Each checker extracts the message from inside
the signature and checks the proofs against the latest mix. In later rounds they
will also have to do this for the inner signatures and inner proofs. If any of the
proofs do not check out, then the message is rejected and the checker waits for a
message containing valid proofs to arrive or for a timeout to occur. If the message
is valid, i.e. is a chain containing a complete sequence of valid proofs, then its
length is calculated by counting the number of layers of signatures. It is impor-
tant to mention here that, if the length of the chain is equal to or exceeds the
length of the checker’s current candidate chain, this is updated to be that most
recently received; otherwise it remains unaltered. Each mix server increments
the counter and, if it is its turn, it performs the mixing.
Having received the message S1(M1(c), ρ(M1(c)), c) and verified the signature
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and proof of mixing, the second mix server mixes M1(c) to produce M2(M1(c))
and must also produce the associated zero-knowledge proof ρ(M2(M1(c))). It
signs its own mix, the proof and the received message to produce the message
S2(M2(M1(c)), ρ(M2(M1(c))),S1(M1(c), ρ(M1(c)), c)), which is a complete chain
of length two. As these chains will get longer as the protocol proceeds, these are
abbreviated to S2(M2, S1(M1, c)).
Figure 9.5, illustrates the messages exchanged in a run of the protocol in the
presence of three honest mix servers faithfully following it. Following receipt of
the first two messages, the third mix server acts as mixer and sends the mes-
sage S3(M3, S2(M2,S1(M1, c))) to the other two mix servers. All the mix servers
maintain a record of the valid chains that they have sent or received during the
protocol that are larger than N2 , where N is the number of mix servers in the
Mix Net. Subsequently, they post all such chains, partially decrypted, onto the
WBB and hence, a polynomial number of different outputs will appear on the
WBB. Any chain that has been partially decrypted by at least a majority of
mix servers can be used as the final output, with preference being given to the
longest.
2
1 3
S2(M2, S1(M1, c))
S1(M1, c) S3(M3, S2(M2,S1(M1, c)))
Figure 9.5: A Mix Net with three honest mix servers.
9.2 Modelling and Formal Analysis
In this section, the processes and specifications used to model and analyse the
Mix Net for the current work are presented. That is, the processes for modelling
the honest mix servers are described, whilst in Section 9.3 the intruder is intro-
duced and the dishonest mix servers modelled. Subsequently, these processes are
composed into models to be checked for robustness and privacy. The complete
script can be found at http://www.tvsproject.org/csp/mixnet.csp.
9.2.1 Honest mix servers
The behaviour of the honest mix servers can be split into four phases: (i) checking
before mixing ; (ii) mixing ; (iii) checking after mixing ; and (iv) posting the results
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to the WBB. The first mixer will, of course, perform no checking before mixing
and the final mixer will carry out no checking after mixing.
Checking before Mixing. The CHKBM process models the initial phase of
checking before mixing. Using toBeMixed, the honest checker keeps track of the
chain that it will use once it becomes a mixer, and also records the identity of
the current mixer, curr. In contrast to the behaviour described in Section 8.2,
where the mix servers were willing to receive and mix any structurally correct mix
from the previous mix server, here, the checkers are willing to receive any valid
mix, represented in CHKBM by the external choice over valid chains signed by
the current mixer, but block the receipt of invalid mixes, and those signed by a
server who is not the current one. This abstracts away the behaviour of receiving
a mix containing an invalid proof, or an incorrectly signed message. If a checker
times out before (resp. after) receiving a valid chain, then toBeMixed remains
the same (resp. is updated with the new chain, if it is not shorter than the last)
and curr is incremented by one.
CHKBM(id, curr, toBeMixed) =
if curr < id then
timeout→ CHKBM(id, curr + 1, toBeMixed)
2 2
m∈{m′∈M|outer(m′)=curr}

recv.m→
timeout→
if #m ≥ #toBeMixed then
CHKBM(id, curr + 1,m)
else CHKBM(id, curr + 1, toBeMixed)


else MIX(id, curr, toBeMixed)
Mixing. If the mix server counter is its own, it enters the mixing phase, mod-
elled by the MIX process below. It performs the mixing using toBeMixed, and
broadcasts a new chain to the other mix servers. Honest mix servers do not time
out before sending a message (as in the previous chapter, it is assumed that the
timeout value is sufficiently large that an honest mix server will have time to
complete its work and send the result out). Thereafter, the mix server need not
keep track of toBeMixed as it will not need to perform any more mixing. The
current mix server counter is incremented by one, and the mix server continues
to be involved in checking other servers’ mixes, that is, it continues on to the
checking after mixing, CHKAM, process.
MIX(id, curr, toBeMixed) = send.Sid(Mid, toBeMixed)→timeout→
CHKAM(id, curr + 1)

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Checking after Mixing. In the checking after mixing phase, checkers can time
out before or after receiving a valid chain, in a similar manner to the previous
checking phase. Once curr exceeds the total number of mix servers, the mixing
protocol terminates as modelled by the mixing success event and the mix server
is now ready to post its results onto theWBB, which is described in the CHKAM
process below.
CHKAM(id, curr) =
if curr ≤ N then
timeout→ CHKAM(id, curr + 1)
2 2
m∈{m′∈M|outer(m′)=curr}
 recv.m→timeout→
CHKAM(id, curr + 1)


else mixing success→ STOP
Each mix server must record all chains it has sent or received during mixing, and
post partial decryptions of those with length greater than N2 . Comparing to the
approach taken when describing the model in Chapter 8, where each mix server
was posting a received message onto its own private transient board, here, it
should be assumed that a mix server has the capacity to record the received
messages, acting then as a n-place buffer.
Posting onto theWBB. A particular mix could become known to a mix server
in a number of ways. For instance, it could feasibly have arrived several times
in messages signed by different mix servers. Like the various learnable facts in
Roscoe and Goldsmith’s perfect Spy [Ros98], a mix server starts off being ignorant
of each possible mix, as modelled by the IGN process. Note that IGN is defined
in terms of a mix, sq, where sq is a sequence of mixes i.e. M3(M2(M1(c))) in the
case of a Mix Net with three honest mix servers. The mix can be learnt, after
which it becomes known and thereafter it can be said. The mix server could also
calculate the mix itself from its toBeMixed value, modelled here as say, which
can only occur in synchrony with the MIX process. Otherwise, the protocol
terminates before the occurrence of a learn or say of this mix and hence, the
process deadlocks. Once known, a mix could potentially be learnt or said again
in the KNW process, without changing the state. Following a done event, the
mix can be posted to the WBB, as long as the chain is over the threshold length,
as defined in PST.
IGN(sq) = done→ STOP2 learn.sq → KNW(sq)
2 say.sq → KNW(sq)

KNW(sq) = done→ PST(sq)2 learn.sq → KNW(sq)
2 say.sq → KNW(sq)

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PST(sq) = if #sq > N2 thenpost.sq → PST(sq)
else STOP

To realise when a mix is received via a message, each learn.sq is renamed to all
possible recv.m in which the message would return the corresponding mix, and
likewise, say.sq is renamed to all possible send.m. The renamings of all IGN
processes, one for each possible mix, are composed in parallel, synchronising only
on the one event their alphabets share, namely done. Subsequently all send,
recv and done events are synchronised with the process CHKBM(id, 1, c), which
initialises the local perspective of the mix server, id, with the current mix server
counter set to the first mixer and the toBeMixed parameter set to the unmixed
value c. This behaviour is illustrated in the HON SRVR process.
HON SRVR(id) = CHKBM(id, 1, c) ‖
{|send,recv,done|}
(‖
sq∈MM IGN(sq)
[[ recv.m,send.m/learn.sq,say.sq m∈M,seq(m)=sq ]])
Similar to Subsection 8.2.2, from a global perspective, the honest mix server
is not just concerned with the send and recv of messages, for the connections
it shares with others are also important. Hence, each send is renamed to an
outgoing comm.id.P8{id}, distributing the sent message to all mix servers other
than id. Likewise, each recv is renamed to an incoming comm.x.Z, where x is
some mix server other than id, and Z is either the singleton set containing only
id or the set of all mix servers other than x. Honest mix servers will send to
everyone, whereas, as mentioned above, a dishonest one could choose to send
different messages to different mix servers or choose to send messages to some
mix servers but not others. The mix server does not know how the message
arrived: he sees the protocol only in terms of the HON SRVR process. However,
when analysing the system, it can been seen which messages were distributed to
whom by synchronising the various renHON SRVR processes and this gives a
view of the protocol from a networking perspective. The post event is renamed
in a similar fashion, such that groups of mix servers can synchronise on an agree
event and then model the threshold decryption.
renHON SRVR(id) = HON SRVR(id)
[[ comm.id.P 8{id}.m/send.m m∈M ]]
[[ comm.x.Z.m/recv.m m∈M,x∈P 8{id},Z∈R,x/∈Z,id∈Z ]]
[[ agree.Z.sq/post.sq sq∈MM ,Z∈PP,|Z|>N2 ,#sq>N2 ]]
The final models are constructed using alphabetised parallel composition. As
things stand, if both are honest, mix server 1 will communicate with mix server 2
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each time 1 sends a mix to all mix servers via comm.1.P8{1}. In addition to
mix server 2 being willing to receive this message, it is also willing to com-
municate via comm.1.{2} as, locally, it is unable to distinguish the two types
of communication. Moreover, the alphabetised parallel composition will ensure
that no events comm.1.{2} ever occur in the model, as long as the appropriate
alphabets are defined. The alphabet of mix server id is defined below.
αHON SRVR(id) = {comm.id.Z.m |m∈M,Z∈R,id/∈Z}
∪{comm.y.Z.m |m∈M,y∈P 8{id},Z∈R,id∈Z,y/∈Z}
∪{agree.Z.m |m∈M,Z∈PP,|Z|>N
2
,id∈Z,#m>N
2
}
∪{timeout, done}
A system can already be composed in which all the mix servers are honest, that
is, D = ∅.
ALLHON = ‖
id∈H[αHON SRVR(id)] renHON SRVR(id)
To perform a more rigorous analysis an intruder model must be included.
9.3 Adapting the Intruder Model
The intruder model presented in this section has just a few differences to the
one in Section 7.5. The Spy process has in its alphabet the channels learn, thus
allowing information to be received, and say, thereby permitting messages to be
sent. Internally, infer actions allow messages to be inferred such that additional
say actions may become possible, that is, additional messages can be sent once
they have been deduced by the intruder. In order to compose Spy with the honest
mix server processes renHON SRVR, Spy is renamed so that it appropriately
communicates with the other mix servers.
renSPY = Spy
[[ comm.id.P 8{id}.m,comm.max(D).{id}.m/learn.m,say.m m∈M,id∈H ]]
[[ agree.Z.seq(m)/say.m m∈M,Z∈PP,|Z|>N
2
,Z8H6=∅,#m>N
2
]]
Each say event is renamed to comm.max(D).{id}. Locally, the mix servers are
unable to distinguish where messages have originated from, and so it does not
matter which of the identities of the dishonest mix servers the intruder uses to
send messages. As such, the number of transitions are reduced, for the intruder
can use only the highest numbered dishonest mix server, without limiting his
capability to attack the protocol. The intruder can send different messages to
different mix servers, so each message is sent to an individual mix server, that is,
to the singleton set {id}, where id is the identity of some honest mix server. If
the intruder wishes like the honest servers to send the same message to all mix
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servers, he simply unicasts the same message to each honest one. Figure 9.6,
demonstrates how the data flows in the proposed Mix Net, in the presence of
an intruder who corrupts a mix server and sends different messages to different
mix servers.
Additionally, the intruder learns all the messages sent to any of the dishonest
mix servers’ identities, so it is not necessary for, say, dishonest mix server 1 to
send messages to dishonest mix server 2. As the intruder learns all messages
sent to any of the mix servers’ identities, and all honest mix servers send to all
mix servers other than themselves, learn events are renamed to comm.id.P8{id},
where id is again the identity of some honest mix server. The intruder may be
tasked with contributing to the group agreements of the final output, so the say
events should also be renamed to agree.Z events, where Z is any set of servers
that contains the identity of at least one dishonest mix server.
Use of the alphabetised composition operator ensures that the mix servers are
synchronised on appropriate events.
αSPY = {comm.id.P8{id}.m|m∈M,id∈H}
∪{comm.x.Z.m |m∈M,x∈D,Z∈R,x/∈Z}
∪{agree.Z.m |m∈M,Z∈PP,|Z|>N
2
,Z8H6=∅,#m>N
2
}
Now that the processes that capture the behaviour of the honest and dishonest
mix servers have been constructed, it is possible to compose them together for
analysis.
9.3.1 Systems and Assertions
Three systems are constructed for the analysis of the protocol. Each involves a
set of honest mix servers that follow the protocol faithfully, and may include an
intruder that has control over a subset of mix servers, receiving any message sent
to them. Initially, the first system, SYSTEMALLHON is developed, in which all
the mix servers faithfully follow the protocol. In this case, it is expected that they
all agree on the longest of the mix chains that is sent on the network, received in
the final round and each posts a partial decryption of this chain onto the WBB.
If more than half of the mix servers post a partial decryption of the same chain
to the WBB, then this decrypted chain of mixes will be considered as the final
output of the mix. This output is modelled in the system as a synchronous agree
event among a majority of mix servers agreeing on the output message and the
goal is to check that it is guaranteed that some agree event occurs.
Once the intruder model is introduced, it will be possible that some chains have
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Server 1
Corrupt
Server 2 Server 3 WBB
Initialisation Phase
read.c
Mixing Phase
send.S1(M1, c)
check and update check and update
send.S2(M2,S1(M1, c))
check and update check and update
send.S3(M3,S1(M1, c))
check and update check and update
Posting onto the WBB
post.M3(M1(c))
post.M3(M1(c))
agree.{1, 3}.M3(M1(c))
A New Mix Net Construction with a Corrupt mix server
Figure 9.6: Message flow in the proposed Mix Net, where the second mix server
is corrupt.
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been received by some mix servers but not by others. For this reason, the ren-
Spy process is placed in parallel with the SYSTEMALLHON , synchronised on
their common events, thus resulting in the second system, SYSTEMSpy. The Spy
model used in this section is the same with the one introduced in Section 8.3 with
respect to the new set of messages.
SYSTEMSpy = SYSTEMALLHON αALLHON‖αSPY renSPY
where
αALLHON =
⋃
({αHON SRVR(id) | id ∈ H})
The third system is now built in which the intruder outputs no chain, in an
attempt to stop any being agreed upon by a threshold of mix servers and this is
described in the SYSTEMSpyNoAgree process below.
SYSTEMSpyNoAgree = SYSTEMALLHON αALLHON‖αSPY (renSPY ‖
{|agree|}
STOP)
Robustness Check. Now it is necessary to verify whether these systems satisfy
the robustness requirement or not and the same RBST specification process as
has been introduced in Section 8.2 is used.
RBST = agreement→ (RBSTuSTOP)
Using the Failures/Divergences model, FD, a check below is made that it is not
possible for the first system, SYSTEMALLHON , to diverge or deadlock before the
occurrence of the agreement event. As all events other than agree have been
hidden and all agree ones renamed to agreement, this checks that no divergences
or deadlocks exist prior to the performance of some agree. Thus, this captures
the robustness requirement that agreement on some complete and valid mix is
guaranteed.
RBST vFD (SYSTEMALLHON \ Σ8{| agree |})[[agreement/agree.X.sq |X∈PP,sq∈MM ]]
The same robustness requirement is checked for the second model, SYSTEMSpy,
that is, it will be possible that some chains have been received by some mix servers
but not by others and whether this assertion holds is checked in FDR.
RBST vFD(SYSTEMSpy \ Σ8{| agree |})[[agreement/agree.X.sq |X∈PP,sq∈MM ]]
Now the same refinement check is performed on the third model in which the
intruder outputs no chain, in an attempt to stop any being agreed upon by a
threshold of mix servers. Similar to above, a check is made in FDR that the
robustness of the system is maintained.
RBST vFD(SYSTEMSpyNoAgree \ Σ8{| agree |})[[agreement/agree.X.sq |X∈PP,sq∈MM ]]
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Privacy Check. Also, a message has to be private as explained in Subsec-
tion 9.1.1 and so a check is made that no majority of mix servers can agree on a
non-private mix. The following process can agree to perform an infinite sequence
of agree events.
PRIV = 2
X∈PP,
y∈{sq∈MM |private(sq),#sq>N2 }
agree.X.y → PRIV
In this process, the recursive function private takes as a parameter a mix chain
and checks whether at least one value in the mix belongs to an honest mix server.
It is defined as:
private(〈c〉) = false
private(〈mx〉ˆ s) = if owner(mx) ∈ H then true else private(s)
where, owner is the function which returns the identity of the mix server to whom
a given mix value belongs. Using the Traces model, T , inclusion of some honest
mix is guaranteed in the agreed output, that is, the PRIV is trace-refined by the
constructed systems. Then a check is made in FDR that the assertions below
hold for all three models.
PRIV vT SYSTEMALLHON \ Σ8{| agree |}
PRIV vT SYSTEMSpy \ Σ8{| agree |}
PRIV vT SYSTEMSpyNoAgree \ Σ8{| agree |}
However, the PRIV and SYSTEM processes are not trace equivalent because
the opposite direction of the above checks does not hold. For example, for the
SYSTEMSpy process, it is shown in FDR that the assertion
SYSTEMSpy \ Σ8{| agree |} vT PRIV
does not hold, since not all traces of the PRIV process are traces of SYSTEMSpy \
Σ8{| agree |} process, i.e. traces(PRIV) * traces(SYSTEMSpy \ Σ8{| agree |}).
For example, in the case with two honest and one dishonest mix servers, the event
agree.{1, 2, 3}.M1(M1(c)), which is a possible event of PRIV, is not available in
{agree.{1, 2, 3}.M2(M1(c)), agree.{1, 2, 3}.M3(M1(c))
agree.{1, 2, 3}.M3(M2(c)), agree.{1, 2, 3}.M3(M2(M1(c))),
agree.{2, 3}.M2(M1(c)), agree.{2, 3}.M3(M1(c)),
agree.{2, 3}.M3(M2(c)), agree.{2, 3}.M3(M2(M1(c))),
agree.{1, 3}.M2(M1(c)), agree.{1, 3}.M3(M1(c)),
agree.{1, 3}.M3(M2(c)), agree.{1, 3}.M3(M2(M1(c))),
agree.{1, 2}.M2(M1(c)), agree.{1, 2}.M3(M1(c)),
agree.{1, 2}.M3(M2(c)), agree.{1, 2}.M3(M2(M1(c)))}
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which is the set of all visible events of the SYSTEMSpy \ Σ8{| agree |} process.
These assertions are sufficient for guaranteeing that the protocol terminates and
guarantees consensus among a majority of mix servers of a complete chain of
mixes in the presence of fewer than N2 mix servers that do not faithfully follow it.
These assertions are checked in FDR, in terms of considering all possible combi-
nations of honest and dishonest mix servers, with up to five mix servers in total,
and a majority of them (that is, three) being honest. In all cases, it was con-
firmed that the constructed models satisfy the specified requirements. Analysis
of some significant traces as well as how the state-space escalates when adding
an extra mix server is presented in the next section. Before proceeding to the
analysis section, it is pertinent to briefly explain why the three attacks described
in Section 8.3 do not apply here. The first attack from Section 8.3 cannot be an
attack in this section due to the broadcast manner of communication. That is, it
has been shown in this chapter that even in the case where a corrupt mix server
refuses to communicate any message within the timeout period, the robustness
requirement holds as the others carry on mixing the previously locally held mixed
message. Additionally, the second attack cannot stand successful here, as there
is no any physical board (VB in Chapter 8), but instead, the mix servers commu-
nicate their messages directly between them. Finally, the model described in this
chapter of the thesis does not rely on the integrity of a single entity, as it happens
in Chapter 8, and then the attack described in the aforementioned chapter is not
applied here.
9.4 Results and Analysis
In this section, the protocol is verified against the liveness and safety proper-
ties. As in Section 8.5, each of the traces discussed in Subsection 9.4.1, were
obtained via simulation of the models in ProBE, a CSP animator that allows a
user to explore how a process behaves. Additionally, the experimental results
presented in Subsection 9.4.2, show how the state-space of the models escalates
when increasing the number of mix servers from four to five.
9.4.1 Interesting Traces
To begin with, all mix servers are honest and in this first trace, each one times out
when sending out a new signed message. When the protocol is checked with five
honest mix servers, as expected, they all agree on the same chain of valid mixes.
Moreover, the privacy of the mixes is guaranteed. The trace below illustrates this
behaviour.
〈comm.1.{2, 3, 4, 5}.S1(M1, c), timeout,
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comm.2.{1, 3, 4, 5}.S2(M2,S1(M1, c)), timeout,
comm.3.{1, 2, 4, 5}.S3(M3,S2(M2, S1(M1, c))), timeout,
comm.4.{1, 2, 3, 5}.S4(M4,S3(M3, S2(M2,S1(M1, c)))), timeout,
comm.5.{1, 2, 3, 4}.S5(M5,S4(M4, S3(M3,S2(M2,S1(M1, c))))), timeout,
mixing success,
agree.{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.M5(M4(M3(M2(M1(c)))))〉
In fact, after the mixing success event, any subset of mix servers larger than
three can agree on any of the three candidate mixes, M5(M4(M3(M2(M1(c))))),
M4(M3(M2(M1(c)))) or M3(M2(M1(c))). In this case, M5(M4(M3(M2(M1(c)))))
will be considered the final output as it is the longest mix agreed upon by a
majority of mix servers.
More interesting traces result from checking the protocol with three honest and
two dishonest mix servers. Analysing the protocol with the two last mix servers
being dishonest leads to a larger state space, because (i) the intruder learns to
say more throughout the execution, and (ii) the honest mix servers accept longer
messages, which results in many more over time, whereby the intruder has lots
of choices about what to send in the last two rounds.
The intruder can send different messages to different mix servers or can follow the
protocol faithfully, in which case the same trace as above occurs. When the in-
truder behaves dishonestly, it is guaranteed that a sufficient number of mix servers
agree on the same output and at least one of them is honest, which means that
the privacy is satisfied. In the situation where the dishonest mix servers 4 and 5
simply time out, all of them or any subset of length four or three would agree on
the chain produced by the honest mix servers, e.g. agree.{1, 2, 3}.M3(M2(M1(c))).
This is illustrated in the trace below.
〈comm.1.{2, 3, 4, 5}.S1(M1, c), timeout,
comm.2.{1, 3, 4, 5}.S2(M2,S1(M1, c)), timeout,
comm.3.{1, 2, 4, 5}.S3(M3,S2(M2, S1(M1, c))), timeout,
timeout,
timeout,
mixing success,
agree.{1, 2, 3}.M3(M2(M1(c)))〉
A more curious behaviour is illustrated below, where the intruder acting as a
dishonest mix server 2 times out without sending any message. Later, acting as
5, he sends a valid but short message to an honest mix server, and two valid
but differing messages to the other honest mix servers. Honest mix servers 1, 3
and 4 follow the protocol faithfully: 1 constructs the initial mix, 3 mixes what it
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received directly from 1 following the timing out of 2, and 4 mixes what it got
sent from 3. Dishonest 5 then proceeds to send the valid but differing mixes to
the honest mix servers.
〈comm.1.{2, 3, 4, 5}.S1(M1, c), timeout,
timeout,
comm.3.{1, 2, 4, 5}.S3(M3, S1(M1, c)), timeout,
comm.4.{1, 2, 3, 5}.S4(M4, S3(M3,S1(M1, c))), timeout,
comm.5.{1}.S5(M5, c),
comm.5.{3}.S5(M2,S4(M4,S3(M3, S1(M1, c)))),
comm.5.{4}.S5(M5,S4(M4,S3(M3, S1(M1, c)))), timeout,
mixing success,
agree.{1, 3, 4}.M4(M3(M1(c)))〉
If the dishonest mix servers refrain from posting any partial decryptions, then, as
illustrated in the trace, the only possible output is a chain of valid mixes mixed
only by the honest mix servers. If the dishonest mix servers are willing to post
partial decryptions, then it is possible that other mixes will be agreed upon as
the final output. In this particular case, dishonest 2 and 5 are able to agree with
honest 3 (resp. 4) on the mix M2(M4(M3(M1(c)))) (resp. M5(M4(M3(M1(c)))))
and as honest 2 received a mix that was shorter than a mix previously received,
the only threshold length mix he is willing to decrypt is M4(M3(M1(c))). Con-
sequently, the privacy is maintained as each of these possible outputs include
mixing by all three honest mix servers.
A very interesting behaviour occurs when the dishonest mix servers swap valid
mixes constructed by honest mix servers with those generated by themselves.
Regarding which, the reader should note that dishonest 2 can swap a valid mix
by the first mix server with one generated by himself and send it to all honest
mix servers. Honest 3 mixes and signs what it received from the second mix
server (because it is of length greater than or equal to what was previously held)
and forwards it to the others; honest 4 then does likewise. On the other hand,
dishonest 5 replaces what it received from honest 4 with its own valid mix and
sends the corresponding complete and valid chain to the other mix servers.
〈comm.1.{2, 3, 4, 5}.S1(M1, c), timeout,
comm.5.{1}.S2(M2, c),
comm.5.{3}.S2(M2, c),
comm.5.{4}.S2(M2, c), timeout,
comm.3.{1, 2, 4, 5}.S3(M3,S2(M2, c)), timeout,
comm.4.{1, 2, 3, 5}.S4(M4,S3(M3,S2(M2, c))), timeout,
comm.5.{1}.S5(M5,S3(M3,S2(M2, c))),
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comm.5.{3}.S5(M5, S3(M3, S2(M2, c))),
comm.5.{4}.S5(M5, S3(M3, S2(M2, c))), timeout,
mixing success,
agree.{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.M5(M3(M2(c)))〉
In this case, as in the others described above, three or more mix servers agree
upon mixes of threshold length, i.e. length three or more. The best the intruder
can do is to swap valid mixes, such that the agreed output M5(M3(M2(c))) ex-
cludes the mixes of honest 1 and 4. Honest 3’s mix is still guaranteed to be a mix
within the agreed upon chain, thus maintaining privacy. It is also possible that
an agreement is made on M4(M3(M2(c))) as all mix servers also have this valid
mix, which is equal in length to M5(M3(M2(c))). Either, or both, can be agreed
upon as being the final output of the Mix Net as both mixes decrypt to the same
vector of values, only ordered differently. Moreover, both are of threshold length
and include a mix by at least one honest mix server.
Finally, to show the importance of the threshold assumption it is worthwhile
to consider what happens when a majority are dishonest. Immediately, the dis-
honest mix servers {1, 3, 5} agree on a chain, e.g. agree.{1, 3, 5}.M5(M3(M1(c))),
without a mix by an honest server and clearly, both the robustness and pri-
vacy requirements are violated. All these traces arise from the specification of
the protocol and might not have been appreciated without this formal analysis.
However, none of them breaks the requirements. The best the intruder can do is
to replace some, but not all, of the honest mix servers’ valid mixes with those of
his own.
9.4.2 State-space Explosion
Individual checks were performed for each possible instantiation of the models,
with a minority of mix servers being dishonest, with the aim being to test the
inevitability of an agree being produced. Only eight and 10 states were produced
when checking the SYSTEMALLHON model with four and five mix servers, re-
spectively. Of course, more states will be produced when adding the intruder in
the constructed models.
In the case where four mix servers were used (three honest and one dishonest),
16 different checks were performed for the SYSTEMSpy and SYSTEMSpyNoAgree
models. Four additional ones were performed in the case where the intruder con-
trols more than one mix server (those with the highest identities) and having
covered all the possible scenarios, the produced state-space is shown in Table 9.1.
In the case where five mix servers were used (three honest and two dishonest),
40 different checks were performed for the SYSTEMSpy and SYSTEMSpyNoAgree
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PPPPPPPPH,D
System SYSTEMSpy SYSTEMSpyNoAgree
RBST PRIV States RBST PRIV States
{2, 3, 4}, {1} X X 30 X X 30
{1, 3, 4}, {2} X X 70 X X 70
{1, 2, 4}, {3} X X 113 X X 113
{1, 2, 3}, {4} X X 124 X X 124
{1, 2}, {3, 4} × X 2549 × X 2549
Table 9.1: The FDR verification results for the models of the proposed Mix Net
with three honest and one dishonest mix servers.
models. Four additional checks were performed in the case where the intruder
controls more than two mix servers (those with the highest identities). How the
state-space grows, when compared to its trajectory presented in Table 9.1, is
illustrated in Table 9.2.
PPPPPPPPH,D
System SYSTEMSpy SYSTEMSpyNoAgree
RBST PRIV States RBST PRIV States
{3, 4, 5}, {1, 2} X X 1616 X X 1616
{2, 4, 5}, {1, 3} X X 2310 X X 2301
{2, 3, 5}, {1, 4} X X 2407 X X 2407
{2, 3, 4}, {1, 5} X X 2931 X X 2931
{1, 4, 5}, {2, 3} X X 8078 X X 8078
{1, 3, 5}, {2, 4} X X 21820 X X 21820
{1, 3, 4}, {2, 5} X X 14876 X X 14876
{1, 2, 5}, {3, 4} X X 198441 X X 198441
{1, 2, 4}, {3, 5} X X 288194 X X 288194
{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5} X X 1155020 X X 1155020
{1, 2}, {3, 4, 5} NA NA NA NA NA NA
Table 9.2: The FDR verification results for the models of the proposed Mix Net
with three honest and two dishonest mix servers. As the state-space increases
quickly with the number of the dishonest mix servers, it is not possible for FDR
to handle such huge states and hence, these are denoted as “NA” in the table.
Looking at the Table 9.2, it can be observed how quickly the state-space grows
when the intruder corrupts mix servers with high identities. This is because the
intruder learns, infers, can deduce and finally say many more messages due to
the fact that he receives lots of messages broadcast from the other mix servers
during the execution of the protocol.
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9.5 Challenges Faced in Modelling
The main challenge faced in this work was to identify the problem existing in an
already implemented Mix Net and then to find evidence to support the proposed
protocol. Choosing the Verificatum Mix Net as the main non robust protocol
to start with, was not a random choice. For, it is a WBB-based Mix Net that
has been already used in small scale elections in Israel and Norway, which offers
interesting properties that are not offered in other constructions, i.e. the use of
non-interactive zero knowledge proofs. In the current research, these have been
efficiently embedded into the actual messages sent among the mix servers.
Another challenge was to define only the correct messages required in the pro-
tocol. That is, the aim was to use only the necessary messages and to leave out
those that could not be sent. By so doing, this had a massive impact on the
state-space reduction and made the produced models tractable without affecting
the behaviour of the overall system. To achieve this, several functions were em-
ployed and the private function shown in Section 9.3 is a representative example.
Furthermore, the identities of the signatories in a chain of mixed messages were
required to be in strictly increasing order such that, a mix server can mix and
sign only messages coming from a preceding mix server, i.e. mix server 2 can
mix only mix server 1’s message but not 3’s. This approach helped further in
reducing the overall state-space of the model.
9.6 Summary
A formal analysis of a conventional Mix Net using CSP/FDR has been conducted.
It has been shown how to remove the need of a trusted authority during the mix-
ing phase, and instead introduce direct communication between the mix servers.
The analysis has demonstrate that the proposed Mix Net is guaranteed to termi-
nate, and output a provably valid mix agreed upon by a majority of mix servers,
as long as a majority of them act according to the protocol. Moreover, at least
one honest mix server’s mix operation is guaranteed to be included in the output
chain of mixes.
In the protocol, an intruder based on Roscoe and Goldsmith’s perfect Spy that
is able to control some minority of the mix servers was included. Moreover, this
Spy was modelled efficiently as a single entity who could corrupt a number of
mix servers, instead of creating a single process for each dishonest mix server.
Consequently, the corrupt mix servers could collaborate by sharing knowledge
between them, i.e. exchanging their secret keys. It has also been shown that
the proposed system remains free of deadlocks and infinite loops, and is guaran-
teed to output a chain of valid mixes of length at least equal to the number of
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honest mix servers. In addition, different intruder models were included and the
protocol checked against them. In all cases it has been proven that its liveness
and safety properties hold. The results of the research are in line with the data-
independence findings of Lazic and Roscoe [LR99], whereby a correct outcome
on a Mix Net with x messages applies to Mix Nets with an arbitrary number of
messages. Moreover, the number of mix servers used in this research is typical for
applications like electronic voting. As a further example of a non robust Mix Net,
in the next chapter, the Mix Net proposed by Wisktro¨m and Groth [WG06] is
modelled and formally analysed. The decision behind choosing this scheme as
well as how it differs from the work presented in this chapter are also explained.

Chapter 10
New Methods for Constructing
a Robust Mix Net
In the previous chapter, the modelling and formal analysis of a conventional
Mix Net was presented for the first time. How to remove the WBB from the
mixing phase while maintaining its notion only for publishing decrypted/agreed
messages was explained. The contribution of this chapter∗ is twofold. First, a
different and more efficient approach to modelling a conventional Mix Net from
that presented in the previous chapter is given. This new method avoids exces-
sively long messages being sent between the mix servers in any implementation of
the scheme, whilst also reducing the state-space for the model in the formal anal-
ysis. Second, by extending the work presented in the previous chapter, it will be
seen that the changes resemble the behaviour of another non-robust WBB-based
Mix Net [WG06], and a detailed comparison between them is also presented.
The aforementioned Mix Net protocol was proposed by Wikstro¨m and Groth
and for a detailed description the reader is referred to Section 5.8. However, for
convenience, a brief description of the mixing (also called Re-encryption and Per-
mutation in their work) and decryption (also called Partial Decryption) phases
are given. In the Re-encryption and Permutation phase, the mix servers, in
turn, perform a re-encryption mix on the commonly known (but locally recorded)
vector of ciphertexts. When it is a mix server’s turn to mix, it performs a re-
encryption on its local copy of the vector of ciphertexts, sorts the output vector
into lexicographical order and updates its local copy of the vector of ciphertexts,
accordingly. This is then published on theWBB and an interactive proof between
the mixer and the other mix servers takes place. When it is not a mix server’s
turn to mix, it waits until the current one communicates its re-encryption mix
and its associated proof via the WBB, subsequently updating its own local copy
∗This chapter is an extended version of the work submitted to Software and System Mod-
elling journal [SWH14] (second round of review).
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of the vector of ciphertexts only if the proof is verified.
Following the verification phase, all the mix servers participate in the Partial
Decryption phase, whereby each mix server partially decrypts its final record of
the vector of ciphertexts and submits the result to theWBB, alongside a proof of
correctness of the decryption operation. The mix servers then wait until all have
posted such information to theWBB and once they all have, they proceed to ver-
ify the correctness of these partial decryptions. In the case where all the proofs
check out, the final sorted vector of plaintext messages is computed from the full
set of partial decryptions, which forms the output of the Mix Net. However, if any
of the proofs fail, a recovery phase starts, where the honest mix servers recover
the dishonest mix server’s secret key and compute its partial decryption [WG06].
Based on how the Mix Net operates, some of its problems are highlighted. It
should be assumed that it is possible for a dishonest mix server to refuse to com-
municate at all and in this case, once it becomes its turn to mix, all other mix
servers perpetually wait to observe a message on the WBB that never arrives.
This is not an assumed behaviour of the dishonest mix server in [WG06], but
this lack of robustness is the primary concern in this chapter. However, if the
amount of time each mix server has to compute and prove a re-encryption mix
is restricted, then the protocol may easily be corrected in this regard. Moreover,
another aim of this chapter is to remove the need for the WBB beyond the Re-
encryption and Permutation phase, whilst also guaranteeing termination in the
presence of a minority of dishonest mix servers and maintaining the anonymity
of the senders.
This chapter is organised as follows. An initial part of the protocol is proposed
in Section 10.1 that concerns the removal of the WBB during the Re-encryption
and Permutation phase only. Consideration of how to remove the WBB from
the Partial Decryption phase is delayed until Section 10.4. In both Section 10.2
and Section 10.5 CSP models are constructed for analysis, with the results being
presented in Section 10.3 and Section 10.6, respectively. Section 10.7 provides
further insights into the proposed protocol and formal analysis, which involves
comparing the scheme directly with that in [WG06]. The challenges faced in
the current work and the techniques used to make the model checking in FDR
tractable are covered in Section 10.8. Finally, a conclusion to the chapter is given
in Section 10.9.
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10.1 Removing the WBB from the Mixing Phase
In this section, a Re-encryption and Permutation phase that avoids the use of the
WBB for communication between mix servers is proposed, which is guaranteed to
terminate in the presence of a dishonest minority. Upon termination of the Re-
encryption and Permutation phase the honest mix servers will all share common
knowledge of at least one mix value. The primary difference between the Re-
encryption and Permutation phase proposed in this section to those of current
Mix Nets found in the literature is that each mix server maintains its own ‘local’
record of the chain of mixes instead of maintaining a consistent global record via
the WBB.
10.1.1 Relation to Previous Work
The separation of the modelling and analysis of the protocol into two main sec-
tions (Sections 10.1 and 10.4), as well as clarifying its subtleties, mirrors the
manner in which the work was carried out. That is, an initial investigation re-
garding this work was presented in Chapter 9 (which is based on [SWH13]), in
which the removal of the WBB only from the mixing phase was considered, in
a similar manner to that presented in this section. However, there are two sig-
nificant differences between the protocol as presented here and that in Chapter 9.
Firstly, the mix servers are no longer required to continue to mix the vector of
ciphertexts after they receive a chain mixed by a majority of mix servers. Using
check messages, the current mix server will instead sign the chain of threshold
length and send this to all other mix servers to confirm the receipt of such a
chain. This avoids excessively long messages being sent between the mix servers
in any implementation of the scheme, whilst also reducing the state-space of the
model in the formal analysis, as shown in Section 10.3. Secondly, each mix server
will update its local record of the mix to mix when it receives a message that is
longer than the mix it was previously holding for this purpose. Previously, this
record was updated each time a mix was received that was at least as long as the
locally held record, whereas now the message is required to be strictly longer than
this. This also reduces the state-space in the models, as the guard that deter-
mines when the individual mix server processes change their state is strengthened.
It also became apparent when extending the work that the latter of these changes
resembled the behaviour of Wikstro¨m and Groth’s [WG06] protocol quite closely.
Regarding which, a dishonest mix server may send a chain equal in length to
the chain held locally by the other mix servers, which is proven to be a mix of
a previous mix. In this case, in both [WG06] and the protocol specified in this
section, the mix servers do not update their local record. However, in Chapter 9
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they do so because it is of equal length to the previous locally held chain and the
proofs check out. The protocol presented in this chapter is compared with the
original in more detail in Section 10.7.
In the previous chapter, some notion of a WBB was retained for publication
of the final mix data from each server. Essentially, that which remained to pub-
lish the final mix data in Chapter 9 corresponded to an assumption that after the
mix servers have done their work, the honest ones have a reliable way of getting
the permuted vector decrypted and ‘out there’. For the Partial Decryption phase
to stand a chance of being successful, all honest mix servers must share knowledge
of at least one threshold length chain upon termination of the Re-encryption and
Permutation phase, such that if they were to partially decrypt the mix associ-
ated with this chain (and possibly other mixes from other chains) at least this one
could feasibly be fully decrypted (even without participation of the dishonest mix
servers). The inevitability of the abstract synchronous agreement in this section
confirms the potential for the Partial Decryption phase to terminate successfully,
and it is from this platform that the specification of this phase is constructed in
Section 10.4.
10.1.2 Requirements
Initially, only the Re-encryption and Permutation phase is considered, and the
consequences of removing the WBB also from the Partial Decryption phase is
delayed until Section 10.4. It is the inevitability of the honest mix servers ter-
minating the Re-encryption and Permutation phase with at least one commonly
shared mix value of threshold length that will be checked in this section. This
will be modelled as the synchronous agreement of a threshold length mix that is
commonly known between a set of (at least a threshold number of) mix servers
that are willing to confirm that they know a chain associated with that mix.
10.1.3 Protocol Description
The protocol description presented here inherits the description of that presented
in Section 9.1, apart from the introduction of check messages and the new be-
haviour of the mix servers when receiving a mix chain. For this reason, in what
follows, only the differences between them are presented.
Once the chain to be mixed is beyond threshold length, the mix servers are no
longer required to perform any further re-encryption and permutation. Instead,
they send an additional signed copy of the previously received chain of threshold
length, a message which will be termed a check message. For example, in the case
that there are five honest mix servers then should the fourth receive the message
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S3(M3, S2(M2,S1(M1, c))) from mix server 3, then it will simply send the message
S4(S3(M3,S2(M2, S1(M1, c)))) to all other mix servers. Should mix server 5 receive
such a check message then it may send S5(S3(M3,S2(M2, S1(M1, c)))) acknowledg-
ing that M3(M2(M1(c))) was the first mix of threshold length that they received
even if it had not got this from mix server 3. The mix servers treat received
messages that contain mixes longer than threshold length in a similar manner
to those that do not include verifiable proofs of the Re-encryption/Permutation
operation and those that are signed by any mix server other than the current
mixer: they are ignored, by not updating the current candidate chain upon the
receipt of such messages. Once all the mix servers have had their opportunity
to mix, the Re-encryption and Permutation phase terminates and is followed by
the Partial Decryption phase, which in this section is abstracted away. The only
requirement is that upon termination the mix servers share common knowledge
of at least one mix of threshold length, for which they hold a valid proof chain.
Should this not be the case, then they do not have enough information to succeed
in the Partial Decryption, as proposed and analysed in Section 10.4.
The protocol description has thus far considered only the actions of honest mix
servers and to justify their actions, how a dishonest mix server may operate needs
to be explained. Figure 10.1 illustrates an analogy between the Byzantine Gen-
erals Problem [LSP82] and the objectives for the current Mix Net. In this classic
problem, the Byzantine Generals, some of which are traitors, communicate with
each other via messengers. Lamport et al. require that all loyal (honest) gen-
erals must reach an agreement upon the same plan of action, whilst traitorous
(dishonest) ones wish to confound them in this aim and they can send differ-
ing messages to different loyal generals in order to violate the consistency of the
received messages. Every loyal general must obtain the same vector of values
v(1), . . . , v(n) and if he is loyal, then the value that he sends must be used by
every other loyal one as that of v(i). The problem can be formulated into the
requirements of each round, in which a single general i wishes to convey his value
v(i), which is simply replicated over n rounds. In each round, general i is termed
the commander, whereas the remaining n−1 generals are termed the lieutenants.
All loyal lieutenants must be guaranteed to obey the same order, and if the com-
manding general is loyal, then each obeys the order v(i) that he sends. This
problem cannot be solved if a third or more of the generals are traitors.
The objectives here are subtly different in that the requirement is that every
honest (loyal) mix server obtains a (maybe differing) chain of at least threshold
length, e.g. Sk(Mk,Sj(Mj , Si(Mi, c))) in the case of five mix servers. Moreover,
not every honest (loyal) mix server needs to have had their permutation oper-
ation Mi included in the chain, but the inclusion of at least one of these must
be guaranteed. As long as these requirements are met, the honest mix servers
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Figure 10.1: Byzantine Generals analogy, mix servers are unable to discern hon-
esty of other mix servers: (a) Lieutenant 2 is a traitor; (b) Server 3 is dishonest;
(c) Commander is a traitor; (d) Server 2 is dishonest.
need not agree on the same chain in each round and the mix server responsible
for mixing (the commander), in any given round, does not have to be guaran-
teed that every honest one updates their toBeMixed value with the chain he sends.
A simple example, composed of two loyal generals and one traitor, serves to
demonstrate that the loyal generals are unable to agree upon a consistent plan
of action in the Byzantine Generals Problem, as illustrated in Figures 10.1 (a)
and (c). The generals assume the roles of either a commander issuing the plan
of action or a lieutenant receiving and verifying the command. In Figure 10.1
(a) Lieutenant 2 acts traitorously by communicating a plan of action different to
that received from the commander, whereas in Figure 10.1 (c) the commander is
the traitor and sends different plans of action to the two lieutenants. It is shown
that Lieutenant 1 receives the same messages in both scenarios and so cannot dis-
tinguish which of the other two generals has acted traitorously or discern which
plan of action to take.
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The Mix Net for this research exhibits an analogous behaviour but the prob-
lem that needs to be solved here does not have such extreme consequences. That
is, although it is required that upon termination of the protocol all honest mix
servers indeed agree upon a common output, the analogous value to the plan
of action is the proof chain linking the input to the output, which need not be
consistent across the different mix servers. Suppose that mix server 1 has already
sent S1(M1, c) to the other two mix servers. Then, like Lieutenant 1, mix server 1
is not able to distinguish which mix server is dishonest by observing the messages
it receives in Figures 10.1 (b) and (d), in which mix server 3 and mix server 2 act
dishonestly, respectively. In the first case, mix server 3 ignores the second mix
server’s mix and instead mixes what it received from mix server 1. In the second
case, mix server 2 only sends a mix to mix server 1 and chooses not to send
anything to mix server 3. Having received no mix from mix server 2, mix server 3
performs its mix on what it received from mix server 1. Of course, the honest
mix server 3 also sends the same message to mix server 2, but this is omitted
from Figure 10.1 (d) because it is inconsequential to mix server 1’s observations.
In each round of the proposed protocol, the mix servers need not agree on a
consistent mix, and its associated proof, but in following all of its steps they are
at least guaranteed to agree on the unique output, although potentially mixed
in different ways in the chains of proof they each receive. The aims here differ
to those of Lamport et al., so it is feasible to weaken the requirement of the
proportion of honest parties, such that only a majority of the mix servers need
to follow the protocol faithfully. That is, the requirement is that every honest
mix server obtains a chain of at least threshold length and not every mix server’s
permutation operation need be included in the chain. As the only proof chains
associated to the outputs are proven to have been mixed by at least a majority of
the servers and only a minority can act dishonestly, at least one mix is performed
by a mix server trusted not to reveal how it permuted the values. In sum, in-
stead of adapting an existing solution to the distributed consensus, which would
enable the mix servers to agree on a specific mix in each round, a new protocol is
proposed that is specific to Mix Nets, operating in a stronger threat environment
and requiring fewer messages to be sent between the servers than Lamport et
al.’s solution to the Byzantine Generals Problem.
10.2 Modelling and Formal Analysis
In this section, the processes and specifications used to model and analyse the
Re-encryption and Permutation phase of the Mix Net are presented. The proce-
dures modelling the honest and dishonest mix servers are described, which are
subsequently composed into models to be checked against the assertions given
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towards the end of this section. The complete script for the model presented in
this section can be found at http://www.tvsproject.org/csp/SoSyM sec4.csp.
10.2.1 Honest mix servers
Similar to Section 9.2, the behaviour of the honest mix servers can be split into
four phases: (i) checking before mixing ; (ii) mixing ; (iii) checking after mixing ;
and (iv) posting the results to the WBB. Again, in this case, the first mixer will
of course perform no checking before mixing and the final one will do no checking
after mixing.
Checking before Mixing. The CHKBM process models the initial phase of
checking before mixing. To avoid handling unnecessarily long chains, the external
choice ranges over any mix message MM and check messages MC . No message
involving a mix longer than threshold length is contained in either of these sets,
so the mix server blocks receipt of such messages, which can be thought of as
an abstraction that ignores such a message upon receipt. If a checker times out
before (resp. after) receiving a valid chain, then toBeMixed remains the same
(resp. is updated with the new chain if strictly longer than the last) and curr is
incremented.
CHKBM(id, curr, toBeMixed, toBeDec) =
if curr < id then
timeout→ CHKBM(id, curr+1, toBeMixed, toBeDec) 2
2
m∈{m′∈MM∪MC |
outer(m′)=curr}

recv.m→
timeout→
if #m > #toBeMixed then
CHKBM(id, curr+1,m, toBeDec ∪ {seq(m) | #seq(m) > N2 })
else
CHKBM(id, curr+1, toBeMixed, toBeDec ∪ {seq(m) | #seq(m) > N2 })

else
MIX(id, curr, toBeMixed, toBeDec)
Later, in the Partial Decryption phase, it will be important for the mix server
to know what mixes it has seen sent and received during this Re-encryption and
Permutation phase. For this purpose, toBeDec is updated each time a mix of at
least of threshold length is sent or received by id in each of the CHKBM, MIX
and CHKAM processes. The set comprehension is such that if the mix in the
sent or received message is at least of threshold length then the mix is added to
toBeDec, but otherwise toBeDec is left unchanged.
Mixing. If the mix server counter is its own, then it enters the mixing phase,
modelled by the MIX process. It performs the mixing using toBeMixed, and sends
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a new chain to the other mix servers. Should the mix associated with toBeMixed
have been mixed N2 times or fewer, then the mix server performs its re-encryption
and permutation operation and produces the new chain Sid(Mid, toBeMixed).
However, if the mix associated with toBeMixed has already been mixed by more
than N2 other mix servers, then the current one does not perform the re-encryption
and permutation operation, but instead signs toBeMixed and sends this to all
other servers. It is this message that is called the check message.
Honest mix servers do not time out before sending a message and thereafter,
each need not keep track of toBeMixed as it will not need to perform any more
mixing. The current mix server counter is incremented by one, and the mix server
continues to be involved in checking other servers’ mixes (that is, it becomes the
CHKAM process described further below).
MIX(id, curr, toBeMixed, toBeDec) =
if #toBeMixed ≤ N2 then send.Sid(Mid, toBeMixed)→timeout→
CHKAM(id, curr+1, toBeDec ∪ {seq(Sid(Mid, toBeMixed)) | #seq(Sid(Mid, toBeMixed)) > N2 })

else send.Sid(toBeMixed)→timeout→
CHKAM(id, curr+1, toDec ∪ {seq(Sid(toBeMixed)) | #seq(Sid(toBeMixed)) > N2 })

To appreciate why sending a check message is necessary, consider the case in
which there are three mix servers, only the second is dishonest, and check mes-
sages are absent. The first mix server sends S1(M1, c) to all others and the
dishonest second mix server sends S2(M2, S1(M1, c)) only to the third but not to
the first. If check messages are not required, mix server 3 need not send anything
and only a majority of mix servers are required to hold the same threshold length
mix for them to be able to decrypt the mix message. However, the first mix
server has not received any mixes of threshold length and the second is dishon-
est so need not participate in the partial decryption. In this case, no mix can
be fully decrypted and the Mix Net as a whole is unable to produce an output.
As is shown in Figure 10.2 (b), the use of check messages precludes this sce-
nario, as the first mix server receives S2(M2, S1(M1, c)) with the check message
S3(S2(M2,S1(M1, c))) being sent to him by the third mix server.
Checking after Mixing. In the checking after mixing phase, modelled by the
CHKAM process, checkers can time out before or after receiving a valid mix or
check message, in a similar manner to the previous checking phase. Once curr
exceeds the total number of mix servers, the Re-encryption and Permutation
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Figure 10.2: Behaviour of a Mix Net with and without check messages. In both
cases, mix server 2 is dishonest: (a) Mix Net without check messages; (b) Mix Net
with check messages.
phase terminates as modelled by the mixing success event and the mix server
is now ready to proceed to the Partial Decryption phase, modelled by the PST
process.
CHKAM(id, curr, toBeDec) =
if curr ≤ N then
timeout→ CHKAM(id, curr+1, toBeDec)
2 2
m∈{m′∈MM∪MC |outer(m′)=curr}
 recv.m→timeout→
CHKAM(id, curr+1, toBeDec ∪ {seq(m) | #seq(m) > N2 })

else
mixing success→ PST(id, toBeDec)
Posting onto the WBB. Following a mixing success event, the execution pro-
ceeds to the Partial Decryption phase, which is modelled by the PST process.
PST(id, toBeDec) =
2
sq∈toBeDec
post.sq → PST(id, toBeDec)
The local perspective of the honest mix server, id, is initialised with the current
mix server counter set to the first mixer, the toBeMixed parameter is set to the
unmixed value c and the record of sent and received mixes of threshold length,
toBeDec, begins as the empty set. This is illustrated in the HON SRVR process.
HON SRVR(id) = CHKBM(id, 1, c, ∅)
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A global perspective of the honest mix server does not just send and recv mes-
sages, for it is defined in terms of the connections it shares with others as well.
Hence, each send is renamed to an outgoing comm.id.P8{id}, distributing the
sent message to all mix servers other than id. Likewise, each recv is renamed to
an incoming comm.x.Z, where x is some mix server other than id, and Z is either
the singleton set containing only id or the set of all mix servers other than x.
Honest mix servers will send to everyone, whereas a dishonest one can choose
to send different messages to different mix servers or choose to send messages to
some mix servers but not others. The mix server does not know how the message
arrived: he sees the protocol only in terms of the HON SRVR process. However,
when analysing the system, which messages were distributed to whom can be seen
by synchronising the various renHON SRVR processes, which gives a view of the
protocol from a networking perspective. The post event is renamed in a simi-
lar fashion, such that groups of mix servers can synchronise on an agree event
and model the potential to perform threshold decryption, which is considered
separately in Section 10.4.
renHON SRVR = HON SRVR(id)
[[ comm.id.P 8{id}.m/send.m m ∈MM ∪MC ]]
[[ comm.x.Z.m/recv.m m ∈MM ∪MC , x ∈ P8{id}, Z ∈ R, x /∈ Z, id ∈ Z ]]
[[ agree.Z.sq/post.sq sq ∈ O, Z ∈ PP, |Z| > N2 ,#sq > N2 , id ∈ Z ]]
The final models are constructed using alphabetised parallel composition. As
things stand, if both are honest, mix server 1 will communicate with mix server 2
each time 1 sends a mix to all via comm.1.P8{1}. However, although mix server 2
is willing to receive this message, it is also willing to communicate via comm.1.{2}
as, locally, it is unable to distinguish between the two types of communication.
The alphabetised parallel composition will ensure that no events comm.1.{2} ever
occur in the model, as long as appropriate alphabets are defined. The alphabet
of the honest mix server id is defined below, where R is the set of all possible
recipients as has been defined in Section 7.4.
αHON SRVR(id) = {comm.id.Z.m|m ∈MM ∪MC , Z ∈ R, id /∈ Z}
∪ {comm.y.Z.m|m ∈MM ∪MC , y ∈ P8{id}, Z ∈ R, id ∈ Z, y /∈ Z}
∪ {agree.Z.m | m ∈MM ∪MC , Z ∈ PP, |Z| > N2 , id ∈ Z,#m > N2 }
∪ {timeout,mixing success}
A model of the Re-encryption and Permutation phase of the protocol in which
all mix servers are honest can already be composed, that is, D = ∅.
ALLHON = ‖
id∈H[αHON SRVR(id)] renHON SRVR(id)
To perform a more rigorous analysis an intruder model must be included.
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10.2.2 Dishonest mix servers
The Spy process presented in this subsection, follows accurately the construction
of the Spy described in Section 9.3. However, with respect to the messages used
in this section, minor changes are required when renaming the Spy and defining
its alphabet.
renSPY = Spy
[[ comm.x.P 8{x}.m,comm.max(D).{x}.m/learn.m,say.m m ∈MM ∪MC , x ∈ H ]]
[[ agree.Z.seq(m)/say.m m ∈MM ∪MC , Z ∈ PP, |Z| > N2 , Z8H 6= ∅,#m > N2 ]]
The intruder could be tasked with participating in the Partial Decryption phase,
abstracted to be a group agreement in this section, so the say events should also be
renamed to agree.Z events, where Z is any set of servers that contains the identity
of at least one dishonest mix server. The use of the alphabetised composition
operator ensures that the mix servers are synchronised on appropriate events.
αSPY = {comm.y.P8{y}.m|m ∈MM ∪MC , y ∈ H}
∪ {comm.x.Z.m|m ∈MM ∪MC , x ∈ D, Z ∈ R, x /∈ Z}
∪ {agree.Z.m|m ∈MM ∪MC , Z ∈ PP, |Z| > N2 , Z8H 6= ∅,#m > N2 }
Now that the processes that capture the behaviour of the honest and dishonest
mix servers have been constructed, they can be composed together for analysis.
10.2.3 Systems and Assertions
For consistency and ease of comparison with Section 9.2, three similar systems
will be developed for the analysis of the protocol, with respect to what has been
presented so far in this section. Each system involves a set of honest mix servers
that follow the protocol faithfully, and includes an intruder that has control over
a subset of mix servers, who receive any message sent to them.
If more than half of the mix servers share common knowledge of the same chain
then this decrypted chain of mixes will be considered as the final output of the
Re-encryption and Permutation phase. This output is modelled in the current
systems as a synchronous agree event among a majority of mix servers agreeing
on the output message and it is necessary to check that it is guaranteed that
some such event occurs.
Initially, the first system, SYSTEMALLHON , is constructed in which all mix servers
faithfully follow the protocol, which is precisely the same as the ALLHON process
described earlier in this section.
SYSTEMALLHON = ‖id∈H[αHON SRVR(id)] renHON SRVR(id)
10.2. Modelling and Formal Analysis 207
In the second model, which is composed of the SYSTEMALLHON with the dis-
honest mix servers, it will be possible that some chains have been received by
some mix servers, but not by others. The robustness requirement of this model,
SYSTEMSpy, is checked.
SYSTEMSpy = SYSTEMALLHON αALLHON‖αSPY renSPY
where
αALLHON =
⋃
({αHON SRVR(id) | id ∈ H})
The final system in which the intruder outputs no chain is now built, in an
attempt to stop any chain being agreed upon by a threshold of mix servers and
this is described in the SYSTEMSpyNoAgree process below.
SYSTEMSpyNoAgree = SYSTEMALLHON αALLHON‖αSPY (renSPY ‖
{|agree|}
STOP)
Robustness Check. Now, it is necessary to check whether or not the con-
structed systems satisfy the robustness requirement. The same RBST specifica-
tion process as that introduced in Section 8.2 is used and the refinement checks
are shown below.
RBST vFD (SYSTEMALLHON \ Σ8{| agree |})[[agreement/agree.X.sq |X∈PP,sq∈MM ]]
RBST vFD(SYSTEMSpy \ Σ8{| agree |})[[agreement/agree.X.sq |X∈PP,sq∈MM ]]
The same check on a model is performed in which the intruder outputs no chain,
in an attempt to stop any chain being agreed upon by a threshold of mix servers.
RBST vFD(SYSTEMSpyNoAgree \ Σ8{| agree |})[[agreement/agree.X.sq |X∈PP,sq∈MM ]]
These assertions are sufficient for guaranteeing that the Re-encryption and Per-
mutation phase of the systems terminates and provides common knowledge among
a majority of mix servers of a complete chain of mixes in the presence of fewer
than N2 mix servers that do not faithfully follow the protocol. These assertions are
checked in FDR, by considering all possible combinations of honest and dishonest
mix servers, with up to five mix servers in total, and a majority of them being
honest. In all cases FDR confirms that the proposed models satisfy the specified
requirements. Some interesting traces, resulting when analysing the systems, as
well as the produced state-space are given in the next section.
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10.3 Results and Analysis
Having verified the robustness of the Re-encryption and Permutation phase with-
out a WBB in the previous section, in Subsection 10.3.1, various traces are pre-
sented that provide insight into the emergent behaviour of the protocol. Fur-
thermore, the experimental results illustrated in Table 10.1 and Table 10.2, in
Subsection 10.3.2, show how the state-space of the models grows when increas-
ing the number of the dishonest mix servers and changing their position in the
Mix Net.
10.3.1 Interesting Traces
Each of the traces discussed in this subsection were obtained via simulation of
the models in ProBE, a CSP animator that allows a user to explore how a process
behaves. All of the traces arise from a model in which the second and fifth mix
servers act as the dishonest minority, whereas the remaining ones faithfully follow
the protocol. In this first trace, the dishonest mix servers happen to choose to
follow the protocol and the use of check messages is highlighted.
〈comm.1.{2, 3, 4, 5}.S1(M1, c), timeout,
comm.5.{1}.S2(M2,S1(M1, c)),
comm.5.{3}.S2(M2,S1(M1, c)),
comm.5.{4}.S2(M2,S1(M1, c)), timeout,
comm.3.{1, 2, 4, 5}.S3(M3,S2(M2, S1(M1, c))), timeout,
comm.4.{1, 2, 3, 5}.S4(S3(M3,S2(M2,S1(M1, c)))), timeout,
comm.5.{1}.S5(S3(M3,S2(M2,S1(M1, c)))),
comm.5.{3}.S5(S3(M3,S2(M2, S1(M1, c)))),
comm.5.{4}.S5(S3(M3,S2(M2, S1(M1, c)))), timeout,
mixing success,
agree.{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.M3(M2(M1(c)))〉
Once the intruder, acting as dishonest mix server 2, has received S1(M1, c) in the
first round, he communicates S2(M2,S1(M1, c)) to all other mix servers as speci-
fied by the protocol. It should be stated here that as the intruder is in control of
mix servers 2 and 5, he knows their secret keys as well as their secret permuta-
tion values and therefore he is able to change the order of mixing between them.
The honest mix server 3 mixes and broadcasts what it received from mix server
2, namely S3(M3,S2(M2, S1(M1, c))), which is a valid chain of threshold length
and at this point, all the mix servers have received this chain. Honest 4 does
not further mix this chain because it follows the protocol faithfully. Instead, it
signs and sends the checked chain to all other mix servers. Likewise, in the fifth
round the intruder chooses to broadcast the mix specified by the protocol and
sends S5(S3(M3,S2(M2, S1(M1, c)))) to all. Following the mixing success event,
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which signals the termination of the Re-encryption and Permutation phase, all
the mix servers agree upon the only one valid mix, M3(M2(M1(c))). Should the
mix servers proceed to the Partial Decryption phase, the fact that they have one
mix to agree upon means that this remains feasible.
In the case where the dishonest mix servers refuse to participate in the Re-
encryption and Permutation phase and simply time out before sending any mes-
sage, the honest mix servers would agree upon M4(M3(M1(c))), which is shown
in the trace below.
〈comm.1.{2, 3, 4, 5}.S1(M1, c), timeout,
timeout,
comm.3.{1, 2, 4, 5}.S3(M3, S1(M1, c)), timeout,
comm.4.{1, 2, 3, 5}.S4(M4, S3(M3,S1(M1, c))), timeout,
timeout,
mixing success,
agree.{1, 3, 4}.M4(M3(M1(c)))〉
More interesting behaviours result from those traces in which the intruder devi-
ates from the specified protocol. For instance, when he behaves dishonestly, it is
still necessary to guarantee that a sufficient number of mix servers agree on the
same output, with at least one of them being honest. A more curious behaviour,
where the intruder sends different messages to different mix servers is illustrated
below.
〈comm.1.{2, 3, 4, 5}.S1(M1, c), timeout,
comm.5.{4}.S2(M2,S1(M1, c)), timeout,
comm.3.{1, 2, 4, 5}.S3(M3, S1(M1, c)), timeout,
comm.4.{1, 2, 3, 5}.S4(M4, S2(M2,S1(M1, c))), timeout,
comm.5.{1}.S5(M5,S2(M2,S1(M1, c))),
comm.5.{3}.S5(M2,S2(M5,S1(M1, c))), timeout,
mixing success,
agree.{1, 3, 4}.M4(M2(M1(c)))〉
In the above trace, dishonest 2 mixes what honest 1 mixed but sends this valid
chain only to honest 4. Honest 3, having never received a message from mix server
2 before the timing out, mixes and signs what it received from the first mix server
and sends this to all others. At this point, honest 4 has received three different
but valid chains: one chain of length one from honest 1 and two chains of the same
length from dishonest 2 and honest 3. Faithfully following the protocol, honest 4
mixes and signs the chain received from 2, producing S4(M4, S2(M2, S1(M1, c))),
as the chain received from honest 3 was not longer than the chain received from
dishonest 2.
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A third (incomplete) trace is considered in which the third mix server is dis-
honest rather than the second. In both of the traces above and below, honest
mix server 4 receives the same messages and, as stated before, is unable to dis-
tinguish which mix server has not faithfully followed the protocol. Rather than
trying to discern this, it takes the same action in both circumstances, sending
S4(M4,S2(M2,S1(M1, c))) to all other mix servers, because S3(M3, S1(M1, c)) was
no longer than S2(M2,S1(M1, c)), received previously. This means that a dishon-
est mix server can preclude the inclusion of the mix of the honest mix server that
follows, but as it is in a minority it cannot stop the inclusion of all honest mix
servers’ re-encryption and permutation operations.
〈comm.1.{2, 3, 4, 5}.S1(M1, c), timeout,
comm.2.{1, 3, 4, 5}.S2(M2,S1(M1, c)),
comm.3.{4}.S3(M3,S1(M1, c)), timeout,
comm.4.{1, 2, 3, 5}.S4(M4,S2(M2, S1(M1, c))), timeout,
. . .〉
Returning to the previous trace to continue through to the Partial Decryption
phase, dishonest 5 ignores what it has received from honest 4, mixes the chain
received from dishonest 2 and sends different chains to honest mix servers 1 and
3, S5(M5,S2(M2, S1(M1, c))) and S5(M2,S2(M5, S1(M1, c))), respectively. Follow-
ing the mixing success event, all the honest mix servers can agree upon the same
valid mix of threshold length, M4(M2(M1(c))). However, this is not the only pos-
sible agreed mix, for mix servers 1, 2 and 5 can agree on M5(M2(M1(c))) and mix
servers 2, 3 and 5 on M2(M5(M1(c))). Regardless of which mix is used, privacy is
maintained because at least one honest mix server’s mix is included in the final
output.
In this case, as in the others, three or more mix servers agree upon mixes of
threshold length, i.e. length three or more. The best the intruder can do is
to swap valid mixes, such that the agreed output M5(M2(M1(c))) excludes the
mixes of honest 3 and 4. Honest 1’s mix is still guaranteed to be a mix within the
agreed upon chain, thus maintaining privacy. It is also possible that an agree-
ment is made on M2(M5(M1(c))) as honest mix server 4 has received a complete
proof chain associated with this mix and is willing to agree upon it with the
dishonest mix servers. Any number can be agreed to be the final output of the
Re-encryption and Permutation phase as all mixes decrypt to the same vector of
values, only being ordered differently. Moreover, all that are of threshold length
include a mix by at least one honest mix server. Most importantly, the honest
mix servers have a chain M4(M2(M1(c))) that can be fully decrypted between
them during the Partial Decryption phase even if the dishonest mix servers do
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not participate in the Partial Decryption and this is presented in the next section,.
Similar to what has been shown in the analysis of the traces in Section 9.4,
the best the intruder can do is to replace some but not all of the honest mix
servers’ mixes with valid mixes of his own.
10.3.2 State-space Explosion
This subsection covers the produced state-space when running the built systems
with four and five mix servers in total. All the checks are geared towards testing
the inevitability of an agree being produced, with a minority of mix servers being
dishonest. Only a few states were produced when checking the SYSTEMALLHON
model with four and five mix servers. Obviously, the number of states grows
quickly when increasing the number of the corrupt mix servers.
In Table 10.1, the number of states produced when checking the SYSTEMSpy
and SYSTEMSpyNoAgree are presented. As expected, this number is very small
due to the use of only one dishonest and three honest mix servers. In this case,
10 different checks were performed: eight for the case where the intruder con-
trols one mix server, and two for where he corrupts the two mix servers with the
highest identities, here 3 and 4.
PPPPPPPPH,D
System SYSTEMSpy SYSTEMSpyNoAgree
RBST States RBST States
{2, 3, 4}, {1} X 88 X 88
{1, 3, 4}, {2} X 53 X 53
{1, 2, 4}, {3} X 81 X 81
{1, 2, 3}, {4} X 97 X 97
{1, 2}, {3, 4} × 105 × 105
Table 10.1: The FDR verification results for the models of the proposed Mix Net
with three honest and one dishonest mix servers.
After adding an extra mix server, the produced state-space is shown in Table 10.2.
In a similar fashion, 22 different checks were performed: 20 for the case where
the intruder is in control of any two mix servers, and two where he corrupts more
than a threshold number (those with the highest identities).
Notably, it can be seen how the state-space climbs when the dishonest mix servers
have higher identities than the honest ones. This can be explained by the fact
that, during the execution of the protocol, they are able to learn, infer and finally
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PPPPPPPPH,D
System SYSTEMSpy SYSTEMSpyNoAgree
RBST States RBST States
{3, 4, 5}, {1, 2} X 2344 X 2344
{2, 4, 5}, {1, 3} X 1120 X 1120
{2, 3, 5}, {1, 4} X 1282 X 1282
{2, 3, 4}, {1, 5} X 1616 X 1616
{1, 4, 5}, {2, 3} X 1599 X 1599
{1, 3, 5}, {2, 4} X 1895 X 1895
{1, 3, 4}, {2, 5} X 3139 X 3139
{1, 2, 5}, {3, 4} X 8022 X 8022
{1, 2, 4}, {3, 5} X 6567 X 6567
{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5} X 10461 X 10461
{1, 2}, {3, 4, 5} X 1238424 × 1290
Table 10.2: The FDR verification results for the models of the proposed Mix Net
with three honest and two dishonest mix servers.
say more messages than when having lower identities, such as 1 or 2†. Addition-
ally, the robustness (and subsequently the privacy) of the protocol is held in this
case despite the intruder being able to decide whether or not to agree on a mix
chain. On top of this, in the case where there is more than a threshold number of
dishonest mix servers (here, three), the robustness and privacy of the protocol is
maintained when the intruder agrees on a mix chain with the honest mix servers.
That is, there is a threshold number of mix servers (including one dishonest),
which agree on the same mix chain. On the other hand, when he is not will-
ing to agree, the robustness of the system is violated, as there are insufficient
mix servers to agree on a mix chain.
Moreover, comparing the results found in this subsection with those found in
Subsection 9.4.2, it is clear that the use of check messages massively reduces the
produced state-space; however, in either case the robustness of both systems is
preserved. For example, in the case where the intruder controls mix servers 3 and
5, the number of states drops from 288,194 (see Table 9.1 in Subsection 9.4.2) to
6,567 in Table 10.2. This is a huge decrement and it is based on the fact that
no excessively long messages are now travelling between the mix servers in the
protocol. Additionally, this allows for checking the robustness of the protocol in
†However, it is shown in Table 10.2 that there are more states produced when the Spy
controls the mix servers {1,2} than when he controls {1,3}. This is because the honest mix server
3 broadcasts its messages to all others in the Mix Net and it is also able to produce check
messages, which is not possible when 2 is the first honest mix server. Hence, honest 3 broadcasts
messages of length three to the other mix servers whereas dishonest 3 can choose to send messages
of length one or two in the case where mix server 1 is dishonest and 2 is honest.
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the case where three dishonest mix servers are used, which was not possible in
Table 9.2, in Subsection 9.4.2.
10.4 Removing the WBB from the Partial Decryption
Phase
The protocol described here is an extension to the one presented in Section 10.1.
The primary aim in this section is to remove the WBB not only from the Re-
encryption and Permutation phase, but also from the Partial Decryption that
follows, in which aWBB was implicitly required in the previous section to enable
the mix servers to agree on the output of the Mix Net. Having extended the
protocol in this regard, the formal modelling and analysis is also accordingly
extended in Section 10.5. Figure 10.3, illustrates how the mix servers interact
with each other in the presence of a WBB.
10.4.1 Protocol Description
Upon completion of the Re-encryption and Permutation phase in [WG06], a single
final vector of ciphertexts, which has been re-encrypted and permuted by all mix
servers, is known to them and it is this single vector that needs to be decrypted.
The proposed protocol differs in the following respect. The mix servers are re-
quired to record all mixes of threshold length for which they have received a valid
proof chain, and will partially decrypt each of these in the Partial Decryption
phase. Moreover, all such partial decryptions are to be communicated directly
between the mix servers alongside the proof of the correctness of the partial de-
cryption operation, rather than via a WBB. This again enables a dishonest mix
server to refrain from sending a message or to send differing messages to different
mix servers, as was possible in the Re-encryption and Permutation phase of the
proposed protocol, but would not be possible in a WBB-based scheme.
The Partial Decryption phase is split into rounds such that each mix server,
in turn, sends a set of partial decryptions to all others and in each of the rounds
of this phase, the mix servers record all the partial decryptions they receive with
the aim of outputting a unique vector of plaintexts. When it is its turn to send the
partial decryption, a mix server partially decrypts each threshold length mix for
which it has a complete proof chain, using its own share of the distributed secret
key. Each of these partial decryptions is sent to all the other mix servers, and this
one must prove that the partial decryption operation was performed correctly.
For example, in a setting with three honest mix servers, P1(M2(M1(c))) denotes
the partial decryption of the mix M2(M1(c)) of threshold length, along with the
proof that the partial decryption operation was performed faithfully on this mix
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Server 1 Server 2 Server 3 WBB
Initialisation Phase
read.c
Mixing Phase
send.S1(M1, c)
recv.S1(M1, c)
check and update check and update
send.S2(M2,S1(M1, c))
recv.S2(M2,S1(M1, c))
check and update check and update
send.S3(S2(M2,S1(M1, c)))
recv.S3(S2(M2,S1(M1, c)))
check and update check and update
Partial Decryption and Output Phase
post.P1(M2(M1(c)))
post.P2(M2(M1(c)))
post.P3(M2(M1(c)))
output.{1}.M2(M1(p))
Conventional WBB-based Mix Net with New Approaches to Mixing and
Decryption Phases
Figure 10.3: Message flow in a conventional WBB-based Mix Net with three
honest mix servers and a new approach to the mixing and decryption phases.
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using mix server 1’s share of the secret key. The messages sent by the mix servers
in the Partial Decryption phase are independent of the messages they receive in
this phase: they are dependent only on what was sent and received during the
Re-encryption and Permutation phase.
When it is not their turn to decrypt, they maintain a record of the partial de-
cryptions they receive from the other mix servers. At least a threshold number,
assumed here to be a majority, of partial decryptions of the same mix can be
combined to produce a vector of plaintexts permuted as it was throughout the
Re-encryption and Permutation phase. The requirement for a mix to be used by
a mix server when calculating the output, is that it should have been partially
decrypted and sent by the mix server when it was its turn to mix as well as being
received partially decrypted by at least N2 − 1 other mix servers in the other
rounds.
As a number of differing mixes can be received in the Re-encryption and Per-
mutation phase, a number of vectors of plaintexts may be calculated by a mix
server. That is, the associated proof chains guarantee a correspondence between
the input and output vector of each mix (without revealing the correspondence
between the individual vector values), so all the decryptions will produce the
same overall output, but permuted differently in each case. Once each of these
decrypted mixes has been lexicographically sorted, they will then be equivalent
and the lexicographically ordered vector of plaintexts is the unique output of the
Mix Net, guaranteed to be agreed upon by at least all honest mix servers. Each
mix server may have a number of proof chains associated with this unique output,
as the same output could, of course, be reached via differing re-encryption and
permutation operations. In addition, the mix servers need not agree on the same
proof chain. However, in the presence of a minority of dishonest mix servers,
each honest one should at least be guaranteed to calculate the same output, and
hold at least one chain of threshold length, thus proving that the output is indeed
a decrypted permutation of the input vector of ciphertexts. This behaviour is
demonstrated in Figure 10.4, where the honest mix servers output the same mix
chain of threshold length.
10.5 Modelling and Formal Analysis
The most significant change made from Section 10.1 and from Chapter 9 is to
extend the protocol to consider the Partial Decryption phase, and remove the
WBB from it. To this end, the simple PST process from Section 10.2 is replaced
by the more involved PRT family of processes and the complete script for this
model can be found at http://www.tvsproject.org/csp/SoSyM sec5.csp.
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1
Corrupt
2 3
Initialisation Phase
read.c
Mixing Phase
send.S1(M1, c)
check and update check and update
send.S2(M2,S1(M1, c))
check and update check and update
send.S3(M3,S1(M1, c))
check and update check and update
Partial Decryption and Output Phase
send.P1(M3(M1(c)))
send.P2(M2(M1(c)))
send.P3(M3(M1(c)))
output.1.M3(M1(p))
output.3.M3(M1(p))
A New Mix Net Construction without a WBB
Figure 10.4: Message flow in the proposed Mix Net without a WBB and with a
corrupt mix server.
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In the CHKAM process from Section 10.2, mixing success will no longer be
followed by the PST process, but the newly constructed processes modelling the
Partial Decryption phase. Like the Re-encryption and Permutation phase, this
is split into three phases: (i) receiving partial decryptions before decrypting ; (ii)
sending partial decryptions; and (iii) receiving partial decryptions after decrypt-
ing. The first mixer will not receive any partial decryptions before he decrypts
and the final one will not receive any after he does so. Once curr exceeds the to-
tal number of mix servers, the Re-encryption and Permutation phase terminates,
signalled via a mixing success event, and the mix server proceeds to the ‘receiving
partial decryptions before decrypting’ phase, modelled by the PRTDBD process
below.
Receiving Partial Decryptions before Decrypting. The requirement is
that for a mix to be used by a mix server when calculating the output, it should
have been partially decrypted and sent when it is its turn to mix, being received
in this form by at least N2 − 1 other mix servers in the other rounds. As it is
not yet its turn to decrypt in PRTDBD, it is not yet required to record which
partial decryptions it has, but it is specified that it records the partial decryptions
received using the multiset partRcvd.
PRTDBD(id, curr, toBeDec, partRcvd) =
if curr < id then
timeout→ PRTDBD(id, curr+1, toBeDec, partRcvd)
2 2
m∈{m′∈MP |outer(m′)=curr}
recv.m→ PRTDBD(id, curr, toBeDec, partRcvd unionmulti {seq(m)})
else
SPRTD(id, curr, toBeDec, ∅, partRcvd)
A number of differing mixes of threshold length could conceivably be recorded in
each mix server’s toBeDec set during the Re-encryption and Permutation phase
and the requirement is that it partially decrypts all of these when it is its turn
to mix. Accordingly, when it is not its turn to do so, it must be willing to
receive multiple partial decryptions in each round and thus, curr is updated only
with each timeout. A timeout does not inevitably immediately follow receipt
of a message as it did in the Re-encryption and Permutation phase, in which
each mix server is required to perform only one re-encryption and permutation
operation. Upon receipt of a partial decryption, it is added to the partRcvd
multiset, and then PRTDBD is recursively invoked, waiting for a timeout or to
receive an additional message. Clearly, a dishonest mix server could send the same
partial decryption indefinitely and, as a consequence of timeout never occurring,
the model would not inevitably produce a required output event. To defend this
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attack, the ONCE process, with which PRTDBD synchronises, blocks the receipt
of the same message multiple times in a single round.
ONCE(partRcvd) =
timeout→ ONCE(∅)
2 2
m∈MP 8partRcvd
recv.m→ ONCE(partRcvd ∪ {m})
Blocking receipt of duplicate messages can be thought of as an abstraction of
ignoring such a message upon receipt. That is, honest mix servers are required
to have delivered all the specified messages within the time specified for the
completion of each round.
Sending Partial Decryptions. Once curr in PRTDBD becomes equivalent
to id, then it is mix server id’s turn to send its partial decryptions, as modelled
by the SPRTD process and it is necessary to record all the partial decryptions
sent by id in SPRTD, which done via partSent, a set that is initially empty.
SPRTD(id, curr, toBeDec, partSent, partRcvd) =
if |toBeDec| > 0 then
2
sq∈toBeDec
send.Pid(sq)→ SPRTD(id, curr, toBeDec8{sq}, partSent ∪ {sq}, partRcvd)
else
timeout→ RPRTDAD(id, curr+1, partSent, partRcvd)
Each mix server will have recorded all chains it sent or received during the Re-
encryption and Permutation phase that were of threshold length in toBeDec and
it is expected that partSent at the end of SPRTD will be equivalent in content to
toBeDec set at the beginning of SPRTD. Each partial decryption removes an item
from toBeDec, adding it to partSent upon the sending of each one in toBeDec,
until toBeDec contains no more elements. After the mix server has no further
partial decryptions to send, the timeout signals the end of this round, and the
mix server proceeds to wait to receive those of the next mix server, as shown in
the RPRTDAD process.
Receiving Partial Decryptions after Decrypting. Like PRTDBD, the RPRT-
DAD process allows any number of partial decryptions to be received in each
subsequent round until all mix servers have had an opportunity to send theirs
and then the Partial Decryption phase terminates. After this, the mix server
proceeds to the ‘publishing the results’ stage, modelled by the OUT process.
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RPRTDAD(id, curr, partSent, partRcvd) =
if curr ≤ N then
timeout→ RPRTDAD(id, curr+1, partSent, partRcvd)
2 2
m∈{m′∈MP |outer(m′)=curr}
recv.m→ RPRTDAD(id, curr, partSent, partRcvd unionmulti {seq(m)})
else OUT(id, partSent, partRcvd)
As SPRTD is the derivative process of PRTDBD, and RPRTDAD is a derivative
of SPRTD, then the ONCE process with which PRTDBD is synchronised also
guarantees that receipt of duplicate copies of partial decryptions will be blocked.
Publishing the Results. Once the Partial Decryption phase terminates, each
mix server is ready to publish its results, which is described by the OUT process
below. Should a partial decryption of a mix have been sent by the mix server
and received from at least N2 −1 others then it is willing to commit to this as the
output.
OUT(id, partSent, partRcvd) =
2
o ∈ {o′ ∈ O | o′ ∈ partSent, |partRcvd|o′ ≥ N2 − 1}
output.id.o→ OUT(id, partSent, partRcvd)
Any mix that it partially decrypted is guaranteed to have been taken from a com-
plete proof chain, thus proving the link between the whole vector of ciphertext
inputs to the vector of plaintext outputs across each re-encryption and permu-
tation operation, without revealing this with an individual ciphertext input and
plaintext output. This proof chain is published alongside the plaintext output,
as well as the proofs of the partial decryption operations.
A number of such vectors of plaintexts may be calculated by a mix server and
each will have arisen from an independent proof chain that it holds. All or any
of these mixes and associated proof chains can be published as the final output
and once each of the decrypted vectors of ciphertexts are lexicographically or-
dered they will all then be equivalent. In this analysis, it is simply required that
each honest mix server is guaranteed to produce at least one output event in this
manner, that is, it holds sufficient information to publish a complete proof chain
from the input vector of ciphertexts to the final vector of plaintexts.
10.5.1 Dishonest mix servers
The first addition to the process Spy is the provision of an additional deduction
rule to allow the dishonest mix servers to partially decrypt any mix of threshold
length (from the set of all possible messages of threshold length, MT ) that they
learn during the protocol. Such inferences are made on the mix associated to
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any chain of threshold length known to them using their own share of the partial
decryption key and their signing key. Recall from Section 7.4, seq(m) is a function
that given a mixed message, m, returns its mix sequence.
deductions(X ) = {({pti, ski, n},Pi(m)) |
Pi(m) ∈ X , i ∈ P, n ∈MT ∪MC , seq(n) = m}
A full decryption is made only on chains of threshold length. As each sub-chain
within a chain must be signed by a different mix server, none signed only by the
minority of dishonest mix servers will be accepted as proof of validity of an output.
Thus, the only valid outputs of the dishonest mix servers will necessarily satisfy
the privacy property and it is therefore of little interest whether a dishonest mix
server generates an output or not. What is more pertinent is whether each honest
mix server is guaranteed to produce an output. For this reason, a deduction
within the process Spy for combining a threshold number of partial decryptions
into a fully decrypted vector of outputs is not included, and there is never a
requirement to perform publish/output events. The omission of such events also
simplifies the renaming of the Spy.
renSPY = Spy[[ comm.x.P 8{x}.m,comm.max(D).{x}.m/learn.m,say.m m ∈M, x ∈ H ]]
10.5.2 Requirements and Assertions
The assertions checked in this subsection are similar to those of the previous
sections. However, the RBST process now concerns the (inevitable) ability of an
honest mix server to publish an output. Reuse of agreement would be misleading
as the mix servers are no longer required to agree on the output.
RBST = publish→ (RBSTuSTOP)
In fact, they need not agree, but instead must each be guaranteed upon termina-
tion of the protocol to hold some chain of proof, associating the vector of input
ciphertexts with the vector of output plaintexts without linking specific values
in the input and output vectors. The inevitability of an output (renamed here
to publish) by the honest mix servers has been checked. The assertion below, for
example, concerns honest mix server 1.
RBST vFD((ALLHONαALLHON‖αSPY renSPY) \ Σ8{| output.1 |})
[[publish/output.1.sq | sq ∈ O]]
In Subsection 10.2.3, two assertions were checked regarding the behaviour of the
intruder: one in which the dishonest mix servers participated on agreement, and
one in which they did not. This behaviour is now captured by the choice of what
messages they wish to send in the Partial Decryption phase. Unlike the asser-
tions in the previous section, separate checks for these two cases are no longer
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required. That is, it is not required that a dishonest mix server inevitably reaches
an output, so the assertion for these servers is redundant.
Each assertion is sufficient to guarantee that the protocol terminates and that
the honest mix server in question obtains a chain of at least threshold length that
includes at least one of the honest mix servers’ permutation operations. All such
assertions have been checked in FDR, for all possible combinations of honest and
dishonest mix servers, with up to five mix servers in total, a majority of them
being honest. In all cases, FDR confirmed that the models satisfy the specified
requirements.
10.6 Results and Analysis
Having verified the robustness of the final protocol without aWBB in the previous
section, in Subsection 10.6.1, significant traces are presented that enhance those
presented in Subsection 10.3.1. Furthermore, the experimental results presented
in Table 10.3 and Table 10.4 in Subsection 10.6.2 show how the state-space of the
models grows when increasing the number of dishonest mix servers and changing
their position in the Mix Net.
10.6.1 Significant Traces
For consistency, the traces presented in this subsection follow on from those in
Subsection 10.3.1. Again to start with, a trace in which all mix servers faithfully
follow the protocol is illustrated and the second demonstrates that an honest
mix server may be unable to distinguish which of two other mix servers have acted
dishonestly, but this does not cause the protocol to fail to meet its requirements.
Like the corresponding trace in Subsection 10.3.1, the best that the dishonest
mix servers can achieve (in some sense) is to replace an honest mix server’s mix
with a dishonest mix server’s as many times as there are such servers (assumed to
be a minority). None of the traces is a counter-example to the property checked,
as there are no failures of the protocol to meet its requirements. Instead, the aim
here is to support the reader’s understanding of the subtleties of the protocol by
exemplifying its emergent behaviours.
The first trace in Section 10.3 illustrated the behaviour of the protocol in the
case where all the mix servers follow the protocol faithfully (even the dishonest
mix servers 2 and 5), that is, they broadcast their messages and time out when
sending a new signed one. Precisely the same messages appear in this trace up
until the mixing success event, which indicates the end of the Re-encryption and
Permutation phase and the beginning of the Partial Decryption phase previously
not considered in Section 10.3.
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〈 comm.1.{2, 3, 4, 5}.S1(M1, c), timeout,
comm.5.{1}.S2(M2,S1(M1, c)),
comm.5.{3}.S2(M2,S1(M1, c)),
comm.5.{4}.S2(M2,S1(M1, c)), timeout,
comm.3.{1, 2, 4, 5}.S3(M3,S2(M2, S1(M1, c))), timeout,
comm.4.{1, 2, 3, 5}.S4(S3(M3,S2(M2,S1(M1, c)))), timeout,
comm.5.{1, 2, 3, 4}.S5(S3(M3,S2(M2,S1(M1, c)))), timeout,
mixing success,
comm.1.{2, 3, 4, 5}.P1(M3(M2(M1(c)))), timeout,
comm.5.{1, 3, 4, 5}.P2(M3(M2(M1(c)))), timeout,
comm.3.{1, 2, 4, 5}.P3(M3(M2(M1(c)))), timeout,
comm.4.{1, 2, 3, 5}.P4(M3(M2(M1(c)))), timeout,
comm.5.{1}.P5(M3(M2(M1(c)))),
comm.5.{3}.P5(M3(M2(M1(c)))),
comm.5.{4}.P5(M3(M2(M1(c)))), timeout,
output.1.M3(M2(M1(p)))〉
Upon termination of the Re-encryption and Permutation phase, a single vector of
ciphertexts M3(M2(M1(c))) is known to all mix servers and it is the unique vector
required to be decrypted. Each mix server, using its own share of the distributed
secret key, partially decrypts the mix of threshold length, broadcasts it to the
others and then times out. When possessing knowledge of a threshold number
of partial decryptions of the same chain, any of the honest mix servers holds suf-
ficient information to output the decrypted message, here M3(M2(M1(p))). As
with the traces presented in Section 10.3, privacy is maintained, as at least one
honest mix server’s mix is included in the output.
The third trace in Section 10.3 demonstrated that two dishonest mix servers
could feasibly replace two honest ones mixes with their own. It is observed that,
much like in the Byzantine Generals Problem, the honest mix server that followed
this dishonest mix server could not distinguish whether the honest or dishonest
mix server had failed to follow the protocol faithfully. In an attempt to make at
least one honest mix server fail to reach an output, dishonest mix server 5 swapped
the fourth mix server’s mix with its own and sent S5(M5, S2(M2,S1(M1, c)))
to honest mix server 1, but instead sent, S5(M2, S2(M5,S1(M1, c))) to honest
mix server 3. The fifth mix server did not send any chain to honest mix server
4. This exemplified all of the most dramatic diversions from the protocol that a
dishonest mix server could take. Following a final timeout, the successful termi-
nation of the Re-encryption and Permutation phase is signaled by the occurrence
of the mixing success event. Subsequently, unlike in the previous section, the
Partial Decryption phase begins.
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〈 comm.1.{2, 3, 4, 5}.S1(M1, c), timeout,
comm.5.{4}.S2(M2, S1(M1, c)), timeout,
comm.3.{1, 2, 4, 5}.S3(M3, S1(M1, c)), timeout,
comm.4.{1, 2, 3, 5}.S4(M4, S2(M2,S1(M1, c))), timeout,
comm.5.{1}.S5(M5,S2(M2,S1(M1, c))),
comm.5.{3}.S5(M2,S2(M5,S1(M1, c))), timeout,
mixing success,
comm.1.{2, 3, 4, 5}.P1(M4(M2(M1(c)))),
comm.1.{2, 3, 4, 5}.P1(M5(M2(M1(c)))), timeout,
timeout,
comm.3.{1, 2, 4, 5}.P3(M4(M2(M1(c)))),
comm.3.{1, 2, 4, 5}.P3(M2(M5(M1(c)))), timeout,
comm.4.{1, 2, 3, 5}.P4(M4(M2(M1(c)))), timeout,
timeout,
output.1.M4(M2(M1(p))),
output.3.M4(M2(M1(p))),
output.4.M4(M2(M1(p)))〉
In the trace above, honest mix server 1 partially decrypts both received mixes of
threshold length for which the chain of proofs check out, namely, P1(M4(M2(M1(c))))
and P1(M5(M2(M1(c)))). In continuing their attempt to cause an honest mix server
not to reach an output, the dishonest mix servers refuse to participate at all in the
Partial Decryption phase and simply time out. Honest mix server 3 then proceeds
to send P3(M4(M2(M1(c)))) and P3(M2(M5(M1(c)))) to all other mix servers.
Honest mix server 4, having seen only one mix of threshold length during the
Re-encryption and Permutation phase, partially decrypts and sends this single
message to all other mix servers, i.e. P4(M4(M2(M1(c)))).
At this stage, only one fully decrypted vector of plaintexts can be calculated
by the honest mix servers from the partial decryptions that they have received.
The honest mix servers all know the partial decryptions P1(M4(M2(M1(c)))),
P3(M4(M2(M1(c)))) and P4(M4(M2(M1(c)))), which can be combined to produce
M4(M2(M1(p))). No other output is possible because the honest mix servers do
not have a threshold number of partial decryptions of any other mixes to com-
bine. All of the honest mix servers have now obtained the fully decrypted vector
of plaintexts and hold a complete chain proving that each mixing operation was
performed as specified at each step, namely S4(M4,S2(M2, S1(M1, c))). Moreover,
at least one honest mix server is guaranteed to have contributed a mixing opera-
tion within the chain, thus maintaining the privacy requirement and the dishonest
mix servers have failed in their attempt to break the protocol by deviating from
the specification.
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However, the dishonest mix servers need not necessarily refrain from partici-
pating in the Partial Decryption phase. If dishonest mix server 2 had sent the
partial decryptions P2(M5(M2(M1(c)))) and P2(M2(M5(M1(c)))) to honest 1 and
3, respectively, instead of timing out and likewise, in the fifth round if mix server
5 had done the same, then the honest mix servers would have had sufficient infor-
mation to decrypt more vectors of plaintexts. In this case, honest mix server 1 has
seen P1(M5(M2(M1(c)))), P2(M5(M2(M1(c)))) and P5(M5(M2(M1(c)))), which is
sufficient information to calculate the mixed vector of plaintexts M5(M2(M1(p))).
Mix server 1 is of course also able to calculate M4(M2(M1(p))). These two out-
put vectors differ only in order and contain precisely the same values, because
they are proven to be mixes of the same input values and the mix servers are
abstracting from the permutations. Mix server 1 holds two proof chains prov-
ing this fact for each output, respectively, namely S5(M5,S2(M2, S1(M1, c))) and
S4(M4,S2(M2, S1(M1, c))), received during the Re-encryption and Permutation
phase. It does not matter which of the mixed vector plaintexts is chosen as the
final output, since both are proven to be decrypted mixes of the vector of input
ciphertexts. For the purpose of a verifiable electronic voting scheme, for instance,
each vector corresponds to the totality of the votes cast and would produce the
same tally.
Similarly, honest mix server 3 is willing to output either or both of the mixed
vectors of plaintexts M2(M5(M1(p))) and M4(M2(M1(p))) alongside their proof
chains S5(M2,S2(M5,S1(M1, c))) and S4(M4, S2(M2,S1(M1, c))), respectively. Un-
like honest mix server 1, honest mix server 3 did not receive sufficient information
to calculate M5(M2(M1(p))) and then, as with honest mix server 1, does not end
up knowing M2(M5(M1(p))).
On the other hand, during the Partial Decryption phase, honest mix server 4
received the message P1(M4(M2(M1(c)))) and P1(M5(M2(M1(c)))) from honest
1, as well as P3(M4(M2(M1(c)))) and P3(M2(M5(M1(c)))) from honest mix server
3. Moreover, dishonest mix servers 2 and 5 refused to send their partial de-
cryptions to honest mix server 4. Having seen only two partial decryptions of
the same mix M4(M2(M1(c))) and received S4(M4,S2(M2,S1(M1, c))) during the
Re-encryption and Permutation phase, honest 4 has enough information to com-
bine, calculate and finally output M4(M2(M1(p))). Furthermore, honest 4 cannot
sufficiently calculate M2(M5(M1(p))) and M5(M2(M1(p))), because it has never
received a threshold number of partial decryptions for these mixes.
Shifting to the Byzantine Generals Problem analogy, rather than requiring every
loyal general to obtain the same vector of values v(1), . . . , v(n), and that if the ith
General is loyal, then the value that he sends must be used by every loyal general
10.6. Results and Analysis 225
as the value of v(i), the objectives were subtly different. That is, the requirement
was that every honest (loyal) mix server obtains a (maybe differing) chain (at
least) of threshold length, e.g. Sk(Mk, Sj(Mj ,Si(Mi, c))) in the case of five mix
servers. The true output of each mix server is the lexicographical ordering of
the vector of decrypted plaintexts, which is guaranteed to precisely match and
what possibly differs between the honest mix servers is the chain proving that
this lexicographically ordered vector of plaintexts was correct.
10.6.2 State-space Explosion
An individual check was performed for each possible instantiation of the model,
with a minority of mix servers being dishonest, testing the inevitability of an out-
put being produced by a specific honest mix server. Only a few states were pro-
duced when checking the SYSTEMALLHON model with four and five mix servers,
respectively. For the case where three mix servers are honest and one is dishon-
est, 26 different models were checked for SYSTEMSpy and SYSTEMSpyNoAgree.
Two extra checks were performed for the case where the intruder controls two
mix servers, those with the highest identities. The produced state-space for each
check is illustrated in Table 10.3.
XXXXXXXXXXXH,D,H
System SYSTEMSpy SYSTEMSpyNoAgree
RBST States RBST States
{2, 3, 4}, {1}, {2} X 154 X 154
{2, 3, 4}, {1}, {3} X 151 X 151
{2, 3, 4}, {1}, {4} X 142 X 142
{1, 3, 4}, {2}, {1} X 140 X 140
{1, 3, 4}, {2}, {3} X 134 X 134
{1, 3, 4}, {2}, {4} X 125 X 125
{1, 2, 4}, {3}, {1} X 284 X 284
{1, 2, 4}, {3}, {2} X 269 X 269
{1, 2, 4}, {3}, {4} X 223 X 223
{1, 2, 3}, {4}, {1} X 586 X 586
{1, 2, 3}, {4}, {2} X 524 X 524
{1, 2, 3}, {4}, {3} X 462 X 462
{1, 2}, {3, 4}, {1} × 942 × 942
{1, 2}, {3, 4}, {2} × 930 × 930
Table 10.3: The FDR verification results for the models of the proposed Mix Net
with three honest and one dishonest mix servers. The third element in the first
column of this table specifies the identity of the mix server for which the in-
evitability of an output is tested.
Similarly, for the case where three mix servers are honest and two are dishonest,
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64 different models were checked in total. In one, the first two mix servers were
honest and the third reported its outputs. A second was constructed with the
same honest and dishonest servers, but in which the fourth mix server reported
its output and then, another was developed in which the first and third were
dishonest with the second reporting its outputs, and so forth. All checks verified
the inevitability of an output by the mix server in question, regardless of the
behaviour of the dishonest mix servers. The produced state-space for each check
is illustrated in Table 10.4.
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XXXXXXXXXXXH,D,H
System SYSTEMSpy SYSTEMSpyNoAgree
RBST States RBST States
{3, 4, 5}, {1, 2}, {3} X 4855 X 4855
{3, 4, 5}, {1, 2}, {4} X 4700 X 4700
{3, 4, 5}, {1, 2}, {5} X 4297 X 4297
{2, 4, 5}, {1, 3}, {2} X 4427 X 4427
{2, 4, 5}, {1, 3}, {4} X 4034 X 4034
{2, 4, 5}, {1, 3}, {5} X 3493 X 3493
{2, 3, 5}, {1, 4}, {2} X 11106 X 11106
{2, 3, 5}, {1, 4}, {3} X 10341 X 10341
{2, 3, 5}, {1, 4}, {5} X 7249 X 7249
{2, 3, 4}, {1, 5}, {2} X 21469 X 21469
{2, 3, 4}, {1, 5}, {3} X 18857 X 18857
{2, 3, 4}, {1, 5}, {4} X 16001 X 16001
{1, 4, 5}, {2, 3}, {1} X 31706 X 31706
{1, 4, 5}, {2, 3}, {4} X 27361 X 27361
{1, 4, 5}, {2, 3}, {5} X 22910 X 22910
{1, 3, 5}, {2, 4}, {1} X 95122 X 95122
{1, 3, 5}, {2, 4}, {3} X 80156 X 80156
{1, 3, 5}, {2, 4}, {5} X 55910 X 55910
{1, 3, 4}, {2, 5}, {1} X 318380 X 318380
{1, 3, 4}, {2, 5}, {3} X 237092 X 237092
{1, 3, 4}, {2, 5}, {4} X 194590 X 194590
{1, 2, 5}, {3, 4}, {1} X 329228 X 329228
{1, 2, 5}, {3, 4}, {2} X 304262 X 304262
{1, 2, 5}, {3, 4}, {5} X 184634 X 184634
{1, 2, 4}, {3, 5}, {1} X 660509 X 660509
{1, 2, 4}, {3, 5}, {2} X 573047 X 573047
{1, 2, 4}, {3, 5}, {4} X 372981 X 372981
{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5}, {1} X 1039450 X 1039450
{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5}, {2} X 892693 X 892693
{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5}, {3} X 745936 X 745936
{1, 2}, {3, 4, 5}, {1} NA NA NA NA
{1, 2}, {3, 4, 5}, {2} NA NA NA NA
Table 10.4: The FDR verification results for the models of the proposed Mix Net
with three honest and two dishonest mix servers. As the state-space increases
quickly with the number of the dishonest mix servers, it is not possible for FDR
to handle such huge states and hence, these are denoted as “NA” in the table.
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10.7 Relation to Wikstro¨m and Groth’s Scheme
In this section it is demonstrated how the proposed protocol was arrived at from
the starting point of that of Wikstro¨m and Groth in [WG06], after solving the
additional challenges faced when replacing theWBB in their protocol with direct
communication between the mix servers. To start with, it is contended that a
couple of changes made to reduce the state-space of the system are not major dif-
ferences between the protocols and do not arise from removing the WBB, which
allows for comparison with regards to the more pertinent changes in a consistent
setting. Next, the consequences of replacing the WBB with direct communica-
tions between mix servers in Wikstro¨m and Groth’s protocol are described and
the specific aspects of the proposed protocol(s) that circumvent these issues are
identified. Following this, it is demonstrated that the changes made do not sig-
nificantly alter the behaviour of the protocol and thus it is valid to compare it
to that of Wikstro¨m and Groth, but this time replacing direct communications
between the mix servers with a WBB. The comparisons drawn in this section
serve to justify the design decisions made to adapt their protocol to solve chal-
lenges raised by removing the need for a WBB during the Re-encryption and
Permutation phase and subsequently, the Partial Decryption phase.
10.7.1 Minor Differences
An initial minor difference between the schemes for this research and the WBB-
based Mix Net presented in [WG06] is what happens in the case where a dishonest
mix server refuses to participate in the Re-encryption and Permutation phase. As
noted in Subsection 10.4.1, Wikstro¨m and Groth require the other mix servers to
wait indefinitely to receive a message from this dishonest mix server, so the whole
Mix Net process stops without producing an output. Clearly, limiting the time
allowed to post their mix to the WBB would suffice to ensure the Re-encryption
and Permutation phase terminated successfully, but still using the WBB. Addi-
tionally, the mix servers would not update their local copy of the current mix, just
as if the dishonest mix server had sent a message containing a mix of something
other than the previous mix.
A second minor difference in the protocol proposed in Subsection 10.4.1 is that
the mix servers are no longer required to perform any further re-encryption and
permutation when the chain reaches the threshold length. This avoids excessively
long messages being sent between the mix servers in any implementation of the
scheme, whilst also reducing the state-space of the model in the formal analy-
sis. In an implementation of Verificatum [Wik14], Wikstro¨m makes the same
assumption, and the Re-encryption and Permutation phase stops when the chain
of mixes is long enough. Additionally, in [Wik05a] he explains why a majority
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of mix servers is needed to shuﬄe and decrypt the ciphertexts. When a chain
of threshold length has been received, as it has been mixed by a majority of
mix servers and only a minority are assumed to be dishonest, then it is guaran-
teed that at least one honest mix server has performed the Re-encryption and
Permutation phase. As the honest mix servers will not share how they mixed
with anyone else, then no one can gain sufficient information to link individual
values in the input vector of ciphertexts to individual values of the output vector
of plaintexts. Neither of these changes is of significance for the main issue of
attempting to remove the WBB from the design. In what follows, a comparison
between the schemes is made assuming that each protocol includes timeouts and
that each allows the mix servers to stop when they construct a mix chain of
threshold length.
10.7.2 Significant Differences
The most important difference between the Mix Net construction presented in
[WG06] and the current scheme, as presented in Sections 10.1 and 10.4, is the
replacement of a WBB with direct communications between the mix servers.
In a WBB-based Mix Net, it is the communication medium (broadcast chan-
nel) between the mix servers and once a vector of ciphertexts is published there,
all the participants have the same view of it. Hence, what a mix server posts
onto the WBB is potentially seen, verified and checked by everyone and con-
sequentially, dishonest mix servers cannot send differing messages to different
mix servers. When the WBB is removed and instead, the requirement is that
the mix servers communicate directly, dishonest ones can send differing mixes
to different mix servers, thus causing them to record differing local copies of the
current mix.
Consider an example with four mix servers, of which only the first is dishon-
est. Mix server 1 mixes the initial vector of ciphertexts in three different ways,
each of which are proven to be a mix of the initial vector of ciphertexts. He sends
M1(c) to mix server 2, M
′
1(c) to mix server 3 and M
′′
1(c) to mix server 4. At
this point each honest mix server has a different but valid copy of the current
mix, which would not have been possible in the original protocol, as the same
message was broadcast via the WBB to all mix servers. Honest mix server 2 en-
ters the mixing phase, mixes what dishonest 1 mixed, updates its local copy with
M2(M1(c)) and sends it to all. Honest 3 and 4 simply disregard this message and
do not update toBeMixed because, according to them, M2(M1(c)) is not a mix of
their local copies M′1(c) and M′′1(c), respectively. In the next round, honest 3
is in charge of mixing and sends M3(M
′
1(c)) to all others. As before, none of
the honest mix servers updates its locally held copies with this mix. The same
procedure is followed when mix server 4 is responsible for mixing and at this
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point, all honest mix servers have different chains of length two in their records.
To avoid this, changes have been made to what messages are passed between the
mix servers and the decision procedure specifying when they should update their
local copy of toBeMixed value.
There are more substantial differences in the Partial Decryption phase between
the proposed protocol and that of Wikstro¨m and Groth. The most significant
difference is that in [WG06] all the mix servers are required to participate in
this phase in order to decrypt the one final vector of ciphertexts (output of the
Mix Net), as it is the last posted on the WBB. The dishonest mix servers need
to participate in the recovery phase even if they did not post a partial decryption
or an invalid one. Each mix server waits for all partial decryptions to appear on
the WBB and then, the verification process starts, where each mix server checks
the validity of the posted partial decryptions. When a dishonest mix server posts
an invalid partial decryption to the WBB and its verification fails, the honest
mix servers collude together to reconstruct the dishonest server’s share of the
secret key and compute its partial decryption.
A WBB-based version of the second protocol is quite similar to [WG06], because
each mix server is willing to partially decrypt one chain of threshold length. This
is because the mix servers do not mix a chain that exceeds the threshold length
and there is only one chain of that length posted on the WBB. The proposed
protocol differs in this respect, because the mix servers are required to record
all different chains of exactly threshold length for which they have received a
valid proof chain. That is, a threshold number of them is required to partially
decrypt each of these chains, for at least this number of partial decryptions of
the same mix can be combined to produce a vector of plaintexts permuted as it
was throughout the Re-encryption and Permutation phase.
Following the Opposite Route. Now the opposite route is followed when
comparing the proposed protocol with that of Wikstro¨m and Groth, whereby this
time direct communications between the mix servers is replaced with a WBB in
order to highlight the similarities. The major effect of putting the current scheme
in the WBB environment is the fact that the local copies held by the mix servers
can no longer differ as different mixes cannot be sent to different ones. Moreover,
the longer chain of mixes that they receive will typically be a mix of the previous
one, so in effect there is little difference between the proposed schemes and that
of [WG06] in this setting. That is, they still meet the requirements and they are
similar to Wikstro¨m and Groth’s.
The only occasion when the chain received is not a mix of the previous one in this
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WBB setting is when it is longer, as illustrated in the following example. Honest 1
posts S1(M1, c) to theWBB, whilst dishonest 2 times out before posting anything
and dishonest 3 posts S3(M3, S2(M2,S1(M1, c))). All other mix servers will accept
this mix because it is larger than the previous locally held. It is obvious from
the fact that mix server 3 posted to the board something mixed by mix server 2
without the latter posting to the board, that neither of the mix servers 2 and
3 has faithfully followed the protocol. Nonetheless, the proposed protocol, as
specified, satisfies its requirements in aWBB environment in spite of this curious
behaviour and such behaviour is not possible in Wikstro¨m and Groth’s scheme
as each chain posted must be proven to be a mix of that previously held.
10.7.3 Modelling the Protocol in a WBB Environment
The primary property of the WBB being utilised in [WG06] is the fact that it
enables the honest mix servers to maintain a common local record of the most
recent mix, reading it as they do from the Web Bulletin Board. As such, it can
be considered as a broadcast channel that forces the mix servers to relay the
same message to all others and only a minor change would need to be made
to the model to consider the proposed protocol in the setting of communication
between the mix servers via a WBB, rather than using direct communication.
The dishonest mix server, rather than being able to send different messages to
different ones, would instead be forced to send the same message to all, which
would be achieved by a subtle renaming of the honest and dishonest mix server
processes.
In the renSpy process, each say event is renamed to comm.max(D).P8{max(D)},
which means that the Spy is now forced to broadcast the mixed message instead
of sending it to the singleton set {x}, where x is the identity of some honest
mix server. Similarly, during the Partial Decryption phase, the intruder, using the
highest identity of the corrupt mix servers, broadcasts the decrypted mix message
and this is described by the renaming of the say event to output.max(D).seq(m).
renHON SRVR(id) =HON SRVR(id)
[[ comm.id.P 8{id}.m/send.m m ∈M ]]
[[ comm.x.P 8{x}.m/recv.m m ∈M, x ∈ P8{id} ]]
[[ out.me.sq/post.sq sq ∈ O,#sq > N2 ]]
The only change required in the renHON process, is to redefine the way an honest
mix server receives a message from another. Recall from Subsection 10.2.1, each
recv event in the renHON process was renamed to an incoming comm.x.Z. In
contrast, here, each recv event is renamed to an incoming comm.x.P8{x}, which
means that the same message has been sent to all mix servers.
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renSPY = Spy[[ comm.x.P 8{x}.m,comm.max(D).P 8{max(D)}.m/learn.m,say.m m ∈M, x ∈ H ]]
[[ out.max(D).seq(m)/say.m m ∈M,#m > N2 ]]
10.8 Challenges Faced in Modelling
In this chapter, the CSP code has been presented in an intuitive manner, such
that the processes modelling the honest mix servers closely resemble the protocol
description. The aim was to aid the reader’s understanding of what information
was necessary to record at each step of the protocol by the honest mix servers by
parameterising the processes with sets and multisets where pertinent, e.g. toBe-
Dec, partRcvd and partSent. In practice, this is not the optimal manner in which
to encode such behaviour in CSPM (the input language of FDR) when model
checking using FDR.
In [Ros10, Ros98], an intuitively constructed process Spy(X ) is presented, which
is parameterised by the current set of all known facts. A second process Spy, as
originally presented in [RG97], is encoded differently to suit model checking in
FDR, although it is semantically equivalent. That is, Spy is encoded as a parallel
composition of one two-state process for each learnable fact in which internalised
infer events are performed and the compression function chase is utilised to in-
crease the speed of the model checking of the confluent nature of the inference of
knowledge, without affecting the results of the checks. Should a state be reached
in the process being compressed with one or more outgoing τ transitions, the
chase operator selects one to traverse immediately [Ros10]. As the process is
divergence free, it will keep selecting a single τ from each state to traverse until
a stable state is reached. The other possible paths from the process, those that
take external or internal actions other than the single internal action taken at
each intermediate state, are never considered.
Similarly, a model with semantically equivalent behaviour to that presented in
this chapter has been encoded using a considerable amount of parallel composi-
tion of processes with few states, and similar compression techniques have been
utilised to those in [RG97]. This has enabled model checking of the proposed
protocol against its requirements, whilst avoiding the impossible amount of pre-
computation that would be performed by FDR should the CSPM encoding syn-
tactically match that presented in this chapter. Such disparities between CSP,
as presented to the CSPM models, are only syntactic differences and are required
only to make the model checking tractable. One final difference made with the
same reasoning is that the checks have been across the honest mix servers. That
is, rather than requiring all honest mix servers to calculate their outputs from
the partial decryptions known to them at the end of the protocol, this is required
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only for a single honest mix server. Separate checks in which each of the honest
mix servers are made to ensure the produced outputs are performed indepen-
dently, such that each individual check becomes tractable, but this is not true
when checking a combined model.
10.9 Summary
A formal analysis of a Mix Net, using CSP and FDR, has been conducted. It
has been shown how to remove the need for a trusted authority during the Re-
encryption/Permutation and Partial Decryption phases, and instead, introduce
direct communication between the mix servers. The analysis has demonstrated
that the proposed Mix Net is guaranteed to terminate, with the vector of output
plaintexts known to all honest mix servers as long as a majority of them act
according to the protocol.
Like other Mix Nets that aim to unlink the correspondence of individual val-
ues in a vector of input ciphertexts to the corresponding values of a vector of
output plaintexts, the proposed Mix Net provides a complete proof chain to each
honest mix server verifying that each Re-encryption/Permutation and Partial De-
cryption operation was performed faithfully. Moreover, at least one honest mix
server’s Re-encryption and Permutation is guaranteed to be included in the proof
chain, thus assuring that no single mix server has sufficient information to link
an input to an output. However, unlike other Mix Nets of this kind, the current
does not guarantee that the same proof chain is shared by all the honest mix
servers. Nevertheless, this does not break the requirements of the protocol, since
the outputs are equivalent except for their ordering, so they will be the same when
sorted lexicographically. This is a subtle consequence of the way in which the
Mix Net has been adapted here to work in a more hostile communication environ-
ment, in which dishonest mix servers have the potential to send differing mixes
to different mix servers. In modelling the capabilities of a dishonest minority of
mix servers that need not follow the protocol, Roscoe and Goldsmith’s perfect
Spy has been adapted. In addition, via a simple renaming of the Spy process,
it has been possible to model the Byzantine fault-like behaviour of the dishonest
mix servers, rather than the Dolev-Yao attacker under consideration in [RG97].
To introduce such an attacker that has full control of the network [DY81] and
that could intercept and block every message, would clearly violate robustness.
The aim was to be explicit about all of the subtleties of the protocol and to
apply sufficient rigour in ensuring its robustness. Its presentation was separated
into two parts: first, removing theWBB from the Re-encryption and Permutation
phase; and secondly, removing theWBB from the subsequent Partial Decryption
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phase. This, along with the traces illustrated in Sections 10.3 and 10.6 and
the comparisons to the Byzantine Generals Problem and Wikstro¨m and Groth’s
Mix Net in Sections 10.1 and 10.7, respectively, was used to illustrate the chal-
lenges faced in removing the WBB as well as to justify the design decisions when
facing them. The format of the messages, the decision procedure regarding what
previous mix each mix server should perform its Re-encryption and Permutation
operation upon, and the specification of what evidence each honest mix server
is expected to hold upon termination, were all key to ensuring that the protocol
would satisfy its requirements. The large amount of complex interactions, result-
ing from the inherent concurrent nature of the protocol, justifies the novel use
of CSP and FDR for its analysis, which is as important a contribution as the
protocol itself. In Section 10.4 it was explained how the proposed protocol was
inspired by that of Wikstro¨m and Groth in [WG06] and involved addressing the
additional challenges faced in an environment in which dishonest mix servers can
send differing messages to different ones.
Conclusion to Part III
This part of the thesis has provided solid and novel work regarding the modelling,
formal analysis and automated verification of three different Mix Net implemen-
tations in CSP/FDR, and the need for a rigorous treatment of Mix Nets has been
illustrated. It is important to analyse their security properties before using them,
as they play a significant role in building commercial applications and many con-
structions in the extant research have been broken into after they were introduced.
The Ximix Mix Net will be used in the first real and large-scale electronic elec-
tions in Victoria State, Australia, in November 2014 and those researchers in-
volved with this have reported that its robustness has been automatically veri-
fied. However, it has been shown that this Mix Net does not satisfy its desired
requirements and in this part of the thesis a successful method has been proposed
that will make it robust. That is, a new method has been introduced that re-
moves the need for a central authority, specific only to Ximix, and instead allows
direct communication among its mix servers.
Regarding the two original proposals in [Wik14, WG06] and in Section 5.8 and 5.9,
both of them satisfy the safety and liveness requirements, but under some strong
and unrealistic assumptions. To address this, two additional Mix Net schemes
have been modelled for the current research and it has been proven that their
desired requirements are met. In this regard, the first scheme presents a novel
Mix Net protocol which is derived from existing work on WBB-based Mix Nets.
However, there is one important difference: the presented model does not contain
a central entity for data sharing (WBB), which can be used by the mix servers
to synchronise with each other. Instead, the effect of a broadcast communication
has been implemented. The advantage of this approach is that the new protocol
no longer has a single point of failure (the WBB), because each mix server can
communicate to the others directly. The key importance of this work is that it
can be applied to all Mix Nets of this category.
The second scheme builds on the previous scheme and presents a more efficient
way for achieving the robustness requirement. More precisely, the current pro-
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posal extends that work by proposing an improved version of the protocol that
avoids unnecessary mixes of ciphertexts’ vectors and updates of local records.
The contribution of this work has been extended by the proposal of a new proto-
col that totally removes the need for theWBB from the partial decryption phase.
In both these cases, in order to ensure that the protocols work correctly, the as-
sumption that the majority of the involved mix servers are not compromised has
been employed and although this can be difficult to guarantee in practical appli-
cations, it is safer than in models with a single point of failure.
Regarding the verification, different assertions were checked to guarantee that
the protocols terminate and provide the appropriate output vector of plaintext
messages, given that the majority of the mix servers faithfully follow the pro-
tocol. Furthermore, a number of significant traces, which were generated via
simulation in ProBE, have also been analysed. Additionally, data on the perfor-
mance and the cost of the model checking have been presented, thus allowing for
a thorough investigation of the scalability of the protocols, which is an important
contribution as this has demonstrated applicability to real world examples.
Part IV
Conclusion and Future
Research Directions
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Chapter 11
Conclusion
In this chapter, the results that were achieved in this thesis are summarised, the
limitations of this work that have been identified are presented and the future
research directions that might be useful to focus upon are put forward.
In this thesis, novel work regarding the modelling, formal analysis and auto-
mated verification of different real Mix Net implementations using the process
algebra CSP [Hoa78] and its associated model checker FDR [TGR13, GRABR14]
has been provided. Moreover, the objective of increasing the rigour of such pro-
tocols through analysis of the models has been successfully met. Since Mix Nets
play an important role in constructing commercial applications such as [GJJS04,
Tor14b, Adi08, RP05, AR06, BCH+12a], where the anonymity and verifiability
are of primary concern, the absence of their formal analysis in the extant research
has been an unfortunate omission. The work presented in this thesis successfully
bridges this gap as a rigorous treatment of Mix Nets has been given. Further-
more, due to the fact that many Mix Net proposals have been broken into after
they were introduced, it is important to analyse their desired security properties
before using them. To this end, in this thesis, formal definitions of the crucial
privacy and liveness properties have been given and the Mix Net protocols have
been verified against them. Should a Mix Net fail to meet these requirements,
FDR automatically generates traces indicative of such failures.
In order for the modelling and analysis to stand successful, the underlying crypto-
graphic primitives were treated in a formal way, based on symbolic terms, which
enabled assessment as to whether the protocols alone fail to meet their require-
ments. This is a common approach found in the literature and the Needham-
Schroeder Public Key (NSPK) [NS78] protocol has been a classic one for the
proposed methods of analysis. Consequently, it has been the foundation of per-
forming such analysis in the Mix Net protocols in this thesis. However, as such
protocols implement complex distributed algorithms and the analysis of the con-
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current interactions between the components in full detail is hard to achieve with
manual techniques, automated verification has been employed. Additionally, in
order to perform a rigorous analysis of the Mix Net protocols, an active intruder
model, based on Roscoe and Goldsmith’s Spy [RG97, Ros98], was included. The
Spy was modelled efficiently as a single entity who could corrupt a number of
mix servers (peers), instead of creating a single process for each corrupt one.
Consequently, the corrupt peers could collaborate by sharing knowledge, i.e. ex-
changing their secret keys, and trying to exclude other mix servers that follow
the protocol faithfully.
This is the first research to compose formal models for real implementation of
Mix Nets, with the aim being to be explicit about all of the subtleties of the
analysed protocols and to apply sufficient rigour in ensuring their safety and ro-
bustness. In this regard, formal modelling and verification of different Mix Net
implementations have been described and conducted. More precisely, it was
demonstrated in Chapter 8 that the January 7th 2014 version of the source code
for the Ximix Mix Net [Xim14] relies on a single point of trust, which sends in-
structions to the mix servers to perform specific operations and therefore, does
not satisfy its liveness and safety requirements in the case that it is corrupted or
unavailable. To address this issue, methods that make it robust have been pro-
posed along with the modifications that are needed in order to satisfy them. That
is, the reliance on the single entity has been replaced by direct communication
between the mix servers and it was shown that in the revised Ximix, the elec-
tion does not rely on the integrity of a single component, but instead distributes
the trust among them. To scrutinise the analysis further, a number of different
attacks, based on the aforementioned intruder model, were included and across
a number of examples for different corruption scenarios, the automated verifica-
tion demonstrated that the revised Ximix guarantees completion and produces a
provably valid output in the presence of dishonest components.
The novelty of the work presented in Chapter 9, is the proposal, construction
and analysis of a new Mix Net, which was inspired by the Verificatum [Wik14]
protocol. In contrast to Ximix, where each peer maintains its own local board
for posting the received messages and the whole execution being dependent on
the integrity of an external component, here, the mix servers communicate with
each other via a trusted and centralised board, with all having the same common
view of the messages posted there. However, although this is a widely accepted
approach, it has been contended in this thesis that this is a strong unrealistic
assumption that all proposals in the extant literature fall foul to. Having high-
lighted the main problems occurring in such Mix Nets, methods were proposed
to remove the dependency on the trustworthiness of this component and to allow
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corrupt peer(s) to deviate from the protocol without affecting the correctness of
the final outcome. Additionally, the experimental results showed the soundness
of the methods put forward and that the number of peers used is typical for
applications like electronic voting.
Having created a flexible framework to model and analyse the privacy and ro-
bustness requirements of conventional Mix Nets in Chapter 9, a different and
more efficient approach to modelling such Mix Nets was presented in Chapter 10.
It was demonstrated that the new method avoids excessively long messages being
sent between the mix servers in any implementation of the scheme, whilst also
reducing the state-space for the model in the formal analysis. Second, by extend-
ing the work presented in Chapter 9, it was seen that the changes resembled the
behaviour of another non-robust Mix Net [WG06].
Regarding the verification, for each of the implementations being analysed, differ-
ent assertions were checked to guarantee that the protocols terminate (complete)
and provide the appropriate output vector of plaintext messages in cases when
the majority of the mix servers faithfully follow the protocol. Furthermore, in
order to demonstrate their correctness, a number of significant traces generated
via simulation in ProBE, were also analysed. Additionally, data on the perfor-
mance and the cost of the model checking were presented, thus allowing for a
thorough investigation of the scalability of the protocols, which is an important
contribution as this has demonstrated applicability to real world examples.
11.1 Limitations
The FDR verification results for the models of the analysed Mix Nets in Ta-
bles 8.3, 8.4, 9.2 and 10.4, illustrate that the produced state-space increases
quickly with the number of the corrupt mix servers and that it is not possi-
ble for FDR to handle it. However, this is a common problem that all model
checkers suffer from. Moreover, although automated analysis has been shown to
be a successful approach in model checking in this thesis, as proved by finding
counter-examples for a failure of the protocol requirement, proving directly that
the systems meet the claimed properties would need an infinite-state model. In
this regard, it should pointed out that all the used sets in this work are finite
and that the produced models deal only with finite sets of facts. Although this
does not impact on the modelling of the protocols, it does on their verification,
because FDR cannot handle sets of infinite number of facts, i.e. it cannot handle
an infinite number of states.
Staying with the state-space explosion problem, the way that FDR works in
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building in advance the whole state-space and then exploring those states needed
for the specified refinement check, makes it difficult for some systems, specifically
in Section 8.5, to run with four mix servers. In this case, a more sophisticated and
efficient construction of the used “Visible Board”, VB, could solve this problem.
In its current implementation, when a new element is posted onto the VB, it is
added in an associated set, which consists of elements of the same type. It is
easy to understand that as the cardinality of such sets increases, FDR struggles
in performing calculations. More precisely, in the case with four mix servers, and
depending on the intruder’s ability to compose a number of different partially de-
crypted messages, the cardinality of such a set varies from 15 to 20, which means
the number of all possible subsets varies from P(15) ' 32K to P(20) ' 1M . A
more efficient approach in implementing the VB, would be to handle each of these
sets as an individual process, as implemented in Roscoe’s seminal peg solitaire
case study [Ros98]. Then, the VB would be defined in terms of the parallel com-
position of all these processes.
Turning to the necessary assumptions and abstractions made in this thesis, it
should be noted that it would not be possible to model the Mix Net implementa-
tions completely, if some parts had not been abstracted away. It has been stated
in Part I, that by abstracting away from the underlying cryptographic primitives
and reasoning that the message exchange alone is not open to attack, there can
be confidence that the security objectives will be achieved if the encryption is
suitably robust. When modelling the Mix Net protocols in this thesis, the typical
approach to security properties was adopted, whereby cryptographic primitives,
such as digital signatures, encryption and decryption, are treated as symbolic op-
erations with the appropriate algebraic properties. In this context, it is assumed
that the decisional Diffie-Hellman [DH76] assumption is a computationally hard
problem and only the owner of a secret key can decrypt a message encrypted with
the corresponding public key. Additionally, each component in these protocols is
modelled as an individual process alongside its own alphabet, which is a standard
technique when modelling complex systems consisting of subsystems interacting
with each other. Moreover, all the communications between the participants are
synchronous and over authenticated channels. Hence, due to these abstractions,
the attacks that may be caused by them have not been covered in the analyses
of Mix Nets in this thesis.
11.2 Future Research Directions
There are several directions which can broaden research on the analysis of Mix Net
implementations.
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Firstly, when modelling the capabilities of a dishonest minority of mix servers that
need not follow the protocol, Roscoe and Goldsmith’s perfect Spy was adapted.
That is, via a simple renaming of the Spy process, it was possible to model the
Byzantine fault-like behaviour of the dishonest mix servers rather than the Dolev-
Yao attacker under consideration in [RG97, Ros98]. To introduce a Dolev-Yao
attacker that has full control of the network [DY81], and that could intercept and
block every message, would clearly violate robustness. It is therefore of interest
to consider to what extent the assumptions made about the threat environment
can be relaxed whilst still maintaining the properties checked in this work. For
example, it may be pertinent to replace the current synchronous communication
between the honest mix servers with asynchronous communication over resilient
channels in the manner proposed in [WdRF12]. In this case, the intruder can
intercept a message sent between the honest mix servers and delay it from arriv-
ing, but cannot indefinitely block the message’s receipt, as long as the recipient is
always willing to receive it. However, there remains outstanding work regarding
the scaling of the approach found in [WdRF12] to cover the proposed models.
Additionally, the framework presented in this thesis for the modelling and anal-
ysis of certain Mix Net properties, could be extended to analyse other important
security requirements, such as fairness, which in the voting context, means that
no party can learn any information regarding the final outcome prior to the of-
ficial tally. Specifically in relation to this thesis, the question raised is whether
any partial decrypted result could be posted onto a publicly accessible site by
corrupt mix server(s), and how it can be manipulated by the intruder. This
property has been used by Kremer and Ryan in [KR05] to analyse the Fujioka et
al. [FOO92] voting system, but their verification was performed in the presence of
an ideal Mix Net and was not fully automated. A roadmap to model this property
tailored to Mix Nets, could be based on Schneider’s formal verification [Sch98]
of the Zhou-Gollmann protocol [ZG96], and Wei and Heather’s CSP/FDR ap-
proach [WH05, WH06], which embeds liveness properties in fair non-repudiation
protocols.
Furthermore, one of the methods of making Mix Nets robust in Part III of the
thesis is to limit the time required for an honest mix server to perform its cryp-
tographic operations before sending the mixed messages to the next mix server.
The approach taken was to introduce an abstract “timeout” value for synchroni-
sation, sufficiently large enough for an honest mix server to complete its work and
send the result out. Although this approach has been proven successful in this
thesis, and since Mix Nets are used in real-life applications, it would be of greater
interest to replace the symbolic timeout with continuous time, as introduced in
Timed-CSP [RR86, RR89, Sch99]. However, the addition of times to events and
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processes in the presence of the WAIT t statement, makes everything become
infinite and consequently makes the automatic verification more problematic.
Another area that deserves further attention for future analysis, concerns the
theoretical enhancements presented in this thesis. Although abstraction of the
cryptographic primitives allowed for successful modelling and analysis of the
Mix Net protocols, the question of whether such protocols run on unbounded
networks is still remains unanswered and to address this, the assumptions made
about cryptography in the first part of the thesis could be relaxed. For example,
the operations made on messages are currently restricted to encryption, decryp-
tion and signing; they could be further extended to include hash functions and
timestamps. In this regard, by extending the entailment relation, as presented in
Section 2.1, what deductions the intruder can make in order to take advantage
of the relevant cryptographic properties can be elicited.
Moreover, another fertile area for future research in Mix Nets is to consider their
standardisation. Regarding which, since there are numerous of Mix Net propos-
als in the literature and most of them follow a different approach in achieving
their security requirements, the need for them being standardised is obvious. A
characteristic example showing this need was illustrated in Chapter 8, where the
approach taken to implement Ximix was to combine a number of research papers.
Hence, the consequence of following this technique is that its correctness relies
on the developers and how they interpret and implement the research proposals.
This leads to Mix Net constructions that are supposed to satisfy their security
properties, but often deviate from the original research proposals and generate
ambiguities. The belief here is that in the presence of a Mix Net standard, these
opacities can be avoided.
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